fix(docker): defer to main's Host allowlist and name an unwritable checkout

Two findings from PoBruno's Docker Engine on Linux run (#208), and one from
re-running the suite in the container after rebasing:

- The launcher pinned its own allowedHosts, including '.local'. Vite reads a
  leading dot as a suffix match, so `Host: anything.local` reached the page and
  the data proxies. Main has since moved the policy into build/allowedHosts.js,
  which drops suffix entries on purpose and applies before the app's routes, so
  the launcher's override is deleted rather than patched. As a side effect
  GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS now also works from `.env`, as it does under `npm run dev`.
- A checkout the container cannot write - typically a clone made as root on a
  NAS or Proxmox host - made Save Keys answer 500 and never created .gev-cache,
  with nothing logged. The launcher now warns at start, naming the owner, the
  ids it runs as, and the two fixes.
- On Docker Desktop the bind-mounted repo always shows an owner other than the
  container user, so git refuses it as "dubious ownership" and the tests that
  shell out to git fail (src/data/bundledJson.test.mjs, new on main). The image
  now marks /app, and only /app, as a safe directory.

Verified in a container on this base: `anything.local` 403 on the page and on
/api routes, localhost 200, GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS honoured from the environment and
from .env, the warning on a root-owned /app run as 1000:1000, and
bundledJson.test.mjs 6/6.

Reported-by: PoBruno
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
SM-26andClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-10-10 19:48:02 +02:00
1 parent 1c6c291774
commit 79a6a0db5c
4 files changed
+51 -32

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+5
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@@ -12,6 +12,11 @@ WORKDIR /app
# `npm test` builds fixtures with `git init`, so the suite cannot run in a
# container without it (71 failures on node:24-slim, all ENOENT on git).
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# The repo is bind-mounted, so inside the container it can show an owner other
# than the user the container runs as - always, on Docker Desktop. git then
# refuses it as "dubious ownership", which fails the tests that shell out to
# git. It is the user's own checkout, so trust that one path.
RUN git config --system --add safe.directory /app
COPY package.json package-lock.json ./
RUN npm ci
+33 -18
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@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
* routing table and declares exactly that one address trusted, then starts
* Vite the way scripts/pinokio-start.mjs does.
*/
import { readFileSync, realpathSync } from 'node:fs';
import { accessSync, constants, readFileSync, realpathSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';
import path from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import { isDirectInvocation } from './pinokio-install.mjs';
@@ -19,8 +19,6 @@ import { loadViteFromCanonicalRoot } from './pinokio-start.mjs';
const MODULE_PATH = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
const ROOT = realpathSync(path.resolve(path.dirname(MODULE_PATH), '..'));
const ROUTE_TABLE = '/proc/net/route';
/** Host names the native launcher accepts; the container matches it. */
const LOCAL_ALLOWED_HOSTS = Object.freeze(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '.local']);
/**
* Extract the IPv4 default gateway from Linux `/proc/net/route` text. The
@@ -63,21 +61,21 @@ export function resolveTrustedPeers({ env = process.env, routeTable = '' } = {})
}
/**
* Host headers this container answers to. A wildcard bind is unavoidable
* inside a container, but build/vite.js reads that as "allow every Host"
* (allowedHosts: true), dropping the DNS-rebinding protection `npm run dev`
* keeps. The published port only ever delivers the host's own browser, so pin
* the same names the native launcher uses, and still honour an operator's
* GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS so a LAN hostname stays addable here too. See issue #21.
* @param {NodeJS.ProcessEnv} [env]
* @returns {string[]}
* A checkout the container cannot write fails quietly: Provider Settings
* answers 500 and `.gev-cache` is never created, with nothing in the log. The
* usual cause is a clone made as root on a NAS or Proxmox host while the
* container runs as 1000:1000. Say so at start, naming both sets of ids.
* @param {{root: string, writable: boolean, owner: {uid: number, gid: number}, runAs: {uid: number, gid: number}}} input
* @returns {string|null} A warning, or null when the checkout is writable.
*/
export function resolveAllowedHosts(env = process.env) {
const configured = String(env.GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS ?? '')
.split(',')
.map((host) => host.trim())
.filter(Boolean);
return [...new Set([...LOCAL_ALLOWED_HOSTS, ...configured])];
export function unwritableRootWarning({ root, writable, owner, runAs }) {
if (writable) return null;
return (
`[Docker] ${root} is owned by ${owner.uid}:${owner.gid} but the container runs as ` +
`${runAs.uid}:${runAs.gid}, so saving keys and caching will fail. Either give ` +
`the checkout to that user (chown -R ${runAs.uid}:${runAs.gid} on the host) or ` +
`run as its owner (env UID=${owner.uid} GID=${owner.gid} docker compose up)`
);
}
function readRouteTable() {
@@ -89,6 +87,24 @@ function readRouteTable() {
}
async function start() {
let writable = true;
try {
accessSync(ROOT, constants.W_OK);
} catch {
writable = false;
}
if (!writable) {
const { uid, gid } = statSync(ROOT);
console.warn(
unwritableRootWarning({
root: ROOT,
writable,
owner: { uid, gid },
runAs: { uid: process.getuid?.() ?? -1, gid: process.getgid?.() ?? -1 },
}),
);
}
const trustedPeers = resolveTrustedPeers({ routeTable: readRouteTable() });
if (trustedPeers) {
// Set before Vite is imported: the dev server snapshots process.env during
@@ -109,7 +125,6 @@ async function start() {
host: '0.0.0.0',
port,
strictPort: true,
allowedHosts: resolveAllowedHosts(),
},
});
await server.listen();
+9 -13
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@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import test from 'node:test';
import {
defaultGatewayFromRouteTable,
resolveAllowedHosts,
unwritableRootWarning,
resolveTrustedPeers,
} from '../scripts/docker-start.mjs';
@@ -56,18 +56,14 @@ test('an operator list wins, and no gateway trusts nothing', () => {
assert.equal(resolveTrustedPeers({ env: {}, routeTable: '' }), '', 'loopback-only when there is no gateway');
});
test('the container answers the same host names as the native launcher', () => {
assert.deepEqual(resolveAllowedHosts({}), ['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '.local'], 'a wildcard bind never means "any Host header"');
assert.deepEqual(
resolveAllowedHosts({ GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS: ' globe.lan , nas.internal ' }),
['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '.local', 'globe.lan', 'nas.internal'],
'an operator can still add a LAN hostname',
);
assert.deepEqual(
resolveAllowedHosts({ GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS: ' , localhost , ' }),
['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '.local'],
'blank and duplicate entries change nothing',
);
test('an unwritable checkout is named at start instead of failing quietly', () => {
const ids = { owner: { uid: 0, gid: 0 }, runAs: { uid: 1000, gid: 1000 } };
assert.equal(unwritableRootWarning({ root: '/app', writable: true, ...ids }), null, 'a writable checkout says nothing');
const warning = unwritableRootWarning({ root: '/app', writable: false, ...ids });
assert.match(warning, /owned by 0:0/, 'names the owner');
assert.match(warning, /runs as 1000:1000/, 'names the ids the container runs as');
assert.match(warning, /chown -R 1000:1000/, 'offers handing the checkout to the container user first');
assert.match(warning, /env UID=0 GID=0 docker compose up/, 'or the env form, which bash does not ignore');
});
test('the Docker install path keeps its loopback-only, launcher-owned contract', () => {
+4 -1
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@@ -141,7 +141,10 @@ const LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set(['127.0.0.1', '::1', '::ffff:127.0.0.1']);
*/
function isTrustedPeerAddress(remoteAddress, env) {
const normalize = (value) =>
String(value || '').trim().toLowerCase().replace(/^::ffff:/, '');
String(value || '')
.trim()
.toLowerCase()
.replace(/^::ffff:/, '');
const address = normalize(remoteAddress);
if (!address) return false;
return String(env?.GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS || '')