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https://github.com/bilawalsidhu/gods-eye-view.git
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fix(docker): defer to main's Host allowlist and name an unwritable checkout
Two findings from PoBruno's Docker Engine on Linux run (#208), and one from re-running the suite in the container after rebasing: - The launcher pinned its own allowedHosts, including '.local'. Vite reads a leading dot as a suffix match, so `Host: anything.local` reached the page and the data proxies. Main has since moved the policy into build/allowedHosts.js, which drops suffix entries on purpose and applies before the app's routes, so the launcher's override is deleted rather than patched. As a side effect GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS now also works from `.env`, as it does under `npm run dev`. - A checkout the container cannot write - typically a clone made as root on a NAS or Proxmox host - made Save Keys answer 500 and never created .gev-cache, with nothing logged. The launcher now warns at start, naming the owner, the ids it runs as, and the two fixes. - On Docker Desktop the bind-mounted repo always shows an owner other than the container user, so git refuses it as "dubious ownership" and the tests that shell out to git fail (src/data/bundledJson.test.mjs, new on main). The image now marks /app, and only /app, as a safe directory. Verified in a container on this base: `anything.local` 403 on the page and on /api routes, localhost 200, GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS honoured from the environment and from .env, the warning on a root-owned /app run as 1000:1000, and bundledJson.test.mjs 6/6. Reported-by: PoBruno Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
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@@ -12,6 +12,11 @@ WORKDIR /app
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# `npm test` builds fixtures with `git init`, so the suite cannot run in a
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# container without it (71 failures on node:24-slim, all ENOENT on git).
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RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
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# The repo is bind-mounted, so inside the container it can show an owner other
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# than the user the container runs as - always, on Docker Desktop. git then
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# refuses it as "dubious ownership", which fails the tests that shell out to
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# git. It is the user's own checkout, so trust that one path.
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RUN git config --system --add safe.directory /app
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COPY package.json package-lock.json ./
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RUN npm ci
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+33
-18
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
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* routing table and declares exactly that one address trusted, then starts
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* Vite the way scripts/pinokio-start.mjs does.
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*/
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import { readFileSync, realpathSync } from 'node:fs';
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import { accessSync, constants, readFileSync, realpathSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';
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import path from 'node:path';
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import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
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import { isDirectInvocation } from './pinokio-install.mjs';
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@@ -19,8 +19,6 @@ import { loadViteFromCanonicalRoot } from './pinokio-start.mjs';
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const MODULE_PATH = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
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const ROOT = realpathSync(path.resolve(path.dirname(MODULE_PATH), '..'));
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const ROUTE_TABLE = '/proc/net/route';
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/** Host names the native launcher accepts; the container matches it. */
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const LOCAL_ALLOWED_HOSTS = Object.freeze(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '.local']);
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/**
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* Extract the IPv4 default gateway from Linux `/proc/net/route` text. The
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@@ -63,21 +61,21 @@ export function resolveTrustedPeers({ env = process.env, routeTable = '' } = {})
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}
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/**
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* Host headers this container answers to. A wildcard bind is unavoidable
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* inside a container, but build/vite.js reads that as "allow every Host"
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* (allowedHosts: true), dropping the DNS-rebinding protection `npm run dev`
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* keeps. The published port only ever delivers the host's own browser, so pin
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* the same names the native launcher uses, and still honour an operator's
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* GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS so a LAN hostname stays addable here too. See issue #21.
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* @param {NodeJS.ProcessEnv} [env]
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* @returns {string[]}
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* A checkout the container cannot write fails quietly: Provider Settings
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* answers 500 and `.gev-cache` is never created, with nothing in the log. The
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* usual cause is a clone made as root on a NAS or Proxmox host while the
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* container runs as 1000:1000. Say so at start, naming both sets of ids.
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* @param {{root: string, writable: boolean, owner: {uid: number, gid: number}, runAs: {uid: number, gid: number}}} input
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* @returns {string|null} A warning, or null when the checkout is writable.
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*/
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export function resolveAllowedHosts(env = process.env) {
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const configured = String(env.GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS ?? '')
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.split(',')
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.map((host) => host.trim())
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.filter(Boolean);
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return [...new Set([...LOCAL_ALLOWED_HOSTS, ...configured])];
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export function unwritableRootWarning({ root, writable, owner, runAs }) {
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if (writable) return null;
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return (
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`[Docker] ${root} is owned by ${owner.uid}:${owner.gid} but the container runs as ` +
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`${runAs.uid}:${runAs.gid}, so saving keys and caching will fail. Either give ` +
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`the checkout to that user (chown -R ${runAs.uid}:${runAs.gid} on the host) or ` +
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`run as its owner (env UID=${owner.uid} GID=${owner.gid} docker compose up)`
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);
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}
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function readRouteTable() {
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@@ -89,6 +87,24 @@ function readRouteTable() {
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}
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async function start() {
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let writable = true;
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try {
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accessSync(ROOT, constants.W_OK);
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} catch {
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writable = false;
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}
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if (!writable) {
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const { uid, gid } = statSync(ROOT);
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console.warn(
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unwritableRootWarning({
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root: ROOT,
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writable,
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owner: { uid, gid },
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runAs: { uid: process.getuid?.() ?? -1, gid: process.getgid?.() ?? -1 },
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}),
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);
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}
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const trustedPeers = resolveTrustedPeers({ routeTable: readRouteTable() });
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if (trustedPeers) {
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// Set before Vite is imported: the dev server snapshots process.env during
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@@ -109,7 +125,6 @@ async function start() {
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host: '0.0.0.0',
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port,
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strictPort: true,
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allowedHosts: resolveAllowedHosts(),
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},
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});
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await server.listen();
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@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
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import test from 'node:test';
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import {
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defaultGatewayFromRouteTable,
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resolveAllowedHosts,
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unwritableRootWarning,
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resolveTrustedPeers,
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} from '../scripts/docker-start.mjs';
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@@ -56,18 +56,14 @@ test('an operator list wins, and no gateway trusts nothing', () => {
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assert.equal(resolveTrustedPeers({ env: {}, routeTable: '' }), '', 'loopback-only when there is no gateway');
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});
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test('the container answers the same host names as the native launcher', () => {
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assert.deepEqual(resolveAllowedHosts({}), ['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '.local'], 'a wildcard bind never means "any Host header"');
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assert.deepEqual(
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resolveAllowedHosts({ GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS: ' globe.lan , nas.internal ' }),
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['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '.local', 'globe.lan', 'nas.internal'],
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'an operator can still add a LAN hostname',
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);
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assert.deepEqual(
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resolveAllowedHosts({ GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS: ' , localhost , ' }),
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['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '.local'],
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'blank and duplicate entries change nothing',
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);
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test('an unwritable checkout is named at start instead of failing quietly', () => {
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const ids = { owner: { uid: 0, gid: 0 }, runAs: { uid: 1000, gid: 1000 } };
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assert.equal(unwritableRootWarning({ root: '/app', writable: true, ...ids }), null, 'a writable checkout says nothing');
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const warning = unwritableRootWarning({ root: '/app', writable: false, ...ids });
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assert.match(warning, /owned by 0:0/, 'names the owner');
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assert.match(warning, /runs as 1000:1000/, 'names the ids the container runs as');
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assert.match(warning, /chown -R 1000:1000/, 'offers handing the checkout to the container user first');
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assert.match(warning, /env UID=0 GID=0 docker compose up/, 'or the env form, which bash does not ignore');
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});
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test('the Docker install path keeps its loopback-only, launcher-owned contract', () => {
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@@ -141,7 +141,10 @@ const LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set(['127.0.0.1', '::1', '::ffff:127.0.0.1']);
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*/
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function isTrustedPeerAddress(remoteAddress, env) {
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const normalize = (value) =>
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String(value || '').trim().toLowerCase().replace(/^::ffff:/, '');
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String(value || '')
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.trim()
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.toLowerCase()
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.replace(/^::ffff:/, '');
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const address = normalize(remoteAddress);
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if (!address) return false;
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return String(env?.GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS || '')
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