A Toronto 501 and a Helsinki 1010 are both the `tram` mode. Only one of
them is called a tram by the people who ride it, and the detection label
is documented as "what a person standing at the stop would call it".
So the mode stays shared — same silhouette, same speed limits — and a
registry entry may carry `modeWords` naming the modes it runs. Everything
without an override falls through to the shared table, so this renames one
word for one operator and nothing else.
Threading the feed to the detection metric needed a resolver in queries.js,
since the cached-contact path has only the entry. It answers from live feeds
first, so a feed disabled mid-session stops supplying vocabulary.
TTC BusTime publishes keyless GTFS-Realtime VehiclePositions with real
coordinates for the surface network: ~1,180 buses and streetcars with
bearing and per-vehicle timestamps. Registering it is one registry row.
The subway is deliberately absent. BusTime covers surface vehicles only
and the subway publishes no positions, so Lines 1/2/4 are left out rather
than inferred from schedules — the same rule that keeps NYCT out.
Route numbers establish the mode: the three-digit 500-series is streetcar,
as are the four Blue Night routes on streetcar trackage. A leading 5 alone
would misclassify bus routes 50-59, so the rule is anchored and tested.
Licensing is the portal-wide Open Government Licence - Toronto; the CKAN
record for the BusTime NVAS dataset leaves its own licence field blank,
and the terms note says so rather than overstating the grant.
Refs #70
The layer recorded failure in a single `_error` string. Every city feed is
fetched independently, so one retired operator set that flag for the whole
layer — and the only code that cleared it ran on a successful *activation*,
which `runProximityCheck` skips for a city that already has rendered points.
A dead feed that re-entered camera range therefore set the flag on every
camera move and nothing ever cleared it: a permanent LOAD FAILED over a map
drawing every other city's stations.
Failure is now tracked per city in `_failedCityIds`, and `getStats()` reports
it only when the failures left nothing to draw. A city that recovers removes
its own entry rather than waiting for a neighbour to succeed.
This was reachable only because Buffalo sits 95 km from Toronto, inside the
100 km activation radius — the one dead city in the registry with a healthy
neighbour in range. The other four failed alone, where LOAD FAILED with an
empty map reads as correct, which is why the latch went unnoticed.
Probing all 33 registry systems found five dead. Three had moved and are
repointed: Reddy Bikeshare (Buffalo) to Social Bicycles, Tugo (Tucson) and
Trinity Metro (Fort Worth) to PBSC, all verified serving stations. Two are
dropped because the systems wound down rather than moved — Broward B-cycle
404s at every documented endpoint, and CoGo's replacement Lyft feed publishes
zero stations with status last reported in March 2025. `gbfs.cogobikeshare.com`
no longer resolves, so its allowlist entry goes too.
All 31 remaining systems were verified live, and every registry URL was
checked against the proxy host and path allowlists.
Toronto runs the same PBSC platform as the Austin, Honolulu and
Chattanooga systems already in the registry, and publishes the identical
GBFS v2 endpoint pair under `toronto.publicbikesystem.net`. The proxy
allowlist already admits the host through its `*.publicbikesystem.net`
wildcard and the paths end in the expected `station_information.json` /
`station_status.json`, so the system needs no new plumbing — only the
registry entry that names it.
Verified against the live feeds: 1,069 stations in both documents, all
1,069 joining on `station_id`. The layer reads `num_bikes_available`,
which Toronto populates normally, so availability renders without a
vendor-specific mapping. It does not populate the standard
`num_bikes_available_types`, reporting per-type counts under PBSC ids
(ICONIC/BOOST/EFIT/ASTRO) instead; nothing reads that field today, and
this entry deliberately does not translate it rather than adding a
mapping with no consumer.
The center is downtown at 43.6532, -79.3832 with the group's 90 km load
radius. The stations span roughly 37 km east-west, from Etobicoke to
Scarborough, so a tighter radius would drop the outer ends on a downtown
pan.
The new registry test is the reason this was cheap to be sure about: it
holds every city's feed URLs against the same host and path predicates
the proxy enforces, so a city the proxy would silently refuse now fails
the suite instead of rendering an empty layer.
Credited to Bike Share Toronto (Toronto Parking Authority). The City's
open-data package declares no licence and the feed publishes no
`license_url`, so it is treated as attribution-only, like the other GBFS
operators, rather than claiming a licence that was never granted.
The pack shipped a flat 90 m. Sampling a DEM at all 336 camera sites puts
the network between 76 m (Queens Quay) and 209 m (Keele & Steeles), mean
116 m: a median error of 14 m against the old value, 88 m at the 90th
percentile and 119 m at worst, with the Allen Road cameras — 170-197 m —
the furthest underground.
No constant fits a city with that much relief; the precomputed ground
heights are what place a camera properly, and until this pack has them the
prior is the fallback for a sidecar miss or an edited pose. The mean is at
least wrong in both directions rather than only one.
This value is not part of the served pose, so it changes no pose hash and
invalidates no precomputed entry.
The province's 511 pack covers Ontario's highways; this adds the municipal
network underneath it — roughly 336 cameras across downtown arterials plus
the Gardiner, DVP, Allen and Lake Shore, from the City's own open data.
The list is keyless and carries no frame URL, so frame URLs are built from
the convention the dataset documents (`CameraImages/loc####.jpg`) and a
camera number validated as plain digits. The frame proxy is therefore
pinned to the portal origin by construction rather than by trusting a
field. The list fetch refuses redirects, bounds the body it buffers, and
releases the transport on every rejection path.
The dataset publishes no camera facing. `D1`-`D4` look like a compass and
map trivially onto one, but they describe the *comparison* images — static
reference stills captured in 2016 and served from a different path — not
the live pan-tilt-zoom frame. A heading derived from them would be
confidently wrong for every camera in the city, so every camera takes the
shared id-hash fallback at low confidence, as headingless Austin, TfL,
Fintraffic and Calgary cameras do. A test pins that down so it is not
"fixed" later.
Names stay verbatim: the feed's labels are upper-case, and title-casing
would mangle MCCOWAN RD and ST HELEN'S AVE more often than it helped.
Carries the Open Government Licence – Toronto attribution the licence
requires. Disable with `CCTV_TORONTO_ENABLED=0`.
Cliff Flood