The build context excluded only .env, so .env.local and the like or
pinokio/ENVIRONMENT would be baked into image layers; exclude every dotenv
file except .env.example, plus local state and QA output. Pin the base to
CI's Node 24.14.0 by digest, default to the image's node user, and correct
the HOST comment. Log the trusted peers as the operator's when set. README
notes that MCP and ChatGPT sign-in voice are unavailable under Docker, and
how to trust no gateway when widening the publish.
Two findings from PoBruno's Docker Engine on Linux run (#208), and one from
re-running the suite in the container after rebasing:
- The launcher pinned its own allowedHosts, including '.local'. Vite reads a
leading dot as a suffix match, so `Host: anything.local` reached the page and
the data proxies. Main has since moved the policy into build/allowedHosts.js,
which drops suffix entries on purpose and applies before the app's routes, so
the launcher's override is deleted rather than patched. As a side effect
GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS now also works from `.env`, as it does under `npm run dev`.
- A checkout the container cannot write - typically a clone made as root on a
NAS or Proxmox host - made Save Keys answer 500 and never created .gev-cache,
with nothing logged. The launcher now warns at start, naming the owner, the
ids it runs as, and the two fixes.
- On Docker Desktop the bind-mounted repo always shows an owner other than the
container user, so git refuses it as "dubious ownership" and the tests that
shell out to git fail (src/data/bundledJson.test.mjs, new on main). The image
now marks /app, and only /app, as a safe directory.
Verified in a container on this base: `anything.local` 403 on the page and on
/api routes, localhost 200, GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS honoured from the environment and
from .env, the warning on a root-owned /app run as 1000:1000, and
bundledJson.test.mjs 6/6.
Reported-by: PoBruno
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Docker delivers the host's own browser to the container from the container
network's gateway, never from 127.0.0.1, so the loopback-only admission gate
answered every POWER UP request with 403 and no key could be saved. The README
and CHANGELOG claimed otherwise; both are corrected here.
- keySetupCore: GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS, an exact-address list (no
wildcards, prefixes or hostnames) admitted alongside loopback. Unset trusts
nothing, and the sharing, Host, Origin, Content-Type and proxy-header checks
all still apply to a listed address. Twelve assertions pin each refusal.
- scripts/docker-start.mjs: the container entry point, shaped after
scripts/pinokio-start.mjs. It reads the default gateway from /proc/net/route,
trusts exactly that address, and starts Vite. No gateway (--network none)
trusts nothing. The pure helpers are unit-tested and a contract test pins the
Dockerfile CMD and the loopback-only publish.
- Dockerfile: install git. `npm test` builds fixtures with `git init`, so the
suite failed 71 tests inside the image and the README's claim that it runs in
the container was wrong.
- SECURITY.md and .env.example document the setting and why it is safe only
behind a 127.0.0.1 publish; README gains the Linux/NAS id note and .dockerignore
drops macOS AppleDouble sidecars, both reported on the PR.
Verified in Docker on a clean build: saving a key from the panel writes the
bind-mounted .env (0600 in the container), it survives `compose down`/`up`, and
REMOVE comments it back out. A foreign Origin, a foreign Host, a proxy header
and a sibling container on the same network are each refused. `npm run doctor`,
`npm test` (5067 passed, 1 skipped, 0 failed) and `npm run build` are green
inside the container.
Reported-by: @jklaze
Co-Authored-By: Bogdan Petrut <[email protected]>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Said