Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream/main' into i18n-spanish

2026-11-04 02:14:01 +00:00 · 2026-10-16 02:18:19 +02:00
commit e82e7a3dd4
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# Keep keys and local state out of the build context: compose bind-mounts the
+# checkout at run time, so the image never needs them.
+.git
+node_modules
+dist
+.env
+.env.*
+!.env.example
+**/ENVIRONMENT
+pinokio/ENVIRONMENT
+pinokio/.installed
+.gev-cache
+.gev-logs
+qa-artifacts
+qa-shots
+screenshots
+output
+3d-models
+.gstack
+*.log
+.DS_Store
+# AppleDouble sidecars from a macOS `tar` copy; `npm test` would otherwise
+# collect `._*.test.mjs` as test files.
+._*
@@ -96,6 +96,13 @@ OPENAI_HUD_SUMMARY_MODEL=gpt-5-nano
 # spend protection set a provider-side budget: OpenAI platform -> Settings ->
 # Limits (usage limits).
 # GEV_RATELIMIT_OPENAI_PER_MIN=30   # the default; uncomment only to change it
+# Optional: exact socket addresses (comma-separated, no wildcards or prefixes)
+# that Provider Settings treats as this machine in addition to loopback. Leave
+# unset. The Docker launcher sets it to the container's gateway at start,
+# because that is where Docker delivers your own browser from; it is safe only
+# while the port is published on 127.0.0.1. Read SECURITY.md before setting it
+# by hand.
+# GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS=

 # Optional: Mapillary imagery for the Street Level layer. Free client token from
 # https://www.mapillary.com/dashboard/developers (register an app, copy its
@@ -212,6 +219,12 @@ AISSTREAM_API_KEY=
 # CCTV_CALGARY_ENABLED=1                               # set 0 to disable the Open Calgary (Alberta) cameras
 # CCTV_CALGARY_MAX_SOURCES=220                         # cap cameras loaded from the Open Calgary catalog
 # CCTV_CALGARY_ROWS_URL=                               # override the Open Calgary catalog URL
+# CCTV_CATALONIA_ENABLED=1                             # set 0 to disable the Servei Català de Trànsit cameras
+# CCTV_CATALONIA_MAX_SOURCES=150                       # cap cameras loaded from Catalonia (~130 exist today)
+# CCTV_KINGCOUNTY_ENABLED=1                            # set 0 to disable the King County (Washington) road cameras
+# CCTV_KINGCOUNTY_MAX_SOURCES=125                      # cap cameras loaded from the King County catalog
+# CCTV_WSDOT_ENABLED=1                                 # set 0 to disable the WSDOT (Washington State) highway cameras
+# CCTV_WSDOT_MAX_SOURCES=250                           # cap cameras loaded from the WSDOT catalog, nearest Seattle/Spokane first; min 8, max 1200
 # CCTV_VEGVESEN_ENABLED=1                              # set 0 to disable the Statens vegvesen (Norway) road cameras
 # CCTV_VEGVESEN_MAX_SOURCES=900                        # cap cameras loaded from Statens vegvesen (default loads all ~850 live; max 1000)
 # CCTV_VEGVESEN_VIDEO=1                                # set 0 to show stills instead of live HLS for Statens vegvesen video cameras
@@ -219,6 +232,11 @@ AISSTREAM_API_KEY=
 # CCTV_NYC_ENABLED=                                    # off by default; set 1 only if you hold a NYC DOT data-sharing agreement ([email protected]) for the camera feed
 # CCTV_NYC_MAX_SOURCES=250                             # cap cameras loaded from the NYC TMC catalog (nearest borough cores first)
 # CCTV_NYC_CAMERAS_URL=                                # override the NYC TMC catalog URL
+# CCTV_TORONTO_ENABLED=1                              # set 0 to disable the City of Toronto RESCU cameras
+# CCTV_TORONTO_MAX_SOURCES=336                         # cap cameras loaded from Toronto RESCU (clamped to 8–500)
+# CCTV_TORONTO_LIST_URL=                               # override the Toronto RESCU camera list URL
+# CCTV_LITHUANIA_ENABLED=                              # off by default; set 1 to load Via Lietuva / Eismoinfo road cameras (photo licence unconfirmed; see DATA_SOURCES.md)
+# CCTV_LITHUANIA_MAX_SOURCES=400                       # cap Lithuanian cameras; no API key required
 # CCTV_MAX_SOURCES=4000                                # catalog-wide ceiling, shared round-robin across packs
 # CCTV_PREFER_AUSTIN=1                                 # prioritize Austin cameras in the registry
 # CCTV_FORCE_AUSTIN=                                   # force live default sources when a source-pack JSON is configured
@@ -1,5 +1,60 @@
 # Changelog

+- Cyclone advisories no longer go dark while NHC publishes an advisory ahead
+  of its nominal time: advisory and position times up to 90 minutes ahead of
+  the server clock are accepted (previously 5 minutes), so the whole feed is
+  not rejected for about half an hour each advisory cycle.
+
+- Flights age out vanished aircraft again. OpenSky's routine position-less rows
+  no longer mark every snapshot partial, which had kept vanished and landed
+  aircraft at full opacity for up to five minutes; those rows retain only their
+  own aircraft, and a likely-landed one still leaves on the landed limit.
+
+- Add WSDOT highway cameras (Washington State) as a keyless CCTV source pack:
+  WSDOT's official Travel Center camera layer, with frames registered only on
+  WSDOT's own image host (partner-hosted cameras such as Oregon DOT and City of
+  Seattle are skipped). Cameras with a single cardinal `CompassDirection` get
+  a high-confidence heading; `B` (both directions), `O`, and unset directions
+  use the shared id-hash fallback at low confidence. By default the 250
+  cameras nearest Seattle and Spokane load; `CCTV_WSDOT_MAX_SOURCES` sets the
+  cap (8–1,200) and `CCTV_WSDOT_ENABLED=0` turns the pack off (bassem chagra,
+  #644).
+
+- Refuse still-image cameras on the CCTV media relay. `/api/cctv/media` is the
+  live-feed route, but it also relayed any registered still camera through an
+  ordinary fetch that followed redirects to any host, passed through whatever
+  content type came back and had no cap on the body, bypassing every protection
+  `/api/cctv/frame` applies to the same URL. Only HLS, MP4, WebM and MJPEG
+  feeds are relayed now; a still camera, or an unknown id, gets a JSON 404
+  without an upstream request and is served only through `/api/cctv/frame`.
+  The client already loaded stills through `/frame`, so nothing it requests
+  changes.
+
+- Add Lithuania's public Via Lietuva / Eismoinfo road cameras to CCTV, with published coordinates, on-demand snapshots, attribution and bounded catalog requests. No API key is required. The pack is opt-in (`CCTV_LITHUANIA_ENABLED=1`) because its camera endpoints are the eismoinfo.lt website backend, not a service listed in Via Lietuva's open-data statement, so the licence for the photos is unconfirmed.
+
+- Add King County road cameras (Washington State) as a keyless CCTV source
+  pack: one public King County DOT ArcGIS layer, fetched with an explicit field
+  list so its staff-name columns are never requested, and frames pinned to the
+  county's own image host and upgraded to HTTPS. WSDOT-owned rows are skipped,
+  and city-owned cameras the county hosts credit their owner. The layer
+  publishes no facing, so headings use the shared id-hash fallback at low
+  confidence. It does publish each camera's hardware, which is served on
+  `/api/cctv/sources` as `model` and `manufacturer`. `CCTV_KINGCOUNTY_MAX_SOURCES`
+  sets the cap and `CCTV_KINGCOUNTY_ENABLED=0` turns the pack off
+  (bassem chagra, #645).
+
+- Add City of Toronto RESCU traffic cameras as a keyless CCTV source pack: the
+  ~336 municipal cameras the Ontario 511 pack does not carry — downtown
+  arterials plus the Gardiner, DVP, Allen and Lake Shore. The list is the
+  City's own open data feed; frames are built from the documented
+  `loc####.jpg` convention and a digits-only camera number, so the frame proxy
+  is pinned to the portal origin by construction. The dataset publishes no
+  camera facing — its `D1`-`D4` fields describe static 2016 comparison images,
+  not the live pan-tilt-zoom frame — so headings use the shared id-hash
+  fallback at low confidence and are corrected with the calibration gizmo.
+  Carries the required Open Government Licence – Toronto attribution. Disable
+  with `CCTV_TORONTO_ENABLED=0`.
+
 - Stop one retired bikeshare feed from reporting the whole layer as failed.
  City feeds are fetched independently, but failure was recorded in a single
  flag that only a successful *activation* cleared — and an already-loaded city
@@ -303,6 +358,21 @@
  [TheSmokeDev](https://github.com/TheSmokeDev) for the credential handling
  from #653.

+- **Docker install path.** `docker compose up` builds on CI's Node 24.14.0 image,
+  pinned by digest, and serves the app on `http://localhost:4173` with no local
+  Node install. The repo is bind-mounted and the container runs as the host user
+  (never root), so `.env`,
+  `.gev-cache`, and `.gev-logs` persist on the host exactly as they do under
+  `npm run dev` — Provider Settings included. The launcher
+  (`scripts/docker-start.mjs`) trusts the container's gateway address for that
+  panel, since that is where Docker delivers the host's own browser from; the
+  opt-in behind it, `GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS`, takes exact addresses only
+  and is unset (so loopback-only, unchanged) under every other launcher.
+  Thanks to [jklaze](https://github.com/jklaze) for finding and diagnosing the
+  container-to-host 403, and to [14traits](https://github.com/14traits),
+  [PoBruno](https://github.com/PoBruno) and [milu70hub](https://github.com/milu70hub)
+  for testing on Apple silicon, Docker Engine on Linux, and NAS hosts.
+
 - Stdio servers from one install share a panel key so a page read from one
  process can make requests through another. Concurrent malformed-key repairs
  now select one winner; unavailable storage or a busy repair retains the
@@ -349,6 +419,18 @@
  largest cities) and `CCTV_VEGVESEN_VIDEO=0` keeps stills only. Attributed
  under NLOD 2.0.

+- Add Catalonia (Servei Català de Trànsit) as a keyless CCTV source pack: ~130
+  cameras from a WFS/GML feed that aggregates SCT's own highway cameras with
+  hotlinked Barcelona and Terrassa municipal cameras, each partner named as a
+  credit beside the shared provider. Ambient-card refresh paced to 3 minutes,
+  matching the empirically observed upstream cadence. `CCTV_CATALONIA_MAX_SOURCES`
+  sets the cap and `CCTV_CATALONIA_ENABLED=0` turns the pack off. The catalog
+  is fetched over https with redirects refused and a 1 MiB body cap, and frame
+  links carrying userinfo or an explicit port, or outside the publisher's frame
+  directory, are rejected even on an allowlisted host. Camera ids come from
+  each frame's SCT camera file or image path rather than the feed's
+  restart-dependent feature id, and rows the feed repeats collapse to one.
+
 - Import your own GeoJSON, KML, KMZ and GPX files from DISPLAY or by dropping
  them onto the app. Show, hide, fly to or remove each file for the session.
  GeoJSON/GPX draw on the ground; KML retains its styles and explicit heights.
@@ -59,8 +59,12 @@ How to read this:
 | **Fintraffic / Digitraffic (weathercams)**                            | CCTV camera catalog + frames, Finland                                                                                               | [CC BY 4.0](https://www.digitraffic.fi/en/terms-of-service/) — attribution REQUIRED                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | "Fintraffic / digitraffic.fi, license CC BY 4.0"                                                                                            |
 | **DriveBC** (Government of British Columbia)                          | CCTV camera catalog + frames, British Columbia highways                                                                             | [Open Government Licence – British Columbia](https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/data/open-data/open-government-licence-bc) — attribution REQUIRED                                                                                                                                                                                                     | "DriveBC. Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence – British Columbia"                                               |
 | **Open Calgary** (`data.calgary.ca`)                                  | CCTV camera catalog + frames, Calgary                                                                                               | [Open Government Licence – City of Calgary](https://data.calgary.ca/stories/s/Open-Calgary-Terms-of-Use/u45n-7awa) — attribution REQUIRED                                                                                                                                                                                                             | "Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence – City of Calgary"                                                         |
+| **Servei Català de Trànsit** (+ Ajuntament de Barcelona, Ajuntament de Terrassa) | CCTV camera catalog + frames, Catalonia                                                                              | [Llicència oberta d'ús d'informació - Catalunya](https://web.gencat.cat/ca/generalitat/dades-indicadors/dades-obertes/llicencies) — attribution REQUIRED                                                                                                                                                                                             | "Servei Català de Trànsit"; partner-supplied cameras also name their owner                                                                  |
+| **King County Road Services** (`services.arcgis.com`, King County GIS) | CCTV camera catalog + frames, unincorporated King County WA road network                                                            | [KCGIS Center terms](https://kingcounty.gov/en/dept/kcit/data-information-services/gis-center/about/terms-conditions-copyrights) — attribution required; public ArcGIS layer                                                                                                                                                                          | "King County Road Services" (partner-city cameras name their owner)                                                                         |
+| **WSDOT** (`data.wsdot.wa.gov`)                                       | CCTV camera catalog + frames, Washington State highways                                                                             | [WSDOT travel information disclaimer](https://wsdot.wa.gov/about/policies/travel-information-disclaimer) — public "low volume" feed; catalog cached, frames on WSDOT's own image host only                                                                                                                                                            | "Washington State Department of Transportation (Travel Center)" (courtesy)                                                                  |
 | **Statens vegvesen** (catalog `ogckart-sn1.atlas.vegvesen.no`, frames `kamera.atlas.vegvesen.no`, HLS `kamera.vegvesen.no`) | CCTV camera catalog + frames + live HLS video, Norway road cameras                                                                                   | [NLOD 2.0](https://data.norge.no/nlod/en/2.0) — attribution REQUIRED | "Contains data under the Norwegian licence for Open Government data (NLOD) distributed by Statens vegvesen" |
 | **NYC DOT Traffic Management Center** (`webcams.nyctmc.org`) | CCTV camera catalog + frames, New York City five boroughs | NYC DOT requires developers to sign a [data-sharing agreement](https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/about/datafeeds.shtml) for the camera feed. **Off by default**; enable only under your own agreement | "NYC DOT Traffic Management Center" + NYC DOT's required application disclaimer (in the Data attribution popover) |
+| **City of Toronto Open Data** (`opendata.toronto.ca`)                 | CCTV camera catalog + frames, Toronto city streets                                                                                  | [Open Government Licence – Toronto](https://www.toronto.ca/city-government/data-research-maps/open-data/open-data-licence/) — attribution REQUIRED                                                                                                                                                                                                    | "Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence – Toronto"                                                                 |
 | **GBFS (Lyft / BCycle / Social Bicycles / PBSC)**                     | Bikeshare availability                                                                                                              | Per-feed (attribution-only)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | Credit the operator (e.g. Austin BCycle) + its `license_url`                                                                                |
 | **Bike Share Toronto** (`toronto.publicbikesystem.net`) | Bikeshare station availability, Toronto | Operator GBFS feed. No licence is published: the City's open-data package declares none and the feed has no `license_url`. Attribution is given to the operator. | "Bike Share Toronto (Toronto Parking Authority)" |
 | **Oslo / Bergen / Trondheim Bysykkel** (Urban Sharing, `gbfs.urbansharing.com`) | Bikeshare availability, Oslo, Bergen and Trondheim city bikes. Keyless GBFS; the proxy sends the `Client-Identifier` header the operators ask for | [NLOD 2.0](https://data.norge.no/nlod/en/2.0) — attribution REQUIRED ([Oslo](https://oslobysykkel.no/en/open-data/realtime), [Bergen](https://bergenbysykkel.no/en/apne-data/sanntid), [Trondheim](https://trondheimbysykkel.no/en/open-data/realtime)) | "Contains data under the Norwegian licence for Open Government data (NLOD) made available by Oslo Bysykkel, Bergen Bysykkel and Trondheim Bysykkel" |
@@ -91,6 +95,8 @@ The optional Local ADS-B layer and the broadcast-FM receiver use radio you recei

  **Quebec is thinly represented**, and that is upstream rather than a filter here: the province runs its own Info-Smog program, so only a handful of Quebec stations appear in ECCC's national feed. The reporting station count also varies hour to hour as stations report or fall silent.

+- **Via Lietuva / Eismoinfo (Lithuania).** Public road-camera catalogs and periodically updated still images from [Eismoinfo](https://eismoinfo.lt/), credited to Via Lietuva / eismoinfo.lt in the app. **Off by default.** The camera endpoints are the eismoinfo.lt website backend and are not among the services listed in Via Lietuva's [open-data statement](https://eismoinfo.lt/eismoinfo-backend/content?id=44), whose conditions are attribution and reuse on the same terms. Until the statement is confirmed to cover the camera photos, the pack loads only when an operator sets `CCTV_LITHUANIA_ENABLED=1`; with the flag unset, empty or any other value, the server makes no request to Eismoinfo. `eismoinfo-backend/camera-info-table` is joined by ID to `layer-static-features/VKR`. Without `lks=true`, the latter returns WGS84 `[latitude, longitude]`; the table's `x/y` instead use LKS-94 metres. Only the official HTTPS `/eismoinfo-backend/image-provider/camera/last?id=…` image endpoint is registered. Catalogs use the shared 15-minute cache; frames are fetched on demand and never bundled or archived. These are periodic snapshots, not continuous video. Camera headings are low-confidence estimates. No API key is required. `CCTV_LITHUANIA_MAX_SOURCES` defaults to 400.
+
 - **Google Maps Platform.** You supply your own API key and are bound by [Google's ToS](https://cloud.google.com/maps-platform/terms). Google Maps Content (tiles, geocodes, places) **may not be cached, stored, rehosted, or committed** — this app only ever uses it live, which is the compliant pattern. The "Google" attribution is displayed on the globe and must stay visible. Restrict your key (see [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md)).
 - **OpenSky Network.** Its license is **non-commercial**, and operational use of the REST API in a live product can require a prior written agreement with OpenSky — even for non-profit/government use. If you deploy this commercially, contact OpenSky for your own terms. The flights layer is a toggle and runs anonymously by default.
 - **adsb.lol flight fallback.** When OpenSky is unavailable and no last-good OpenSky response exists, the server requests a cached, capped 250 nm adsb.lol point snapshot around the current camera subpoint. This is regional observed context, not worldwide completeness; provenance is exposed in the Flights stats/context row. Military ICAOs remain reconciled through the existing dedicated military registry rather than duplicated.
@@ -142,8 +148,12 @@ The optional Local ADS-B layer and the broadcast-FM receiver use radio you recei
 - **Warendorf webcam.** The Stadt Warendorf Marktplatz webcam, registered from the curated `config/cctv_sources.warendorf.json` (the Kreis Warendorf registration-office cameras from the contributing PR are indoor waiting rooms and were left out); only the municipal image host is proxied, frames are fetched at request time and never stored or redistributed. Disable with `CCTV_WARENDORF_ENABLED=0`.
 - **Live Traffic NSW cameras.** The camera list is the keyless public `data.livetraffic.com/cameras/traffic-cam.json` feed (Transport for NSW open data, CC BY 4.0); frames are stills on `webcams.transport.nsw.gov.au`, and only that host is registered. That image host answers non-browser clients with an HTML placeholder, so the proxy identifies as a browser for that one host and as itself everywhere else. Frames are fetched at request time and never stored or redistributed. Disable with `CCTV_NSW_ENABLED=0`.
 - **Open Calgary traffic cameras.** Keyless. The camera list is the public Socrata dataset `k7p9-kppz` on `data.calgary.ca`; frames are stills on the city's own `trafficcam.calgary.ca` host, and only that host is registered. Most rows publish an `http://` frame URL and the host redirects those to HTTPS, so URLs are upgraded and pinned to that origin before registration. Frames are fetched at request time and never stored or redistributed. The dataset publishes no camera facing: the `quadrant` field and the quadrant suffix on each camera name are Calgary's address grid, not a bearing, so headings use the shared id-hash fallback at low confidence and are corrected with the in-app calibration gizmo. The licence requires the attribution statement above. Disable with `CCTV_CALGARY_ENABLED=0`.
+- **Catalonia (Servei Català de Trànsit) cameras.** The camera list is the keyless `https://www.gencat.cat/transit/opendata/cameres.xml` WFS/GML feed, fetched over https with redirects refused and the body read capped at 1 MiB, since the list decides ids, coordinates and which allowlisted frame path is proxied. It carries a `font` field naming the real publisher per camera; this pack keeps SCT's own highway cameras plus hotlinked Barcelona (IMI) and Terrassa municipal cameras (~130 total), each confirmed to return a real frame, so frame URLs are checked against a small host allowlist (`mct.gencat.cat`, `www.bcn.cat`, `emap.terrassa.cat`) rather than one pinned origin (a link carrying `user:pass@` userinfo or an explicit port, or pointing outside that host's frame directory, is rejected even on an allowed host; an SCT `sctidcam` must be a bare `.gif`/`.jpg` filename), and every non-SCT camera carries its real owner as a `credit` shown beside the shared `provider`. The feed carries no compass heading, so every camera loads at low heading confidence (same as TfL and Fintraffic). SCT's own feed link (`RenderService`) needed a workaround: it always 302s to a second endpoint (`TransitCamera`) on a Location the upstream hardcodes as plain http even when requested over https — refused by `fetchWithinHost`'s same-origin (scheme-included) redirect policy — and separately, `mct.gencat.cat`'s TLS setup fails the handshake with Node's fetch outright (`ERR_SSL_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE`) even though other HTTP clients complete it. The loader therefore builds the `TransitCamera` URL itself, over plain http, from `RenderService`'s `sctidcam` id, rather than registering the (broken) upstream link — the only transport this one host actually serves to this runtime. Camera ids are built from the SCT camera file or the partner image path, not the feed's `fid` (which embeds an upstream server-start stamp and changes on every upstream restart), and rows the feed lists more than once collapse to one camera. The feed carries no camera status field, so a camera its publisher has taken offline still registers and shows the publisher's own "image unavailable" still (SCT and Barcelona both serve one with HTTP 200), the same as other packs without a status field. Frames are fetched at request time and never stored or redistributed. The feed itself states no licence; the pack relies on the Generalitat de Catalunya open-data portal's terms for this dataset (the licence and attribution above). Disable with `CCTV_CATALONIA_ENABLED=0`.
+- **King County road cameras.** Keyless. The camera list is one public ArcGIS FeatureServer GeoJSON query (King County DOT Road Services, "King County and WSDOT Traffic Cameras"). The `outFields` list is explicit on purpose: the layer also carries asset-administration columns — including staff names — that are never fetched. Only live, active cameras with frames on the county's own `info.kingcounty.gov` image handler are registered (the feed writes `http://`; the handler serves HTTPS, so URLs are upgraded and pinned before registration). WSDOT-owned rows in the layer are skipped because their frames are WSDOT-hosted, outside the pinned image origin; partner-city cameras hosted on the county image handler (e.g. Newcastle) name their owner as the per-camera credit. The layer publishes no facing, so headings use the shared id-hash fallback at low confidence. Uniquely, the county publishes each camera's hardware `Manufacturer`/`Model` (Cohu 3950/3965, Bosch AUTODOME, Axis PTZ domes); both are carried on the source (and served by `/api/cctv/sources`) as `model` and `manufacturer` for identified-hardware consumers (vendor-generic strings such as `PTZ` name no model and are omitted). Frames are fetched at request time and never stored or redistributed. Disable with `CCTV_KINGCOUNTY_ENABLED=0`.
+- **WSDOT highway cameras.** Keyless. The camera list is the Esri JSON layer `data.wsdot.wa.gov/travelcenter/Cameras.json` — the same layer WSDOT's own Travel Center map consumes (~1,700 point features, EPSG:3857 geometry converted to WGS84 on load; the body carries Windows-1252 bytes and is decoded as such). Only frames on WSDOT's own `images.wsdot.wa.gov` host are registered — the catalog also lists ~70 partner cameras (Oregon DOT, City of Seattle, lodges, airports) whose own terms apply, and those are skipped rather than proxied. WSDOT's layer metadata marks the feed for "low volume" use (see WSDOT's [travel information disclaimer](https://wsdot.wa.gov/about/policies/travel-information-disclaimer)). The catalog is fetched once per CCTV catalog refresh (every 15 minutes), and a camera's frame is fetched only when that camera is viewed; frames are never stored or redistributed. The live feed's `CompassDirection` is a single cardinal (N/E/S/W), `B` (both directions — most rows), `O`, or null. A single cardinal gives a high-confidence heading (the diagonals NE/SE/SW/NW are mapped too should they appear); `B`, `O`, null, and any other code carry no single facing and use the shared id-hash fallback at low confidence. By default the 250 cameras nearest Seattle and Spokane load; `CCTV_WSDOT_MAX_SOURCES` changes the cap (8–1,200) and `CCTV_WSDOT_ENABLED=0` turns the pack off. A keyed WSDOT Traveler Information API serves the same population for higher-volume use and is deliberately not required here.
 - **Statens vegvesen road cameras.** Keyless. The camera list is one GeoJSON request to the OGC API Features view of the official DATEX 3.1 CCTV site table (`ogckart-sn1.atlas.vegvesen.no/ogc/features/v1/collections/datex_3_1:CctvSimple/items`), so no DATEX account is needed; frames are stills on `kamera.atlas.vegvesen.no/api/images/<cameraId>`, and only that exact path per camera is registered. Cameras the feed reports as faulty are dropped. About 135 working cameras also publish live HLS (`kamera.vegvesen.no/public/<cameraId>/manifest.m3u8`, MPEG-TS); those play as live video through the bounded in-memory HLS relay, with the still as the snapshot fallback, and only that exact manifest path per camera is registered. `CCTV_VEGVESEN_VIDEO=0` keeps every camera on stills. `orientationDescription` names the place a camera faces, not a bearing, so it goes into the label and headings use the id-hash fallback at low confidence. By default every live camera loads (~850); `CCTV_VEGVESEN_MAX_SOURCES` (8–1000) lowers the cap, keeping the cameras nearest Oslo, Bergen, Stavanger, Trondheim, Kristiansand, Bodø and Tromsø and `CCTV_VEGVESEN_ENABLED=0` turns the pack off. Frames are fetched at request time and never stored or redistributed. The NLOD attribution is registered in the Data attribution popover.
 - **NYC DOT Traffic Management Center cameras.** Off by default. NYC DOT's [developer data feeds page](https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/about/datafeeds.shtml) asks developers who want the camera feed to contact `[email protected]` and sign a data-sharing agreement. This project does not hold one that covers downstream installations, so the pack loads only when an operator who holds their own agreement sets `CCTV_NYC_ENABLED=1`; with the flag unset, empty or any other value, the server makes no request to NYC DOT. The endpoint needs no key. The camera list is the public `webcams.nyctmc.org/api/cameras` catalog (~980 cameras across the five boroughs); frames are stills at `webcams.nyctmc.org/api/cameras/<uuid>/image`, synthesized from a validated UUID rather than taken from the payload, and only that host is registered. Cameras the feed reports as offline are dropped. The catalog publishes no camera facing, so headings use the shared id-hash fallback at low confidence and are corrected with the in-app calibration gizmo. Once enabled, the 250 cameras nearest the borough cores load; `CCTV_NYC_MAX_SOURCES` (8–400) changes the cap. Frames are fetched at request time and never stored or redistributed. NYC DOT asks every application that uses its data to carry its disclaimer; it is registered verbatim in the Data attribution popover.
+- **City of Toronto RESCU cameras.** Keyless. The camera list is the City's public `tmcearthcameras.json` on `opendata.toronto.ca` (dataset "Traffic Cameras", Transportation Services), served as JSONP and unwrapped with an anchored pattern. This is the municipal network the Ontario 511 pack does not carry: downtown arterials plus the Gardiner, DVP, Allen and Lake Shore. The list publishes no frame URL, so frame URLs are BUILT from the documented `CameraImages/loc####.jpg` convention and a strictly-digits camera number, pinning the frame proxy to the portal origin by construction; the list fetch refuses redirects and bounds the body it buffers. Frames are fetched at request time and never stored or redistributed. The dataset publishes no camera facing: the `D1`-`D4` fields are the directions of the *comparison* images (static reference stills captured in 2016 under a different path), not a bearing for the live pan-tilt-zoom frame, so headings use the shared id-hash fallback at low confidence and are corrected with the in-app calibration gizmo. A camera that is temporarily out of service still answers 200 with a byte-identical "Image Unavailable" placeholder rather than an error (about 6% of the network at any moment), so such a camera reads as healthy; the frame it shows is the agency's, not a synthesized one. The licence requires the attribution statement above. Disable with `CCTV_TORONTO_ENABLED=0`.
 - **Camera frame content.** Public camera frames can contain people, vehicles and license plates, and the camera layer does nothing with them beyond putting them on the map. A successful upstream response is relayed as the provider served it: nothing in the camera pipeline blurs, redacts, enhances or restores it, and nothing there runs face, plate or object detection or otherwise recognises or classifies what is in the picture. (The ALPR layer described below maps where plate-reader cameras are, from locations contributors tagged in OpenStreetMap; it reads nothing from any camera frame.) When an upstream has no frame for a camera, what you see instead is a Google Street View still or the app's own placeholder card; the panel's source badge names which of them you are looking at, and a refresh that fails after a frame has arrived leaves the last good picture on screen rather than replacing it. The browser resamples each frame for display: onto a fixed 1920x1080 surface for the camera's projection plane in the scene, and onto a 192x108 canvas for the small ambient card. That scaling is the only change made to the picture, and the only pixels the camera layer reads back are a 64x36 downscale hashed to tell whether the picture has changed. Live streams are piped through; the still path reads the image into memory to pass it on — TxDOT wraps its JPEG in a JSON envelope, which is decoded there — and no frame is written to disk (the disk cache, `.gev-cache/`, holds feed JSON for other layers and never camera imagery). Outside that pipeline, the voice assistant is the one feature that sends imagery anywhere: when it answers a question about what is in view it may attach a downscaled screenshot of the rendered scene — including any camera plane on screen — to the request it sends to the voice model. Frames are fetched only from server-registered camera URLs — a client cannot hand the proxy a URL (see [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md)). What the app does stays inside the line README draws: no named-person search, no face recognition, no tracking individuals.
 - **Transit (GTFS-Realtime).** The proxy requests only registered operator feeds, validates redirects, bounds responses, and uses conditional requests, short snapshot caching and failure backoff. All seven registered regions are live-enabled; each can be disabled independently. Vehicles use delayed playback between reports, with report age and waiting states shown separately. Session-local selected trails are available for every feed. MBTA additionally retains up to 15 minutes of recently observed positions in the running proxy, so available history can survive a browser reload; server restart clears it. History reads never fetch upstream, and other feeds have no proxy retention. Nothing is archived to disk or collected in the background. Operator text credits are included as a courtesy and do not imply endorsement. Heights are aligned to work with Google 3D tiles; subway markers are shown at street level because these feeds do not supply depth.
 - **Radio Browser.** `/api/radio/stations` discovers official API mirrors, makes bounded and coalesced healthy/geolocated HTTPS-station queries, caches the normalized public-domain directory for 45 minutes, and may serve the last good catalog for up to seven days during an outage. Refreshes must meet minimum accepted-query and station coverage before replacing a warm catalog; schema-valid responses whose rows all fail the product's health policy do not count as successful queries. A usable partial cold catalog is explicitly `DEGRADED`, and malformed or empty successful payloads are rejected atomically. Every directory and click-count request rejects redirects, validates all resolved addresses as globally routable (including reserved/documentation IPv4 and special/non-global IPv6 exclusions), and pins the TLS connection to a validated address. Only MP3/AAC non-HLS directory rows with public HTTPS stream targets are returned; favicons are intentionally omitted. Pressing play connects one browser audio element directly to the selected broadcaster and calls the directory's click counter through known-ID-only `POST /api/radio/click/:uuid`. GEV never proxies, caches, records, bundles, or redistributes audio. Radio Browser supplies station-level tags, not dependable current-song or upcoming-program metadata, so Radio filtering never claims either. Direct playback exposes the listener's IP address to the broadcaster, whose own stream terms apply.
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1
+#
+# The dev server is the whole app: Vite serves the client AND runs the API
+# proxies (ADS-B, AIS, Overpass, OpenAI Realtime, ...) as middleware, so there
+# is nothing else to containerise. See compose.yaml for the usual entry point.
+# Same Node as CI (package.json engines, .github/workflows), pinned by digest.
+FROM node:24.14.0-slim@sha256:d8e448a56fc63242f70026718378bd4b00f8c82e78d20eefb199224a4d8e33d8
+
+# Puppeteer is only used by the QA scripts; skip its ~150MB Chromium download.
+ENV PUPPETEER_SKIP_DOWNLOAD=1
+
+# `npm test` builds fixtures with `git init`, so the suite cannot run in a
+# container without it (71 failures on node:24-slim, all ENOENT on git).
+RUN apt-get update   && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git   && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+# The repo is bind-mounted, so inside the container it can show an owner other
+# than the user the container runs as - always, on Docker Desktop. git then
+# refuses it as "dubious ownership", which fails the tests that shell out to
+# git. It is the user's own checkout, so trust that one path.
+RUN git config --system --add safe.directory /app
+
+# Never run as root. The image's own user is `node` (1000); compose overrides
+# it with the host user so bind-mounted files stay yours.
+WORKDIR /app
+RUN chown node:node /app
+USER node
+
+COPY --chown=node:node package.json package-lock.json ./
+RUN npm ci
+# node_modules belongs to `node`, but compose may run as another UID. Vite only
+# needs to write its dep-optimizer cache, so open up those two directories
+# rather than chowning a few hundred MB to a UID we cannot know at build time.
+RUN mkdir -p node_modules/.vite && chmod 777 node_modules node_modules/.vite
+
+COPY --chown=node:node . .
+
+# Bind to all interfaces, otherwise the published port hits nothing. This does
+# not widen the Host allowlist: IP addresses and localhost are accepted, other
+# names only via GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS (see build/allowedHosts.js).
+ENV HOST=0.0.0.0
+ENV PORT=4173
+EXPOSE 4173
+# The launcher is `npm run dev` plus one step: it trusts the container's
+# gateway address for Provider Settings, because that is where Docker delivers
+# the host's own browser from (never 127.0.0.1). See scripts/docker-start.mjs.
+CMD ["node", "scripts/docker-start.mjs"]
@@ -153,6 +153,72 @@ See [docs/PERFORMANCE.md](docs/PERFORMANCE.md).
 **macOS shortcut:** `./scripts/dev-fresh.sh` clears the Vite cache and pulls any
 configured keys straight from the Keychain. It starts keyless too.

+### Path 3 — Docker
+
+No Node install needed; the container publishes the same dev server.
+
+```bash
+git clone https://github.com/bilawalsidhu/gods-eye-view.git
+cd gods-eye-view
+docker compose up
+```
+
+Open **`http://localhost:4173`** as above. Everything the app saves stays in the folder you cloned, so `docker compose down` never loses anything:
+
+- `.env` - your API keys, whether saved from Provider Settings or typed in by hand
+- `.gev-cache/` - downloaded map and satellite data, so later starts are faster
+- `.gev-logs/` - logs
+
+Back up that folder and you've backed up everything; delete `.env` to forget your keys. Source edits still hot-reload. The port is published to `127.0.0.1` only, so the default matches the native one.
+
+The local MCP server and ChatGPT OAuth voice are not available under Docker; use an OpenAI API key for voice.
+
+Publishing it wider is the [Sharing an instance](#-sharing-an-instance) opt-in, and it hands out **Provider Settings** too: the launcher trusts the container gateway as this machine, and a wider publish delivers everyone else from that same address. For an instance you mean to share, put the keys in `.env` by hand instead. [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) has the detail.
+
+When you widen the publish, also set `GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS=none` so the launcher trusts no gateway address.
+
+<details>
+<summary>Running on Linux, a NAS, or behind a reverse proxy</summary>
+
+Run it as the user who should own the files it writes. `id` shows the numbers; for yourself on Linux:
+
+```bash
+env UID=$(id -u) GID=$(id -g) docker compose up
+```
+
+On a NAS, clone onto the share you want the data on and use the share owner's ids:
+
+```bash
+cd /volume1/docker
+git clone https://github.com/bilawalsidhu/gods-eye-view.git
+cd gods-eye-view
+env UID=1026 GID=100 docker compose up -d
+```
+
+Keep the `env`: bash treats `UID` as read-only, so a plain `UID=1026` in front of a command is silently ignored. If the container can't write the checkout, it says so at start. Docker Desktop on macOS and Windows maps ownership for you.
+
+Behind a reverse proxy, put your keys in `.env` or pass them as environment variables - Provider Settings refuses proxied requests on purpose - and add the hostname you serve it on, for example `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS=globe.example.lan` (see [Sharing an instance](#-sharing-an-instance)).
+
+</details>
+
+<details>
+<summary>IPv6-only networks, rebuilding, and the test suites</summary>
+
+The launcher reads the IPv4 default gateway, so an IPv6-only Docker network
+finds none: it logs `No default gateway; Provider Settings stays loopback-only`
+and the panel refuses every save. Put your keys in `.env` by hand there, or name
+the gateway yourself with `GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS` after reading
+[SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md).
+
+`node_modules` deliberately stays inside the image, so it survives in an
+anonymous volume across restarts: after a `git pull` that changes dependencies,
+recreate it with `docker compose down -v && docker compose up --build`. The
+image also skips Puppeteer's Chromium download, which keeps it small but leaves
+`npm run test:track` to the host — `npm run build` and `npm test` run fine in
+the container.
+
+</details>
+
 ### Then power it up — in the app, not in a file

 Keys are upgrades, not prerequisites. When you want one, click the **POWER UP**
@@ -311,7 +377,7 @@ Twenty layers and map sources. **Eighteen have a keyless path.** Some offer addi
 | 🌍 **Earthquakes**          | Global seismic activity, last 24h                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | USGS                                    | 🟢                                                                                                  |
 | ◍ **Air quality**           | Live AQHI on the published 1–10+ health-risk scale, with a Weather-panel card showing the band legend and the highest readings in view. **Canada only** — ECCC is the first registered provider | ECCC MSC GeoMet                          | 🟢                                                                                                  |
 | 🚗 **Traffic**              | Simulated vehicles on OSM roads. With TomTom, live flow speeds drive the simulation and congestion colors below ~8 km; individual vehicle positions are not live observations                                                                                                                                                                                                       | TomTom + OSM                            | 🟢 simulation · 🟡 live flow speeds                                                                 |
-| 📹 **CCTV Mesh**            | ~3,900 public cameras projected _into_ the 3D space — Austin · Texas (TxDOT) · California (Caltrans) · London (TfL) · Ontario (511) · Finland (Fintraffic) · British Columbia (DriveBC) · Estonia (Tallinn, Tarktee) · Delaware (DelDOT live video) · New South Wales (Live Traffic NSW) · Calgary · Norway (Statens vegvesen), plus opt-in New York City (NYC DOT TMC, needs your own NYC DOT agreement). Positions are published; poses are estimated priors **you calibrate by dragging a gizmo on the camera itself** | City APIs                               | 🟢                                                                                                  |
+| 📹 **CCTV Mesh**            | ~4,000 public cameras (shared cap) projected _into_ the 3D space — Austin · Texas (TxDOT) · California (Caltrans) · London (TfL) · Ontario (511) · Finland (Fintraffic) · British Columbia (DriveBC) · Estonia (Tallinn, Tarktee) · Delaware (DelDOT live video) · New South Wales (Live Traffic NSW) · Calgary · Norway (Statens vegvesen) · Toronto · King County (WA) · Washington (WSDOT) · Catalonia (Servei Català de Trànsit), plus opt-in New York City (NYC DOT TMC, needs your own NYC DOT agreement) and opt-in Lithuania (Via Lietuva / Eismoinfo, photo licence unconfirmed). Positions are published; poses are estimated priors **you calibrate by dragging a gizmo on the camera itself** | City APIs                               | 🟢                                                                                                  |
 | 📷 **Mapped ALPR Cameras**  | License-plate-reader camera locations tagged by OpenStreetMap contributors, loaded one city-sized view at a time, with **SHOW NEAREST**. Locations and tags only: no plate data, no video                                                                                                                                                                                           | OpenStreetMap (incl. DeFlock mapping)   | 🟢                                                                                                  |
 | 📷 **Street Level**         | Street-level photos behind one panel, one chip per provider: coverage on the streets, image cones, an embedded viewer and **FOLLOW**. Mapillary, Google Street View, KartaView and Panoramax | Mapillary · Google · KartaView · Panoramax | 🟢 KartaView, Panoramax · 🟡 Mapillary token · 🔴 Google Maps key |
 | 📻 **Radio**                | Geolocated world radio with an **analog tuner** — drag the needle across up to 750 stations and the globe flies to each broadcaster                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Radio Browser / broadcasters            | 🟢                                                                                                  |
@@ -87,6 +87,17 @@ The dev server is a **key broker**: every server-side key above is spendable by
 - **Local-only by default.** `./scripts/dev-fresh.sh` (and the Vite config itself) bind to `localhost`, so only your machine can reach the server — and only local names are accepted (`allowedHosts` stays restricted, which also blunts DNS-rebinding tricks). Binding to all interfaces keeps that restriction: IP addresses and `localhost` work, and LAN hostnames must be listed in `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS` (for example `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS=globe.lan`); suffix and wildcard entries are ignored.
 - **LAN exposure is an explicit opt-in**: `HOST=0.0.0.0 ./scripts/dev-fresh.sh`. The launcher prints a prominent warning plus your LAN URL. Understand what opting in means: **every device on that network can drive the proxies and spend your OpenAI / Google / OpenSky / AISStream / TomTom / FIRMS quota** for as long as the server runs. Do this only on networks you trust.
 - **App-level throttles (on by default):** `GEV_RATELIMIT_OPENAI_PER_MIN` (default `30`) and `GEV_RATELIMIT_GOOGLE_PER_MIN` (default `120`) — the values the Pinokio build already ships — cap the cost-bearing endpoints per client IP per minute (over-limit requests receive a sanitized `429`). Both defaults sit well above what the app itself generates; set either to exactly `0` to run unthrottled. They are **per-IP, process-local, in-memory guards** — they reset on restart, a caller with several addresses gets a bucket per address, and they are **not billing caps**.
+- **Docker trusts one address, and only because the port is on loopback.**
+  Docker delivers the host's own browser to the container from the container
+  network's gateway, never from `127.0.0.1`, so a loopback-only Provider
+  Settings refuses the machine running it. `scripts/docker-start.mjs` therefore
+  sets `GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS` to exactly that gateway address. The list
+  takes exact addresses only (no wildcards, prefixes or hostnames), is unset
+  under every other launcher, and relaxes none of the sharing, Host, Origin,
+  Content-Type or proxy-header checks. It is safe precisely because
+  `compose.yaml` publishes on `127.0.0.1`: **widen that mapping and every LAN
+  client arrives from the same gateway address, which hands them Provider
+  Settings too.** Treat publishing beyond loopback as the LAN opt-in above.
 - **Provider-side budgets are the real backstop.** For hard spend protection, configure limits where the money is: OpenAI platform usage limits, Google Cloud budget alerts + per-API quotas, and equivalent controls for any other keyed provider.
 - **Pinokio LAN and Cloudflare sharing are refused.** The current supported
  Pinokio release re-reads sharing state when an app registers its Open URL and
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+services:
+  gods-eye-view:
+    build: .
+    # Everything the app writes (.env with your keys, .gev-cache, .gev-logs)
+    # lands in the bind-mounted repo, so run as you, not root. UID/GID are
+    # unset on Docker Desktop, where the 1000 fallback is ignored anyway.
+    user: "${UID:-1000}:${GID:-1000}"
+    ports:
+      # Publish to loopback only. Docker's default ("4173:4173") would bind
+      # every host interface, which quietly turns the LAN warning in the README
+      # into the default: this server brokers whatever provider keys you have
+      # configured to anyone who can reach it. Widen this deliberately, not by
+      # accident.
+      - "127.0.0.1:4173:4173"
+    volumes:
+      # Bind the source so edits hot-reload and so keys pasted into the setup
+      # UI land in the .env on your host instead of vanishing with the
+      # container. node_modules stays in the image: sharp and friends are
+      # compiled for Linux and must not be shadowed by a host install.
+      - .:/app
+      - /app/node_modules
@@ -339,7 +339,12 @@ Cyclones combine fixed NHC/CPHC status and summary GIS endpoints through a bound
 same-origin provider. The status endpoint lacks browser CORS; each installation
 fetches keyless public sources at runtime, with no centralized ingestion service.
 The five-minute snapshot covers Atlantic and eastern/central North Pacific only.
-Current positions, advisory issue time and position time stay distinct. Tracks,
+Current positions, advisory issue time and position time stay distinct. NHC may
+release an advisory before its nominal time (routinely up to about 30 minutes,
+rarely about an hour), so advisory issue and position times up to and including
+90 minutes ahead of the server clock are accepted; 90 minutes is this app's
+tolerance, not an NHC limit. Later, non-canonical, or more than 12-hour-old
+times still reject the status snapshot. Tracks,
 forecast lead-hour points and cones render only when all source parts match the
 status advisory; a newer status shows its position with geometry pending rather
 than relabeling older geometry. The cone represents forecast center uncertainty,
@@ -872,7 +877,13 @@ addition to the locally accumulated trail, never a promise of complete coverage.

 Snapshot coverage, completeness and freshness are separate fields. A partially
 admitted aircraft snapshot retains absent contacts for up to five minutes before
-the usual missed-poll eviction. Unknown snapshot times remain unknown in stats. An invalid nonempty
+the usual missed-poll eviction. An OpenSky row with an ICAO24 address but null
+longitude and latitude is a contact without a position, not a malformed row: it
+leaves the snapshot complete and is listed in `retainIds`, so civil flights
+retain that aircraft under the same five-minute bound, unless it is likely
+landed, while other absent aircraft fade and leave on the missed-poll limits. A
+nonempty snapshot with no positioned rows is still malformed. Military readsb
+admission is unchanged. Unknown snapshot times remain unknown in stats. An invalid nonempty
 snapshot retains the previous display. Empty vessel refreshes retain the existing
 first-connect grace and warm-data behavior. Known source failures have bounded
 messages; arbitrary HTTP response bodies are not surfaced as diagnostics.
@@ -977,7 +988,41 @@ id-hash fallback at low confidence.

 Once enabled, the 250 cameras nearest the five borough cores load.
 `CCTV_NYC_MAX_SOURCES` sets the pack cap (8–400). The catalog-wide ceiling stays at 4,000 and is shared
-round-robin, so adding this pack does not silently drop another region.
+round-robin: no region is dropped outright, but when the packs together exceed
+the ceiling, adding a pack trims cameras from the largest packs.
+
+## City of Toronto RESCU CCTV source pack
+
+The CCTV catalog adds the City of Toronto RESCU traffic cameras — downtown
+arterials plus the Gardiner, DVP, Allen and Lake Shore, which the Ontario 511
+pack does not cover. The server reads the keyless camera list the City
+publishes on its open data portal (`tmcearthcameras.json`, served as JSONP).
+The list has no URL field: frame URLs are built from each validated, digits-only
+camera number on the fixed origin
+`https://opendata.toronto.ca/transportation/tmc/rescucameraimages/CameraImages/`.
+The feed has no compass data, so headings are low-confidence priors. Some
+cameras return a 200 "Image Unavailable" placeholder frame instead of an error.
+
+By default all ~336 cameras load, nearest downtown first.
+`CCTV_TORONTO_MAX_SOURCES` sets the pack cap (8–500) and
+`CCTV_TORONTO_ENABLED=0` turns the pack off. The pack shares the 4,000
+catalog-wide ceiling round-robin with the other packs.
+
+## Lithuania CCTV source pack
+
+The CCTV catalog can include Via Lietuva / Eismoinfo road cameras. The pack is
+off unless `CCTV_LITHUANIA_ENABLED=1`, because its camera endpoints are the
+eismoinfo.lt website backend rather than a service listed in Via Lietuva's
+open-data statement, so the licence for the photos is unconfirmed.
+Two keyless public endpoints provide current snapshot URLs and WGS84 camera
+locations; records are joined by ID, with invalid coordinates and off-origin
+image URLs rejected. Catalog requests refuse redirects, have a 15-second
+deadline and a 4 MiB response cap, and use the existing shared 15-minute cache
+and fair catalog allocation. An unavailable source contributes an empty pack.
+Frames use the registered-image proxy and retain Via Lietuva attribution.
+The images are periodically updated road-condition photographs, not continuous
+video; camera poses use the existing low-confidence heading prior.
+`CCTV_LITHUANIA_MAX_SOURCES` sets its cap (default 400, bounded to 1–1000).

 ## DriveBC CCTV source pack

@@ -1162,6 +1207,9 @@ still waiting to drain reschedules that deadline, so a slow client does not read
 as a stalled upstream. Error responses are cancelled. Buffered snapshots have a
 16 MiB streaming cap; an oversized image remains an upstream miss and uses the
 normal fallback chain. The existing declared media size ceiling remains 64 MiB.
+`/api/cctv/media` relays live feeds (HLS, MP4, WebM, MJPEG) only; a still-image
+camera is refused there with a JSON 404 and is served solely through
+`/api/cctv/frame` and its same-origin, `image/*`-only, size-capped fetch.

 ## GBFS upstream bounds

@@ -3226,7 +3274,7 @@ its criteria cannot be silently ignored.
 | Satellites             | CelesTrak                                                                                                                                                                                       | `src/data/satellites.js`                              | `/api/celestrak`                                         | 120s                                                                              |
 | Space Missions (30d)   | Launch Library 2 + CelesTrak                                                                                                                                                                    | `src/data/rocketLaunches.js`                          | `/api/launches` + `/api/celestrak/active`                | 5 min                                                                             |
 | Traffic | Selectable TomTom / OpenStreetMap / Hybrid roads; optional TomTom flow (BYOK) | `src/data/traffic.js` | browser-direct OpenFreeMap tiles; `/api/tomtom` for flow | viewport-driven; capped tile cache |
-| CCTV                   | Austin + Caltrans (CA) + TfL London + Ontario 511 + Fintraffic (FI) + DriveBC (BC) + TxDOT (TX) + Estonia (Tallinn, Tarktee) + Live Traffic NSW + Open Calgary Open Data + Statens vegvesen (NO, stills + live HLS) + NYC DOT TMC (opt-in) + Street View fallback | `src/data/cctv.js`                                    | `/api/cctv`                                              | 10s (active)                                                                      |
+| CCTV                   | Austin + Caltrans (CA) + TfL London + Ontario 511 + Fintraffic (FI) + DriveBC (BC) + TxDOT (TX) + Estonia (Tallinn, Tarktee) + Live Traffic NSW + Open Calgary Open Data + Statens vegvesen (NO, stills + live HLS) + King County (WA) Open Data + WSDOT (WA) Open Data + NYC DOT TMC (opt-in) + City of Toronto RESCU + Catalonia (Servei Català de Trànsit) + Street View fallback | `src/data/cctv.js`                                    | `/api/cctv`                                              | 10s (active)                                                                      |
 | Radio                  | Radio Browser (public-domain station directory)                                                                                                                                                 | `src/data/radio.js`                                   | `/api/radio/stations`, `/api/radio/click/:uuid`          | 45 min directory refresh                                                          |
 | Transit 🚌             | Operator GTFS-Realtime VehiclePositions (7 keyless regions, `src/data/transitFeeds.js`)                                                                                                         | `src/layers/transit/` via `src/app/layers/transit.js` | `/api/transit`                                           | 15s (poll + delayed playback)                                                     |
 | Bikeshare 🚲           | GBFS (Lyft + BCycle + Social Bicycles + PBSC incl. Bike Share Toronto + Urban Sharing, Entur, JCDecaux NO)                                                                                                                                        | `src/data/bikeshare.js`                               | `/api/gbfs`                                              | 60s                                                                               |
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+/**
+ * Docker launcher — the container's entry point (see Dockerfile).
+ *
+ * `compose.yaml` publishes the port on the host's loopback, but Docker still
+ * delivers the host's own browser to the container FROM the container
+ * network's gateway address, never from 127.0.0.1. Provider Settings admits
+ * loopback only, so without this the POWER UP panel refuses the very machine
+ * running the container. This launcher reads the gateway out of the kernel
+ * routing table and declares exactly that one address trusted, then starts
+ * Vite the way scripts/pinokio-start.mjs does.
+ */
+import { accessSync, constants, readFileSync, realpathSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+import { isDirectInvocation } from './pinokio-install.mjs';
+import { loadViteFromCanonicalRoot } from './pinokio-start.mjs';
+
+const MODULE_PATH = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
+const ROOT = realpathSync(path.resolve(path.dirname(MODULE_PATH), '..'));
+const ROUTE_TABLE = '/proc/net/route';
+
+/**
+ * Extract the IPv4 default gateway from Linux `/proc/net/route` text. The
+ * addresses there are little-endian hex and only the default route (a
+ * destination of 00000000 on an interface flagged up) names a gateway.
+ * Returns null when there is none — the `--network none` case, which must
+ * never fabricate an address.
+ * @param {string} text Raw routing-table contents.
+ * @returns {string|null} Dotted-quad gateway, or null.
+ */
+export function defaultGatewayFromRouteTable(text) {
+  const lines = String(text || '').split(/\r?\n/).slice(1);
+  for (const line of lines) {
+    const fields = line.trim().split(/\s+/);
+    if (fields.length < 4) continue;
+    const [, destination, gateway, flags] = fields;
+    if (destination !== '00000000' || !/^[0-9a-f]{8}$/i.test(gateway)) continue;
+    if ((Number.parseInt(flags, 16) & 0x1) === 0) continue; // RTF_UP
+    const octets = [6, 4, 2, 0].map((offset) =>
+      Number.parseInt(gateway.slice(offset, offset + 2), 16),
+    );
+    if (octets.every((octet) => octet === 0)) continue;
+    return octets.join('.');
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decide this launch's trusted-peer list. An operator value always wins, so a
+ * compose override stays authoritative; otherwise the gateway alone is
+ * trusted. No gateway trusts nothing and Provider Settings stays loopback-only,
+ * exactly as under `npm run dev`.
+ * @param {{env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, routeTable?: string}} input
+ * @returns {string} Value for GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS ('' trusts nothing).
+ */
+export function resolveTrustedPeers({ env = process.env, routeTable = '' } = {}) {
+  const explicit = String(env.GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS ?? '').trim();
+  if (explicit) return explicit;
+  return defaultGatewayFromRouteTable(routeTable) ?? '';
+}
+
+/**
+ * A checkout the container cannot write fails quietly: Provider Settings
+ * answers 500 and `.gev-cache` is never created, with nothing in the log. The
+ * usual cause is a clone made as root on a NAS or Proxmox host while the
+ * container runs as 1000:1000. Say so at start, naming both sets of ids.
+ * @param {{root: string, writable: boolean, owner: {uid: number, gid: number}, runAs: {uid: number, gid: number}}} input
+ * @returns {string|null} A warning, or null when the checkout is writable.
+ */
+export function unwritableRootWarning({ root, writable, owner, runAs }) {
+  if (writable) return null;
+  return (
+    `[Docker] ${root} is owned by ${owner.uid}:${owner.gid} but the container runs as ` +
+    `${runAs.uid}:${runAs.gid}, so saving keys and caching will fail. Either give ` +
+    `the checkout to that user (chown -R ${runAs.uid}:${runAs.gid} on the host) or ` +
+    `run as its owner (env UID=${owner.uid} GID=${owner.gid} docker compose up)`
+  );
+}
+
+function readRouteTable() {
+  try {
+    return readFileSync(ROUTE_TABLE, 'utf8');
+  } catch {
+    return '';
+  }
+}
+
+async function start() {
+  let writable = true;
+  try {
+    accessSync(ROOT, constants.W_OK);
+  } catch {
+    writable = false;
+  }
+  if (!writable) {
+    const { uid, gid } = statSync(ROOT);
+    console.warn(
+      unwritableRootWarning({
+        root: ROOT,
+        writable,
+        owner: { uid, gid },
+        runAs: { uid: process.getuid?.() ?? -1, gid: process.getgid?.() ?? -1 },
+      }),
+    );
+  }
+
+  const fromOperator = Boolean(
+    String(process.env.GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS ?? '').trim(),
+  );
+  const trustedPeers = resolveTrustedPeers({ routeTable: readRouteTable() });
+  if (trustedPeers) {
+    // Set before Vite is imported: the dev server snapshots process.env during
+    // configuration, and the admission gate reads it per request.
+    process.env.GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS = trustedPeers;
+    console.log(
+      fromOperator
+        ? `[Docker] Provider Settings trusted peers: ${trustedPeers} (GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS).`
+        : `[Docker] Provider Settings trusts the container gateway (${trustedPeers}).`,
+    );
+  } else {
+    console.log('[Docker] No default gateway; Provider Settings stays loopback-only.');
+  }
+
+  const port = Number.parseInt(process.env.PORT, 10) || 4173;
+  const { createServer } = await loadViteFromCanonicalRoot(ROOT);
+  const server = await createServer({
+    root: ROOT,
+    server: {
+      // The container's own namespace. compose publishes this to the host's
+      // 127.0.0.1 only; widening that mapping is the LAN opt-in.
+      host: '0.0.0.0',
+      port,
+      strictPort: true,
+    },
+  });
+  await server.listen();
+  server.printUrls();
+  console.log(`[Docker] Ready at http://localhost:${port}/`);
+
+  for (const signal of ['SIGINT', 'SIGTERM']) {
+    process.once(signal, async () => {
+      await server.close();
+      process.exit(0);
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+if (isDirectInvocation(process.argv[1], MODULE_PATH)) {
+  start().catch((error) => {
+    console.error(`[Docker] Start refused: ${error.message}`);
+    process.exitCode = 1;
+  });
+}
@@ -112,6 +112,8 @@
  "server/providers/cctv/cap.js",
  "server/providers/cctv/groundHeights.js",
  "server/providers/cctv/catalog.js",
+  "server/providers/cctv/lithuania.js",
+  "src/data/cctvLithuania.test.mjs",
  "server/providers/cctv/constants.js",
  "server/providers/cctv/media.js",
  "server/providers/cctv/normalize.js",
@@ -546,6 +548,7 @@
  "src/data/cctvEstonia.test.mjs",
  "src/data/cctvWarendorf.test.mjs",
  "src/data/cctvCalgary.test.mjs",
+  "src/data/cctvCataloniaSource.test.mjs",
  "src/data/cctvVegvesen.test.mjs",
  "src/data/cctvNyc.test.mjs",
  "src/data/cctvNswSource.test.mjs",
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@
      "server/providers/cctv/cap.js",
      "server/providers/cctv/groundHeights.js",
      "server/providers/cctv/catalog.js",
+      "server/providers/cctv/lithuania.js",
      "server/providers/cctv/constants.js",
      "server/providers/cctv/media.js",
      "server/providers/cctv/normalize.js",
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ export { CCTV_FRAME_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS, fetchCctvImageFromUpstream };
 *   GET /api/cctv/sources        — list all registered camera sources
 *   GET /api/cctv/health         — per-camera health/status report
 *   GET /api/cctv/stream/:id     — stream info (feedType, URLs) for a camera
- *   GET /api/cctv/media/:id      — proxy live video/image media from upstream
+ *   GET /api/cctv/media/:id      — proxy live video media from upstream
 *   GET /api/cctv/frame/:id      — single frame with fallback chain
 *
 * @returns {import('vite').Plugin}
@@ -164,6 +164,8 @@ export function cctvProxy({ sourceRoot = process.cwd() } = {}) {
              sourceKind:
                source.sourceKind || (source.url ? 'configured' : 'fallback'),
              poseSource: source.poseSource,
+              model: source.model || '',
+              manufacturer: source.manufacturer || '',
              license: source.license,
              credit: source.credit || '',
              code: source.code || '',
@@ -214,6 +216,21 @@ export function cctvProxy({ sourceRoot = process.cwd() } = {}) {
          const source = sourceById.get(cameraId);
          const mediaUrl = source?.url || '';
          const feedType = normalizeFeedType(source?.feedType || 'image');
+          // Live feeds only. A still camera is served by /frame, whose fetch
+          // keeps redirects on the registered origin, accepts only image/* and
+          // caps the body; relaying it here would bypass all three.
+          if (!isVideoFeedType(feedType) && feedType !== 'mjpeg') {
+            res.writeHead(404, {
+              'Content-Type': 'application/json',
+              'Cache-Control': 'no-store',
+            });
+            res.end(
+              JSON.stringify({
+                error: 'No live media for this camera; use the frame endpoint',
+              }),
+            );
+            return;
+          }
          const leaseId = url.searchParams.get('lease');
          if (feedType === 'hls' && !/^[a-f0-9-]{36}$/i.test(leaseId || '')) {
            res.writeHead(400);
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import { DEFAULT_CCTV_SOURCE_FILE, CCTV_SOURCE_CACHE_MS } from './constants.js';
 import { allocateSourceCap, resolveCatalogCap } from './cap.js';
 import { loadGroundHeights, joinGroundHeights } from './groundHeights.js';
 import { cameraRegion, normalizeSourceItem } from './normalize.js';
+import { loadLithuaniaSources } from './lithuania.js';
 import {
  loadAustinSourcesFromOpenData,
  loadCaltransSourcesFromOpenData,
@@ -17,23 +18,30 @@ import {
  loadWarendorfSourcesFromCatalog,
  loadNswSourcesFromOpenData,
  loadCalgarySourcesFromOpenData,
+  loadCataloniaSourcesFromOpenData,
  loadDelDOTSourcesFromOpenData,
+  loadKingCountySourcesFromOpenData,
+  loadWsdotSourcesFromOpenData,
  loadVegvesenSourcesFromOpenData,
  loadNycSourcesFromOpenData,
+  loadTorontoSourcesFromOpenData,
 } from './sources.js';

 /** Env kill switch: unset or anything but "0" means enabled. */
 const envEnabled = (name) => String(process.env[name] || '1').trim() !== '0';
 /** Env opt-in: only "1" enables. For packs whose feed access needs an
- * operator agreement, so an unset flag never reaches the upstream. */
+ * operator agreement or whose terms are unconfirmed, so an unset flag never
+ * reaches the upstream. */
 const envOptIn = (name) => String(process.env[name] || '').trim() === '1';

 /**
 * Live open-data packs, in merge order. Adding a region is one entry here
- * plus its loader in sources.js; the catalog cap is shared across entries
- * round-robin (cap.js), so a new pack never silently evicts an older one.
+ * plus its loader (in sources.js or its own module); the catalog cap is
+ * shared across entries round-robin (cap.js), so a new pack never silently
+ * evicts an older one.
 * Each pack fails independently (allSettled) and is gated by its own env
- * kill switch, or by an opt-in flag where access needs an agreement.
+ * kill switch, or by an opt-in flag where access needs an agreement or the
+ * terms are unconfirmed.
 */
 const LIVE_PACKS = [
  { name: 'austin', enabled: () => true, load: loadAustinSourcesFromOpenData },
@@ -92,11 +100,26 @@ const LIVE_PACKS = [
    enabled: () => envEnabled('CCTV_CALGARY_ENABLED'),
    load: loadCalgarySourcesFromOpenData,
  },
+  {
+    name: 'catalonia',
+    enabled: () => envEnabled('CCTV_CATALONIA_ENABLED'),
+    load: loadCataloniaSourcesFromOpenData,
+  },
  {
    name: 'deldot',
    enabled: () => envEnabled('CCTV_DELDOT_ENABLED'),
    load: loadDelDOTSourcesFromOpenData,
  },
+  {
+    name: 'kingcounty',
+    enabled: () => envEnabled('CCTV_KINGCOUNTY_ENABLED'),
+    load: loadKingCountySourcesFromOpenData,
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'wsdot',
+    enabled: () => envEnabled('CCTV_WSDOT_ENABLED'),
+    load: loadWsdotSourcesFromOpenData,
+  },
  {
    name: 'vegvesen',
    enabled: () => envEnabled('CCTV_VEGVESEN_ENABLED'),
@@ -109,6 +132,18 @@ const LIVE_PACKS = [
    enabled: () => envOptIn('CCTV_NYC_ENABLED'),
    load: loadNycSourcesFromOpenData,
  },
+  {
+    name: 'toronto',
+    enabled: () => envEnabled('CCTV_TORONTO_ENABLED'),
+    load: loadTorontoSourcesFromOpenData,
+  },
+  {
+    // Opt-in until the Via Lietuva open-data terms are confirmed to cover the
+    // camera photos (see DATA_SOURCES.md).
+    name: 'lithuania',
+    enabled: () => envOptIn('CCTV_LITHUANIA_ENABLED'),
+    load: loadLithuaniaSources,
+  },
 ];
 /**
 * Load CCTV sources from a local JSON file (CCTV_SOURCES_FILE env or default).
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ export const DEFAULT_AUSTIN_MAX_SOURCES = 250;
 * Catalog-wide safety ceiling on served cameras. Each pack already caps
 * itself (nearest-to-anchor first); this bound only matters when the packs
 * together exceed it, and it is then filled round-robin across packs (see
- * cap.js) so no region is silently dropped. Sized above the sum of the
- * default per-pack caps so a default install never trims.
+ * cap.js) so no region is silently dropped. The default per-pack caps
+ * together can exceed it, so a default install may be thinned evenly here.
 */
 export const DEFAULT_CCTV_MAX_SOURCES = 4000;
 /** Hard upper bound for CCTV_MAX_SOURCES; also sizes the health map. */
@@ -236,6 +236,56 @@ export const CALGARY_DOWNTOWN = { lat: 51.0461, lon: -114.0626 };
 * body cannot be buffered without limit. */
 export const CALGARY_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024;

+/**
+ * Catalonia traffic cameras (Servei Català de Trànsit): one keyless WFS/GML
+ * XML list (verified 2026-09-15, hourly catalog refresh), fetched over https
+ * (verified 2026-09-27: same 200 body, no redirect). The feed carries a
+ * `font` field naming the actual publisher per camera — SCT's own highway
+ * cameras plus hotlinked Barcelona (IMI) and Terrassa municipal cameras are
+ * kept, each confirmed to return a real frame. Frame URLs are checked
+ * against a host allowlist rather than one pinned origin, since each
+ * publisher serves from its own host.
+ */
+export const CATALONIA_CAMERAS_URL =
+  'https://www.gencat.cat/transit/opendata/cameres.xml';
+/** Byte ceiling for the Catalonia catalog read (~90 KB observed 2026-09-27),
+ * so a runaway body cannot be buffered without limit. */
+export const CATALONIA_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;
+/** Allowed image hosts, one per kept `font` publisher in the feed, each
+ * mapped to the one directory its frame links live in (every link in the
+ * 2026-10 feed shares it); a link must name a single file directly inside. */
+export const CATALONIA_IMAGE_HOSTS = Object.freeze(
+  new Map([
+    ['mct.gencat.cat', '/mct2bo/'], // SCT
+    ['www.bcn.cat', '/transit/imatges/'], // IMI (Ajuntament de Barcelona)
+    ['emap.terrassa.cat', '/it_terrassa/'], // Ajuntament de Terrassa
+  ]),
+);
+/** SCT `sctidcam` values: a bare image filename, which also keys the camera
+ * id (the feed's `fid` embeds an upstream server-start stamp). */
+export const CATALONIA_SCT_CAMERA_FILE_RE = /^[a-z0-9]+\.(gif|jpe?g)$/i;
+/** Per-`font` partner credit, shown beside the provider in the CCTV panel
+ * (same pattern as DriveBC's partner-supplied cameras). SCT is the feed's
+ * own publisher and carries no separate credit. */
+export const CATALONIA_FONT_CREDIT = Object.freeze({
+  IMI: 'Ajuntament de Barcelona',
+  Terrassa: 'Ajuntament de Terrassa',
+});
+/** Ground-elevation priors in metres, by `font`: the feed carries no
+ * elevation, and this pack spans sea level (Barcelona) to Terrassa's plateau
+ * (~270 m). The client's ground snap corrects these on 3D-tile stacks. */
+export const CATALONIA_FONT_ELEVATION_M = Object.freeze({
+  SCT: 80,
+  IMI: 20,
+  Terrassa: 270,
+});
+export const DEFAULT_CATALONIA_MAX_SOURCES = 150;
+/** Prioritization anchors: Barcelona and Terrassa. */
+export const CATALONIA_ANCHORS = [
+  { lat: 41.3874, lon: 2.1686 }, // Barcelona
+  { lat: 41.5636, lon: 2.0111 }, // Terrassa
+];
+
 /** Statens vegvesen (Norway) road cameras: the keyless OGC API Features view
 * of the official DATEX 3.1 CCTV site table, one GeoJSON request for the whole
 * country (~900 cameras). The raw DATEX node needs an account; this view does
@@ -249,9 +299,9 @@ export const VEGVESEN_IMAGE_ORIGIN =
 * per-camera manifest path is registered. */
 export const VEGVESEN_VIDEO_URL = (cameraId) =>
  `https://kamera.vegvesen.no/public/${cameraId}/manifest.m3u8`;
-/** Above the ~850 working cameras so a default install keeps them all, while
- * staying close to them: the per-pack defaults are meant to sum to no more
- * than DEFAULT_CCTV_MAX_SOURCES. */
+/** Above the ~850 working cameras so the pack keeps them all on its own. The
+ * catalog-wide DEFAULT_CCTV_MAX_SOURCES cap still applies across packs and is
+ * filled round-robin, so a full default install may thin this pack. */
 export const DEFAULT_VEGVESEN_MAX_SOURCES = 900;
 /** Hard ceiling on the catalog body. The whole country is ~800 KB. */
 export const VEGVESEN_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
@@ -305,6 +355,83 @@ export const DELDOT_ANCHORS = [
  { lat: 39.1582, lon: -75.5244 }, // Dover (Kent)
  { lat: 38.6906, lon: -75.3877 }, // Georgetown (Sussex)
 ];
+
+/** King County, WA road cameras: keyless public ArcGIS FeatureServer layer
+ * ("King County and WSDOT Traffic Cameras", King County DOT Road Services).
+ * GeoJSON with WGS84 point geometry. `outFields` is an explicit list on
+ * purpose: the layer also carries asset-administration columns (including
+ * staff names in `ModifiedBy`) that must never be fetched. Uniquely among the
+ * packs, the county publishes each camera's hardware `Manufacturer`/`Model`
+ * (Cohu 3950/3965, Bosch AUTODOME, Axis Q6135-LE, …), carried through as the
+ * source's `model`. */
+export const KING_COUNTY_CAMERAS_URL =
+  'https://services.arcgis.com/Ej0PsM5Aw677QF1W/arcgis/rest/services/TRAFFICCAMERA_POINT_2029/FeatureServer/0/query?where=1%3D1&outFields=AssetID,Location,ImageURL,Live,Model,Manufacturer,Owner,CurrentStatus&f=geojson';
+/** Frames come only from the county's own image handler host. */
+export const KING_COUNTY_IMAGE_ORIGIN = 'https://info.kingcounty.gov/';
+/** The whole catalog is ~125 rows (~59 live county cameras); no thinning by
+ * default. */
+export const DEFAULT_KING_COUNTY_MAX_SOURCES = 125;
+/** Prioritization anchor: Renton, roughly central to the county road network. */
+export const KING_COUNTY_ANCHORS = [{ lat: 47.4829, lon: -122.2171 }];
+/** Hard ceiling on the King County catalog body. The whole layer is ~125 rows
+ * and well under 100 KB; this only exists so an upstream that streams an
+ * unbounded body cannot be buffered without limit. */
+export const KING_COUNTY_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;
+/**
+ * City of Toronto RESCU traffic cameras: the municipal network the province's
+ * 511 pack does not cover — downtown arterials plus the Gardiner, DVP, Allen
+ * and Lake Shore. One keyless list for the whole city (~336 cameras), from the
+ * City's open data portal. It is fetched on every catalog refresh, but the
+ * upstream file is not updated often and may lag the live camera network.
+ *
+ * The list is served as JSONP (`jsonTMCEarthCamerasCallback({...})`); the
+ * portal publishes the same data as .xml and .csv beside it.
+ */
+export const TORONTO_RESCU_LIST_URL =
+  'https://opendata.toronto.ca/transportation/tmc/rescucameraimages/Data/tmcearthcameras.json';
+/**
+ * The only origin Toronto camera frames may come from. The list carries no URL
+ * field: frame URLs are BUILT from this origin and a strictly-digits camera
+ * number (`loc####.jpg`, the convention the dataset documents), so no upstream
+ * field can steer the frame proxy off-host.
+ */
+export const TORONTO_RESCU_IMAGE_ORIGIN =
+  'https://opendata.toronto.ca/transportation/tmc/rescucameraimages/CameraImages/';
+/** The whole city fits under this; the cap exists to stay tunable, not to trim. */
+export const DEFAULT_TORONTO_MAX_SOURCES = 336;
+/** Yonge / Queen: the prioritization anchor. */
+export const TORONTO_DOWNTOWN = { lat: 43.6532, lon: -79.3832 };
+/** The city climbs from 76 m at the lake to 209 m at Steeles, so no single
+ * number fits: this is the mean across the 336 camera sites. The ground-height
+ * sidecar has no Toronto entries yet, so this prior seeds placement; a camera
+ * that gains a sidecar entry uses it instead, and the client's ground snap
+ * corrects the prior wherever 3D tiles are loaded. */
+export const TORONTO_GROUND_ELEVATION_M = 116;
+/** Hard ceiling on the RESCU list body. The whole city is ~336 rows and under
+ * 60 KB; this only exists so an upstream that streams an unbounded body cannot
+ * be buffered without limit. */
+export const TORONTO_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
+/** WSDOT Travel Center cameras (Washington State): keyless Esri JSON on the
+ * official open-data host — ~1,700 point features in EPSG:3857 (Web Mercator),
+ * ETag/Last-Modified served. WSDOT's metadata marks the feed "low volume" use;
+ * the catalog is fetched once per CCTV_SOURCE_CACHE_MS refresh. */
+export const WSDOT_CAMERAS_URL =
+  'https://data.wsdot.wa.gov/travelcenter/Cameras.json';
+/** Only frames on WSDOT's own image host are registered; the catalog also
+ * lists ~70 partner cameras (Oregon DOT, City of Seattle, lodges, airports)
+ * whose own terms apply. */
+export const WSDOT_IMAGE_ORIGIN = 'https://images.wsdot.wa.gov/';
+export const DEFAULT_WSDOT_MAX_SOURCES = 250;
+/** Hard ceiling on the WSDOT catalog body. The live layer is ~400 KB; this
+ * only exists so an upstream that streams an unbounded body cannot be
+ * buffered without limit. */
+export const WSDOT_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
+/** Prioritization anchors: downtown Seattle and Spokane. */
+export const WSDOT_ANCHORS = [
+  { lat: 47.6062, lon: -122.3321 }, // Seattle
+  { lat: 47.6588, lon: -117.426 }, // Spokane
+];
+
 /** Camera CATALOGS change rarely; 15 min keeps multi-megabyte upstream list refetches (Austin rows.json + 4 Caltrans districts + TfL + Ontario 511) infrequent. Frames are fetched per-request and are unaffected. */
 export const CCTV_SOURCE_CACHE_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000;
 /** Per-provider catalog-fetch timeout. Bounds the worst-case refresh so one
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+import { CCTV_SOURCE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS } from './constants.js';
+import {
+  cameraDisplayCode,
+  fallbackHeadingFromId,
+  prioritizeSources,
+} from './normalize.js';
+import { readResponseJsonCapped } from '../common/http.js';
+
+const BASE = 'https://eismoinfo.lt/eismoinfo-backend';
+export const LITHUANIA_CAMERAS_URL = `${BASE}/camera-info-table`;
+// Without lks=true this endpoint returns [latitude, longitude]. The camera
+// table's x/y fields use LKS-94 metres and must never be treated as degrees.
+export const LITHUANIA_LOCATIONS_URL = `${BASE}/layer-static-features/VKR`;
+export const LITHUANIA_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
+const FRAME_PATH = '/eismoinfo-backend/image-provider/camera/last';
+const ANCHORS = [
+  { lat: 54.6872, lon: 25.2797 }, // Vilnius
+  { lat: 54.8985, lon: 23.9036 }, // Kaunas
+  { lat: 55.7033, lon: 21.1443 }, // Klaipeda
+  { lat: 55.9349, lon: 23.3137 }, // Siauliai
+  { lat: 55.7348, lon: 24.3575 }, // Panevezys
+];
+
+/** Join public catalogs by ID; register only the official still endpoint. */
+export function lithuaniaCameraToSource(row, feature) {
+  const id = String(row?.id ?? '');
+  if (!/^[1-9]\d{0,8}$/.test(id) || String(feature?.id) !== id) return null;
+  const point = feature?.points?.[0]?.point;
+  if (!Array.isArray(point) || point.length !== 2) return null;
+  const [lat, lon] = point;
+  if (
+    !Number.isFinite(lat) ||
+    !Number.isFinite(lon) ||
+    lat < 53.8 ||
+    lat > 56.5 ||
+    lon < 20.8 ||
+    lon > 26.9
+  )
+    return null;
+  try {
+    const url = new URL(row.image);
+    if (
+      url.origin !== 'https://eismoinfo.lt' ||
+      url.username ||
+      url.password ||
+      url.pathname !== FRAME_PATH ||
+      url.searchParams.get('id') !== id
+    )
+      return null;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+  // Reconstruct so extra query parameters cannot alter the request.
+  const imageUrl = `https://eismoinfo.lt${FRAME_PATH}?id=${id}`;
+  const cameraId = `lithuania-${id}`;
+  const name = String(row.name || feature.name || `Lietuva ${id}`)
+    .trim()
+    .slice(0, 160);
+  return {
+    id: cameraId,
+    name,
+    city: 'Lithuania / Lietuva',
+    cityId: 'lithuania',
+    provider: 'Via Lietuva / Eismoinfo',
+    lat,
+    lon,
+    // No calibrated pose is published; use the app's low-confidence prior.
+    headingDeg: fallbackHeadingFromId(cameraId),
+    headingConfidence: 'low',
+    pitchDeg: -18,
+    fovDeg: 44,
+    rangeM: 145,
+    mountHeightM: 8,
+    feedType: 'image',
+    url: imageUrl,
+    snapshotUrl: imageUrl,
+    sourceKind: 'eismoinfo-public',
+    credit:
+      'Via Lietuva / eismoinfo.lt — periodically updated road-camera stills',
+    code: cameraDisplayCode(name.toUpperCase()),
+  };
+}
+
+async function readCatalog(url, sibling) {
+  const signal = AbortSignal.any([
+    AbortSignal.timeout(CCTV_SOURCE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS),
+    sibling.signal,
+  ]);
+  try {
+    const response = await fetch(url, {
+      headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },
+      redirect: 'manual',
+      signal,
+    });
+    if (!response.ok) {
+      await response.body?.cancel().catch(() => {});
+      throw new Error(
+        response.status >= 300 && response.status < 400
+          ? 'catalog redirected; redirects are not followed'
+          : `Catalog HTTP ${response.status}`,
+      );
+    }
+    return await readResponseJsonCapped(
+      response,
+      LITHUANIA_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES,
+      signal,
+    );
+  } catch (error) {
+    // The join needs both catalogs; release the other request at once
+    // rather than leaving its body open until the timeout.
+    sibling.abort();
+    throw error;
+  }
+}
+
+/** Two bounded requests per shared catalog refresh, no API key required. */
+export async function loadLithuaniaSources() {
+  try {
+    const sibling = new AbortController();
+    const [rows, layers] = await Promise.all([
+      readCatalog(LITHUANIA_CAMERAS_URL, sibling),
+      readCatalog(LITHUANIA_LOCATIONS_URL, sibling),
+    ]);
+    if (!Array.isArray(rows) || !Array.isArray(layers)) return [];
+    const features = layers.find((layer) => layer?.layer === 'VKR')?.features;
+    if (!Array.isArray(features)) return [];
+    const locations = new Map(
+      features.filter(Boolean).map((feature) => [String(feature.id), feature]),
+    );
+    const cameras = new Map();
+    for (const row of rows) {
+      const camera = lithuaniaCameraToSource(
+        row,
+        locations.get(String(row?.id)),
+      );
+      if (camera && !cameras.has(camera.id)) cameras.set(camera.id, camera);
+    }
+    const rawCap = Number(process.env.CCTV_LITHUANIA_MAX_SOURCES || 400);
+    const cap = Number.isFinite(rawCap)
+      ? Math.max(1, Math.min(1000, Math.floor(rawCap)))
+      : 400;
+    const sources = prioritizeSources([...cameras.values()], cap, ANCHORS);
+    console.log(
+      `[CCTV] Loaded Lithuania camera sources: ${cameras.size} (using ${sources.length})`,
+    );
+    return sources;
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.warn(
+      '[CCTV] Lithuania camera download error:',
+      error?.message || error,
+    );
+    return [];
+  }
+}
@@ -394,6 +394,44 @@ export function isLikelyFinlandCoordinate(lat, lon) {
  return lat >= 59.5 && lat <= 70.5 && lon >= 19 && lon <= 32;
 }

+/** Catalonia bounding box (mainland is roughly 40.5..42.9 N, 0.15..3.4 E). */
+export function isLikelyCataloniaCoordinate(lat, lon) {
+  return (
+    isPlausibleLatLon(lat, lon) &&
+    lat >= 40.3 &&
+    lat <= 42.9 &&
+    lon >= 0.0 &&
+    lon <= 3.4
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decode numeric HTML character references, decimal ("&#237;") and hex
+ * ("&#xED;") alike, the entity form the Catalonia feed uses for accented
+ * place names, plus the handful of named entities XML/HTML text commonly
+ * carries. A reference that names no valid character (NUL, a surrogate, or
+ * anything past U+10FFFF) is left as written rather than thrown on, so one
+ * bad field cannot fail a whole catalog.
+ *
+ * @param {string} text
+ * @returns {string}
+ */
+export function decodeNumericEntities(text) {
+  return String(text || '')
+    .replace(/&#(?:x([0-9a-f]+)|(\d+));/gi, (match, hex, dec) => {
+      const code = hex ? Number.parseInt(hex, 16) : Number(dec);
+      const valid =
+        code > 0 && code <= 0x10ffff && (code < 0xd800 || code > 0xdfff);
+      return valid ? String.fromCodePoint(code) : match;
+    })
+    .replace(/&amp;/g, '&')
+    .replace(/&quot;/g, '"')
+    .replace(/&#39;/g, "'")
+    .replace(/&lt;/g, '<')
+    .replace(/&gt;/g, '>')
+    .trim();
+}
+
 /**
 * Human label for one Fintraffic preset (camera view).
 *
@@ -562,5 +600,30 @@ export function normalizeSourceItem(item) {
    // badge can distinguish them from raw automated priors (e.g. Austin Open
    // Data, which never sets this field). Passed through as-is to the client.
    poseSource: item.poseSource === 'curated' ? 'curated' : undefined,
+    // Optional hardware-model passthrough (additive, like poseSource): packs
+    // whose catalog publishes the camera's hardware model — King County's
+    // layer carries Manufacturer/Model per camera — pass it through so
+    // identified-hardware consumers can use it. Absent everywhere else.
+    model:
+      typeof item.model === 'string' && item.model.trim()
+        ? item.model.trim()
+        : undefined,
+    // Bare model strings collide across vendors (e.g. "3950"), so the
+    // publishing pack's manufacturer rides along for disambiguation.
+    manufacturer:
+      typeof item.manufacturer === 'string' && item.manufacturer.trim()
+        ? item.manufacturer.trim()
+        : undefined,
  };
 }
+
+/** City of Toronto bounding box (Steeles to the lake, Etobicoke to Scarborough). */
+export function isLikelyTorontoCoordinate(lat, lon) {
+  return (
+    isPlausibleLatLon(lat, lon) &&
+    lat >= 43.55 &&
+    lat <= 43.9 &&
+    lon >= -79.7 &&
+    lon <= -79.1
+  );
+}
@@ -55,10 +55,34 @@ import {
  DEFAULT_CALGARY_MAX_SOURCES,
  CALGARY_DOWNTOWN,
  CALGARY_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES,
+  CATALONIA_CAMERAS_URL,
+  CATALONIA_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES,
+  CATALONIA_IMAGE_HOSTS,
+  CATALONIA_SCT_CAMERA_FILE_RE,
+  CATALONIA_FONT_CREDIT,
+  CATALONIA_FONT_ELEVATION_M,
+  DEFAULT_CATALONIA_MAX_SOURCES,
+  CATALONIA_ANCHORS,
+  TORONTO_RESCU_LIST_URL,
+  TORONTO_RESCU_IMAGE_ORIGIN,
+  DEFAULT_TORONTO_MAX_SOURCES,
+  TORONTO_DOWNTOWN,
+  TORONTO_GROUND_ELEVATION_M,
+  TORONTO_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES,
  CCTV_SOURCE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS,
  DELDOT_CCTV_URL,
  DEFAULT_DELDOT_MAX_SOURCES,
  DELDOT_ANCHORS,
+  KING_COUNTY_CAMERAS_URL,
+  KING_COUNTY_IMAGE_ORIGIN,
+  DEFAULT_KING_COUNTY_MAX_SOURCES,
+  KING_COUNTY_ANCHORS,
+  KING_COUNTY_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES,
+  WSDOT_CAMERAS_URL,
+  WSDOT_IMAGE_ORIGIN,
+  DEFAULT_WSDOT_MAX_SOURCES,
+  WSDOT_ANCHORS,
+  WSDOT_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES,
  DEFAULT_VEGVESEN_CCTV_URL,
  VEGVESEN_IMAGE_ORIGIN,
  VEGVESEN_VIDEO_URL,
@@ -89,14 +113,21 @@ import {
  isLikelyTexasCoordinate,
  isLikelyNswCoordinate,
  isLikelyCalgaryCoordinate,
+  isLikelyCataloniaCoordinate,
+  decodeNumericEntities,
  isLikelyNycCoordinate,
  isLikelyNorwayCoordinate,
+  isLikelyTorontoCoordinate,
  cameraDisplayCode,
  rowArrayToObject,
  prioritizeSources,
 } from './normalize.js';
 import { directionToHeading } from '../../../src/data/directionText.js';
-import { readResponseJsonCapped } from '../common/http.js';
+import {
+  readResponseBytesCapped,
+  readResponseJsonCapped,
+  readResponseTextCapped,
+} from '../common/http.js';
 /**
 * Fetch and parse Austin traffic camera records from the city Open Data portal.
 *
@@ -1613,6 +1644,261 @@ export async function loadCalgarySourcesFromOpenData() {
  }
 }

+/**
+ * Parse the Catalonia (`cameres.xml`) WFS/GML feed into raw feature records.
+ * Regex-based rather than a full XML parser — the feed is small (~160
+ * features) and this avoids a new dependency for one field set per feature.
+ *
+ * @param {string} xml
+ * @returns {Array<{fid:string, lat:number, lon:number, carretera:string, municipi:string, pk:string, link:string, font:string}>}
+ */
+export function parseCataloniaXml(xml) {
+  const out = [];
+  const blockRe = /<gml:featureMember>([\s\S]*?)<\/gml:featureMember>/g;
+  const tag = (block, name) => {
+    const match = new RegExp(`<cite:${name}>([^<]*)<\\/cite:${name}>`).exec(
+      block,
+    );
+    return match ? decodeNumericEntities(match[1]) : '';
+  };
+  let match;
+  while ((match = blockRe.exec(String(xml || ''))) !== null) {
+    const block = match[1];
+    const fidMatch = /<cite:cameres\s+fid="([^"]+)"/.exec(block);
+    const coordsMatch = /<gml:coordinates[^>]*>([^<]+)<\/gml:coordinates>/.exec(
+      block,
+    );
+    if (!fidMatch || !coordsMatch) continue;
+    const [lonRaw, latRaw] = coordsMatch[1].split(',');
+    out.push({
+      fid: fidMatch[1],
+      lon: toFiniteNumber(lonRaw),
+      lat: toFiniteNumber(latRaw),
+      carretera: tag(block, 'carretera'),
+      municipi: tag(block, 'municipi'),
+      pk: tag(block, 'pk'),
+      link: tag(block, 'link'),
+      font: tag(block, 'font'),
+    });
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate and normalize one Catalonia feed `link` against the publisher
+ * host allowlist (CATALONIA_IMAGE_HOSTS), upgrading to https. Rejects
+ * anything else, including a host that merely resembles an allowed one, any
+ * URL carrying userinfo (`https://user:[email protected]/...`) or an explicit
+ * port — the hostname check alone would pass either, letting catalog data
+ * inject credentials or steer the server-side frame request to another
+ * service on that host — and any path outside the host's frame directory.
+ *
+ * SCT's own `RenderService` frame link is a special case, for two stacked
+ * reasons (both verified 2026-09-15):
+ *  1. It always 302s to `TransitCamera`, on a Location the upstream
+ *     hardcodes as plain http even when RenderService itself was requested
+ *     over https. fetchWithinHost (media.js) only follows same-origin
+ *     redirects — same scheme included, by design, to stop an upstream
+ *     steering a host-pinned request into a plaintext downgrade — so that
+ *     hop is refused and the camera would render as a placeholder.
+ *  2. mct.gencat.cat's TLS setup itself does not complete a handshake with
+ *     Node's fetch/OpenSSL (`ERR_SSL_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE`) even though it
+ *     is reachable over https from other clients (e.g. curl) — an upstream
+ *     server misconfiguration this proxy cannot route around.
+ * TransitCamera answers the frame directly over **http**, no redirect, and
+ * that is the only transport this host actually serves to this runtime — so
+ * this builds that URL itself from RenderService's `sctidcam` id instead of
+ * registering the (https, then-redirecting) RenderService link. The
+ * `sctidcam` id must be a bare image filename (CATALONIA_SCT_CAMERA_FILE_RE).
+ *
+ * @param {string} rawUrl
+ * @returns {string} Normalized URL, or '' if not accepted.
+ */
+export function normalizeCataloniaImageUrl(rawUrl) {
+  let parsed;
+  try {
+    parsed = new URL(String(rawUrl || '').trim());
+  } catch {
+    return '';
+  }
+  if (parsed.protocol !== 'http:' && parsed.protocol !== 'https:') return '';
+  if (parsed.username || parsed.password || parsed.port) return '';
+  const dir = CATALONIA_IMAGE_HOSTS.get(parsed.hostname);
+  if (!dir || !parsed.pathname.startsWith(dir)) return '';
+  const file = parsed.pathname.slice(dir.length);
+  if (!file || file.includes('/')) return '';
+
+  if (parsed.hostname === 'mct.gencat.cat') {
+    const camId = parsed.searchParams.get('sctidcam');
+    if (file !== 'RenderService') return '';
+    if (!camId || !CATALONIA_SCT_CAMERA_FILE_RE.test(camId)) return '';
+    const direct = new URL('http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/TransitCamera');
+    direct.searchParams.set('nom', camId);
+    direct.searchParams.set('visualitzacio', 'imatge');
+    return direct.toString();
+  }
+
+  parsed.protocol = 'https:';
+  return parsed.toString();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Stable camera id for one normalized Catalonia frame URL (the output of
+ * normalizeCataloniaImageUrl). The feed's `fid` is not used: it embeds an
+ * upstream server-start stamp and changes on every upstream restart. SCT
+ * cameras key on the `sctidcam` filename stem (`cat-sct-nc87`), partner
+ * cameras on the frame host and path (`cat-www-bcn-cat-transit-imatges-…`).
+ *
+ * @param {string} imageUrl - A URL normalizeCataloniaImageUrl accepted.
+ * @returns {string}
+ */
+export function cataloniaCameraId(imageUrl) {
+  const parsed = new URL(imageUrl);
+  const slug = (text) =>
+    text
+      .toLowerCase()
+      .replace(/[^a-z0-9]+/g, '-')
+      .replace(/^-+|-+$/g, '');
+  if (parsed.hostname === 'mct.gencat.cat') {
+    const file = parsed.searchParams.get('nom') || '';
+    return `cat-sct-${slug(file.replace(/\.[^.]*$/, ''))}`;
+  }
+  return `cat-${slug(parsed.hostname)}-${slug(parsed.pathname)}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Human label for one Catalonia camera: "<road/place> (<municipality>)",
+ * skipping the parenthetical when the municipality is already named in the
+ * road/place text or when one half is missing.
+ *
+ * @param {string} carretera
+ * @param {string} municipi
+ * @returns {string}
+ */
+export function cataloniaCameraName(carretera, municipi) {
+  const road = String(carretera || '').trim();
+  const city = String(municipi || '').trim();
+  if (road && city) {
+    return road.toLowerCase().includes(city.toLowerCase())
+      ? road
+      : `${road} (${city})`;
+  }
+  return road || city || 'Càmera de trànsit';
+}
+
+/**
+ * Fetch Catalonia traffic cameras (Servei Català de Trànsit), keyless: one
+ * WFS/GML XML list. The feed carries a `font` field naming the real
+ * publisher per camera; only SCT's own highway cameras and the hotlinked
+ * Barcelona (IMI) and Terrassa municipal cameras are kept — the publishers
+ * whose frame links were confirmed to serve images. Frame URLs are checked
+ * against a host allowlist (CATALONIA_IMAGE_HOSTS), so a row from any other
+ * publisher is dropped. The feed carries no camera status, so a camera its
+ * publisher has taken offline still registers and serves that publisher's
+ * own "image unavailable" still.
+ * Each non-SCT camera carries its publisher as a `credit` alongside the
+ * shared `provider`. The feed carries no heading, so every camera takes the
+ * id-hash fallback, low-confidence pose (same as TfL and Fintraffic).
+ *
+ * Ids come from the validated frame URL (cataloniaCameraId), not the feed's
+ * restart-dependent `fid`, and rows sharing one are collapsed before the cap
+ * (the live feed repeats a few SCT cameras).
+ *
+ * The list decides ids, coordinates, labels and which allowlisted frame path
+ * is proxied, so it is fetched over https, redirects are refused (the list
+ * host cannot be steered or downgraded) and the body read is capped at
+ * CATALONIA_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES.
+ *
+ * @returns {Promise<Array<object>>} Normalized camera source objects.
+ */
+export async function loadCataloniaSourcesFromOpenData() {
+  try {
+    const resp = await fetch(CATALONIA_CAMERAS_URL, {
+      headers: { Accept: 'application/xml,text/xml,*/*' },
+      redirect: 'manual',
+      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(CCTV_SOURCE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS),
+    });
+    // A response this loader will not read still owns its transport until the
+    // body is released, so every rejection path cancels before returning.
+    const discard = async () => {
+      try {
+        await resp.body?.cancel();
+      } catch {
+        /* no-op */
+      }
+      return [];
+    };
+    if (resp.status >= 300 && resp.status < 400) {
+      console.warn(
+        '[CCTV] Catalonia catalog redirected; redirects are not followed',
+      );
+      return discard();
+    }
+    if (!resp.ok) {
+      console.warn('[CCTV] Catalonia camera download failed:', resp.status);
+      return discard();
+    }
+    const xml = await readResponseTextCapped(resp, CATALONIA_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES);
+    const rows = parseCataloniaXml(xml);
+    if (!rows.length) return [];
+
+    const cameras = [];
+    for (const row of rows) {
+      if (!isLikelyCataloniaCoordinate(row.lat, row.lon)) continue;
+      const imageUrl = normalizeCataloniaImageUrl(row.link);
+      if (!imageUrl) continue;
+
+      const font = row.font.trim();
+      const cameraId = cataloniaCameraId(imageUrl);
+
+      cameras.push({
+        id: cameraId,
+        name: cataloniaCameraName(row.carretera, row.municipi),
+        city: row.municipi.trim() || 'Catalunya',
+        cityId: 'catalunya',
+        provider: 'Servei Català de Trànsit',
+        lat: row.lat,
+        lon: row.lon,
+        headingDeg: fallbackHeadingFromId(cameraId),
+        headingConfidence: 'low',
+        pitchDeg: -18,
+        fovDeg: 44,
+        rangeM: 145,
+        mountHeightM: 8,
+        groundElevationM: CATALONIA_FONT_ELEVATION_M[font] ?? 80,
+        feedType: 'image',
+        url: imageUrl,
+        snapshotUrl: imageUrl,
+        sourceKind: 'catalonia-open-data',
+        license:
+          "Generalitat de Catalunya — Llicència oberta d'ús d'informació",
+        credit: CATALONIA_FONT_CREDIT[font] || '',
+      });
+    }
+
+    const unique = Array.from(
+      new Map(cameras.map((camera) => [camera.id, camera])).values(),
+    );
+    const maxRaw = Number(
+      process.env.CCTV_CATALONIA_MAX_SOURCES || DEFAULT_CATALONIA_MAX_SOURCES,
+    );
+    const maxCount = Number.isFinite(maxRaw)
+      ? Math.max(8, Math.min(600, Math.floor(maxRaw)))
+      : DEFAULT_CATALONIA_MAX_SOURCES;
+    const prioritized = prioritizeSources(unique, maxCount, CATALONIA_ANCHORS);
+    console.log(
+      `[CCTV] Loaded Catalonia camera sources: ${unique.length} (using nearest ${prioritized.length})`,
+    );
+    return prioritized;
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.warn(
+      '[CCTV] Catalonia camera download error:',
+      error?.message || error,
+    );
+    return [];
+  }
+}
+
 export async function loadDelDOTSourcesFromOpenData() {
  try {
    const resp = await fetch(DELDOT_CCTV_URL, {
@@ -1717,6 +2003,319 @@ export async function loadDelDOTSourcesFromOpenData() {
  }
 }

+/** Rough King County, WA bounding box. */
+function isLikelyKingCountyCoordinate(lat, lon) {
+  return (
+    Number.isFinite(lat) &&
+    Number.isFinite(lon) &&
+    lat >= 47.0 &&
+    lat <= 48.0 &&
+    lon >= -123.1 &&
+    lon <= -121.0
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * A King County `Model` value, whitespace-collapsed, or '' when it is a
+ * vendor-generic string ("PTZ", "PTZ IP", "BOSCH/PTZ") that names no model.
+ */
+function kingCountyModel(raw) {
+  const model = String(raw || '')
+    .replace(/\s+/g, ' ')
+    .trim();
+  return /^(?:[a-z]+\/)?ptz(?: ip)?$/i.test(model) ? '' : model;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Fetch King County road cameras (Washington State). Keyless: one public
+ * ArcGIS FeatureServer GeoJSON query (King County DOT Road Services), with an
+ * explicit `outFields` list so the layer's asset-administration columns are
+ * never fetched. Only cameras that are live and active (`Live`,
+ * `CurrentStatus`) with a positive integer id, finite in-county coordinates,
+ * and a frame on the county's own image handler are kept. WSDOT-owned rows in
+ * the layer are skipped because their frames are WSDOT-hosted, outside the
+ * pinned image origin, while partner-city cameras hosted on the county image
+ * handler (e.g. Newcastle) name their owner as the per-camera credit,
+ * DriveBC-style. The layer publishes no facing, so every heading is the id
+ * hash at low confidence.
+ *
+ * Uniquely among the packs, the county publishes each camera's hardware
+ * `Manufacturer`/`Model`; the model string (whitespace-collapsed — the feed
+ * carries stray newlines) rides along as the source's `model` for
+ * identified-hardware consumers. Vendor-generic strings ("PTZ", "PTZ IP",
+ * "BOSCH/PTZ") name no model and are treated as absent.
+ *
+ * @returns {Promise<Array<object>>} Normalized camera source objects.
+ */
+export async function loadKingCountySourcesFromOpenData() {
+  try {
+    const resp = await fetch(KING_COUNTY_CAMERAS_URL, {
+      headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },
+      redirect: 'manual',
+      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(CCTV_SOURCE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS),
+    });
+    // A response this loader will not read still owns its transport until the
+    // body is released, so every rejection path cancels before returning.
+    const discard = async () => {
+      try {
+        await resp.body?.cancel();
+      } catch {
+        /* no-op */
+      }
+      return [];
+    };
+    if (resp.status >= 300 && resp.status < 400) {
+      console.warn(
+        '[CCTV] King County catalog redirected; redirects are not followed',
+      );
+      return discard();
+    }
+    if (!resp.ok) {
+      console.warn('[CCTV] King County camera download failed:', resp.status);
+      return discard();
+    }
+    const payload = await readResponseJsonCapped(
+      resp,
+      KING_COUNTY_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES,
+    );
+    const rows = Array.isArray(payload?.features) ? payload.features : [];
+
+    const cameras = [];
+    const seen = new Set();
+    for (const row of rows) {
+      const attrs = row?.properties;
+      const rawId = attrs?.AssetID;
+      if (!Number.isSafeInteger(rawId) || rawId <= 0) continue;
+      if (attrs.Live !== 1) continue;
+      if (String(attrs.CurrentStatus || '').trim() !== 'Active') continue;
+      const owner = String(attrs.Owner || '').trim();
+      // WSDOT-owned rows serve WSDOT-hosted frames, outside the pinned
+      // county image origin, so they are skipped.
+      if (owner === 'WSDOT') continue;
+      // The handler is served over HTTPS; the feed still writes http://.
+      const imageUrl = String(attrs.ImageURL || '')
+        .trim()
+        .replace(/^http:\/\/info\.kingcounty\.gov\//, KING_COUNTY_IMAGE_ORIGIN);
+      if (!imageUrl.startsWith(KING_COUNTY_IMAGE_ORIGIN)) continue;
+      const [lon, lat] = Array.isArray(row?.geometry?.coordinates)
+        ? row.geometry.coordinates
+        : [];
+      if (!isLikelyKingCountyCoordinate(lat, lon)) continue;
+
+      const cameraId = `kingcounty-${rawId}`;
+      if (seen.has(cameraId)) continue;
+      seen.add(cameraId);
+      const model = kingCountyModel(attrs.Model);
+      const manufacturer = String(attrs.Manufacturer || '')
+        .replace(/\s+/g, ' ')
+        .trim();
+      const camera = {
+        id: cameraId,
+        name:
+          String(attrs.Location || '').trim() || `King County camera ${rawId}`,
+        city: 'King County',
+        cityId: 'king-county',
+        provider: 'King County Road Services',
+        lat,
+        lon,
+        headingDeg: fallbackHeadingFromId(cameraId),
+        headingConfidence: 'low',
+        // The low-confidence pose personality shared by the other packs.
+        pitchDeg: -18,
+        fovDeg: 44,
+        rangeM: 145,
+        mountHeightM: 8,
+        feedType: 'image',
+        url: imageUrl,
+        snapshotUrl: imageUrl,
+        sourceKind: 'kingcounty-open-data',
+        license: 'King County GIS open data (KCGIS Center terms of use)',
+        credit: owner && owner !== 'King County' ? owner : '',
+      };
+      if (model) camera.model = model;
+      if (model && manufacturer) camera.manufacturer = manufacturer;
+      cameras.push(camera);
+    }
+
+    const maxRaw = Number(
+      process.env.CCTV_KINGCOUNTY_MAX_SOURCES ||
+        DEFAULT_KING_COUNTY_MAX_SOURCES,
+    );
+    const maxCount = Number.isFinite(maxRaw)
+      ? Math.max(8, Math.min(1200, Math.floor(maxRaw)))
+      : DEFAULT_KING_COUNTY_MAX_SOURCES;
+    const prioritized = prioritizeSources(
+      cameras,
+      maxCount,
+      KING_COUNTY_ANCHORS,
+    );
+    console.log(
+      `[CCTV] Loaded King County camera sources: ${cameras.length} published (using nearest ${prioritized.length})`,
+    );
+    return prioritized;
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.warn(
+      '[CCTV] King County camera download error:',
+      error?.message || error,
+    );
+    return [];
+  }
+}
+
+/** WSDOT `CompassDirection` codes as headings in degrees. The live feed sends
+ * single cardinals (N/E/S/W), `B` (both directions — most rows), `O`, and
+ * null; the diagonals are mapped in case they appear. `B`, `O`, null, and any
+ * other code carry no single facing and fall through to the id hash. */
+const WSDOT_COMPASS_HEADINGS = Object.freeze({
+  N: 0,
+  NE: 45,
+  E: 90,
+  SE: 135,
+  S: 180,
+  SW: 225,
+  W: 270,
+  NW: 315,
+});
+
+/**
+ * Converts an EPSG:3857 (Web Mercator) coordinate pair to WGS84 degrees.
+ * The WSDOT camera layer publishes point geometry in wkid 102100.
+ * @param {number} x - Web Mercator metres east.
+ * @param {number} y - Web Mercator metres north.
+ * @returns {{lat: number, lon: number}} WGS84 degrees.
+ */
+export function webMercatorToWgs84(x, y) {
+  const R = 6378137;
+  const lon = (x / R) * (180 / Math.PI);
+  const lat = (2 * Math.atan(Math.exp(y / R)) - Math.PI / 2) * (180 / Math.PI);
+  return { lat, lon };
+}
+
+/** Rough Washington State bounding box (with the Columbia River border cams). */
+function isLikelyWashingtonCoordinate(lat, lon) {
+  return (
+    Number.isFinite(lat) &&
+    Number.isFinite(lon) &&
+    lat >= 45.3 &&
+    lat <= 49.3 &&
+    lon >= -125 &&
+    lon <= -116.5
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Fetch WSDOT highway cameras (Washington State). Keyless: one Esri JSON
+ * layer on WSDOT's official open-data host (the same layer the WSDOT Travel
+ * Center map consumes; a keyed Traveler Information API serves the identical
+ * population for higher-volume use). Only cameras with a positive integer id,
+ * finite in-state coordinates, and a frame on WSDOT's own image host are
+ * kept — the catalog's ~70 partner cameras (Oregon DOT, City of Seattle,
+ * lodges, airports) are skipped rather than proxied under someone else's
+ * terms. A single-facing `CompassDirection` (a cardinal) gives a
+ * high-confidence heading; `B` (both directions), `O`, and null fall back to
+ * the id hash.
+ * The feed carries Windows-1252 bytes (en-dashes in titles) with no charset
+ * declaration, so the body is decoded explicitly before parsing.
+ *
+ * @returns {Promise<Array<object>>} Normalized camera source objects.
+ */
+export async function loadWsdotSourcesFromOpenData() {
+  try {
+    const resp = await fetch(WSDOT_CAMERAS_URL, {
+      headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },
+      redirect: 'manual',
+      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(CCTV_SOURCE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS),
+    });
+    const discard = async () => {
+      try {
+        await resp.body?.cancel();
+      } catch {
+        /* no-op */
+      }
+      return [];
+    };
+    if (resp.status >= 300 && resp.status < 400) {
+      console.warn(
+        '[CCTV] WSDOT catalog redirected; redirects are not followed',
+      );
+      return discard();
+    }
+    if (!resp.ok) {
+      console.warn('[CCTV] WSDOT camera download failed:', resp.status);
+      return discard();
+    }
+    const payload = JSON.parse(
+      new TextDecoder('windows-1252').decode(
+        await readResponseBytesCapped(resp, WSDOT_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES),
+      ),
+    );
+    const rows = Array.isArray(payload?.features) ? payload.features : [];
+
+    const cameras = [];
+    for (const row of rows) {
+      const attrs = row?.attributes;
+      const rawId = attrs?.CameraID;
+      if (!Number.isSafeInteger(rawId) || rawId <= 0) continue;
+      const imageUrl = String(attrs.ImageURL || '').trim();
+      if (!imageUrl.startsWith(WSDOT_IMAGE_ORIGIN)) continue;
+      const x = row?.geometry?.x;
+      const y = row?.geometry?.y;
+      if (!Number.isFinite(x) || !Number.isFinite(y)) continue;
+      const { lat, lon } = webMercatorToWgs84(x, y);
+      if (!isLikelyWashingtonCoordinate(lat, lon)) continue;
+
+      const cameraId = `wsdot-${rawId}`;
+      const heading =
+        WSDOT_COMPASS_HEADINGS[
+          String(attrs.CompassDirection || '')
+            .trim()
+            .toUpperCase()
+        ];
+      const hasHeading = Number.isFinite(heading);
+      cameras.push({
+        id: cameraId,
+        name: String(attrs.CameraTitle || '').trim() || `WSDOT camera ${rawId}`,
+        city: 'Washington',
+        cityId: 'washington-state',
+        provider: 'WSDOT',
+        lat,
+        lon,
+        headingDeg: hasHeading ? heading : fallbackHeadingFromId(cameraId),
+        headingConfidence: hasHeading ? 'high' : 'low',
+        // Same two pose personalities as the other packs: raw priors that the
+        // client's ground snap and manual calibration refine.
+        pitchDeg: hasHeading ? -24 : -18,
+        fovDeg: hasHeading ? 56 : 44,
+        rangeM: hasHeading ? 210 : 145,
+        mountHeightM: hasHeading ? 10 : 8,
+        feedType: 'image',
+        url: imageUrl,
+        snapshotUrl: imageUrl,
+        sourceKind: 'wsdot-open-data',
+        license: 'WSDOT Travel Center camera data (public low-volume feed)',
+      });
+    }
+
+    const maxRaw = Number(
+      process.env.CCTV_WSDOT_MAX_SOURCES || DEFAULT_WSDOT_MAX_SOURCES,
+    );
+    const maxCount = Number.isFinite(maxRaw)
+      ? Math.max(8, Math.min(1200, Math.floor(maxRaw)))
+      : DEFAULT_WSDOT_MAX_SOURCES;
+    const prioritized = prioritizeSources(cameras, maxCount, WSDOT_ANCHORS);
+    console.log(
+      `[CCTV] Loaded WSDOT camera sources: ${cameras.length} published (using nearest ${prioritized.length})`,
+    );
+    return prioritized;
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.warn(
+      '[CCTV] WSDOT camera download error:',
+      error?.message || error,
+    );
+    return [];
+  }
+}
+
 /**
 * One Statens vegvesen `CctvSimple` feature -> one catalog source, or null.
 *
@@ -2016,3 +2615,172 @@ export async function loadNycSourcesFromOpenData() {
    return [];
  }
 }
+
+/**
+ * The JSONP envelope the City of Toronto wraps its camera list in. Anchored at
+ * both ends, so only that exact callback is unwrapped — a payload that merely
+ * contains the name somewhere is not treated as the list.
+ */
+const RESCU_JSONP = /^jsonTMCEarthCamerasCallback\(([\s\S]*)\)\s*;?$/;
+
+/**
+ * Unwrap the RESCU camera list. The portal serves the list as JSONP; should it
+ * ever drop the wrapper, the bare JSON document still parses. Anything else —
+ * a foreign callback, a truncated body, an error page — yields no cameras
+ * rather than a thrown loader.
+ *
+ * @param {string} text - Raw response body.
+ * @returns {Array<object>} The `Data` rows, or [] when the body is unusable.
+ */
+export function parseRescuCameraList(text) {
+  const body = String(text ?? '').trim();
+  if (!body) return [];
+  const unwrapped = RESCU_JSONP.exec(body)?.[1] ?? body;
+  try {
+    const parsed = JSON.parse(unwrapped);
+    const rows = parsed?.Data ?? parsed?.data;
+    return Array.isArray(rows) ? rows : [];
+  } catch {
+    return [];
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Convert one RESCU list row into a camera source.
+ *
+ * The row carries no URL: the frame URL is built from the documented
+ * `loc####.jpg` convention and a camera number validated as plain digits, so
+ * the frame proxy is pinned to the city origin by construction and no upstream
+ * field — present or planted — can steer it.
+ *
+ * No compass heading exists in this dataset. `D1`-`D4` are the directions of
+ * the *comparison* images (static reference stills captured in 2016, served
+ * from a different path); the live frame is one pan-tilt-zoom camera pointing
+ * wherever the operator left it. Treating those letters as a facing would put
+ * a confident, wrong bearing on every camera in the city, so every row takes
+ * the id-hash fallback and the low-confidence pose, as headingless Austin,
+ * TfL, Fintraffic and Calgary cameras do.
+ *
+ * @param {object} row - One entry from the RESCU `Data` array.
+ * @returns {object|null} Normalized camera source, or null when unusable.
+ */
+export function torontoCameraToSource(row) {
+  if (!row || typeof row !== 'object') return null;
+  const number = String(row.Number ?? row.number ?? '').trim();
+  // Plain digits only: a number is about to become a URL path segment.
+  if (!/^\d{1,6}$/.test(number)) return null;
+
+  const lat = toFiniteNumber(row.Latitude ?? row.latitude);
+  const lon = toFiniteNumber(row.Longitude ?? row.longitude);
+  if (!isLikelyTorontoCoordinate(lat, lon)) return null;
+
+  const cameraId = `toronto-${number}`;
+  // The feed's own label, verbatim. It is upper-case ("MCCOWAN RD", "ST
+  // HELEN'S AVE"); title-casing it would mangle more names than it fixed.
+  const name =
+    String(row.Name ?? row.name ?? '')
+      .replace(/\s+/g, ' ')
+      .trim() || `Toronto Camera ${number}`;
+
+  return {
+    id: cameraId,
+    name,
+    city: 'Toronto',
+    cityId: 'toronto',
+    provider: 'City of Toronto',
+    lat,
+    lon,
+    headingDeg: fallbackHeadingFromId(cameraId),
+    headingConfidence: 'low',
+    pitchDeg: -18,
+    fovDeg: 44,
+    rangeM: 145,
+    mountHeightM: 8,
+    groundElevationM: TORONTO_GROUND_ELEVATION_M,
+    feedType: 'image',
+    url: `${TORONTO_RESCU_IMAGE_ORIGIN}loc${number}.jpg`,
+    snapshotUrl: `${TORONTO_RESCU_IMAGE_ORIGIN}loc${number}.jpg`,
+    sourceKind: 'toronto-rescu-open-data',
+    license:
+      'Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence – Toronto',
+    // Unselected-label code: the intersection, so a camera at rest reads as a
+    // place rather than as its id.
+    code: cameraDisplayCode(name.toUpperCase()),
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Fetch City of Toronto RESCU traffic cameras from the City's open data
+ * portal, keyless. One JSONP list for the whole city; frames are stills on the
+ * same portal origin.
+ *
+ * The list fetch refuses redirects (`redirect: 'manual'`) so the list host
+ * cannot be steered, and caps the body it will buffer.
+ *
+ * Attribution: Open Government Licence – Toronto, registered in
+ * src/data/dataCredits.js.
+ *
+ * @returns {Promise<Array<object>>} Normalized camera source objects.
+ */
+export async function loadTorontoSourcesFromOpenData() {
+  try {
+    const endpoint =
+      process.env.CCTV_TORONTO_LIST_URL || TORONTO_RESCU_LIST_URL;
+    const resp = await fetch(endpoint, {
+      headers: { Accept: 'application/json, text/javascript' },
+      redirect: 'manual',
+      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(CCTV_SOURCE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS),
+    });
+    // A response this loader will not read still owns its transport until the
+    // body is released, so every rejection path cancels before returning.
+    const discard = async () => {
+      try {
+        await resp.body?.cancel();
+      } catch {
+        /* no-op */
+      }
+      return [];
+    };
+    if (resp.status >= 300 && resp.status < 400) {
+      console.warn(
+        '[CCTV] Toronto camera list redirected; redirects are not followed',
+      );
+      return discard();
+    }
+    if (!resp.ok) {
+      console.warn('[CCTV] Toronto camera download failed:', resp.status);
+      return discard();
+    }
+    const text = await readResponseTextCapped(resp, TORONTO_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES);
+    const rows = parseRescuCameraList(text);
+    if (!rows.length) return [];
+
+    const cameras = [];
+    const seen = new Set();
+    for (const record of rows) {
+      const camera = torontoCameraToSource(record);
+      if (!camera || seen.has(camera.id)) continue;
+      seen.add(camera.id);
+      cameras.push(camera);
+    }
+    const maxRaw = Number(
+      process.env.CCTV_TORONTO_MAX_SOURCES || DEFAULT_TORONTO_MAX_SOURCES,
+    );
+    const maxCount = Number.isFinite(maxRaw)
+      ? Math.max(8, Math.min(500, Math.floor(maxRaw)))
+      : DEFAULT_TORONTO_MAX_SOURCES;
+    const prioritized = prioritizeSources(cameras, maxCount, [
+      TORONTO_DOWNTOWN,
+    ]);
+    console.log(
+      `[CCTV] Loaded Toronto camera sources: ${cameras.length} (using nearest ${prioritized.length})`,
+    );
+    return prioritized;
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.warn(
+      '[CCTV] Toronto camera download error:',
+      error?.message || error,
+    );
+    return [];
+  }
+}
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ function number(value, min, max) {
  const n = Number(value);
  return Number.isFinite(n) && n >= min && n <= max ? n : null;
 }
+// NHC stamps an advisory with its nominal time (e.g. 03:00Z) and publishes it
+// up to about half an hour before; allow that, but not a clock far ahead.
+const EARLY_ADVISORY_MS = 90 * 60_000;
 function iso(value, now) {
  if (
    typeof value !== 'string' ||
@@ -52,7 +55,7 @@ function iso(value, now) {
  const n = Date.parse(value);
  if (
    !Number.isFinite(n) ||
-    n > now + 5 * 60_000 ||
+    n > now + EARLY_ADVISORY_MS ||
    now - n > 12 * HOUR ||
    new Date(n).toISOString().replace('.000Z', 'Z') !==
      value.replace('.000Z', 'Z')
@@ -0,0 +1,683 @@
+import { test } from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import fs from 'node:fs';
+import os from 'node:os';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { createCctvCatalog } from '../../server/providers/cctv/catalog.js';
+import {
+  CATALONIA_CAMERAS_URL,
+  CATALONIA_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES,
+} from '../../server/providers/cctv/constants.js';
+import { decodeNumericEntities } from '../../server/providers/cctv/normalize.js';
+import {
+  parseCataloniaXml,
+  normalizeCataloniaImageUrl,
+  cataloniaCameraName,
+  loadCataloniaSourcesFromOpenData,
+} from '../../server/providers/cctv/sources.js';
+
+/** Set (or, for `undefined`, delete) environment variables for one test. */
+function withEnv(t, env) {
+  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(env)) {
+    const previous = process.env[name];
+    t.after(() => {
+      if (previous === undefined) delete process.env[name];
+      else process.env[name] = previous;
+    });
+    if (value === undefined) delete process.env[name];
+    else process.env[name] = value;
+  }
+}
+
+/** Silence the loaders' progress and failure logging. */
+function quiet(t) {
+  t.mock.method(console, 'log', () => {});
+  t.mock.method(console, 'warn', () => {});
+}
+
+/**
+ * A response whose body is a live stream, plus a flag that flips when the
+ * stream is cancelled. A rejection path that returns without cancelling holds
+ * the transport open, so the flag is what the refusal tests actually assert.
+ */
+const streamingResponse = (init = {}) => {
+  const state = { cancelled: false };
+  const body = new ReadableStream({
+    start(controller) {
+      controller.enqueue(new TextEncoder().encode('<?xml'));
+    },
+    cancel() {
+      state.cancelled = true;
+    },
+  });
+  return { response: new Response(body, init), state };
+};
+
+/** One `<gml:featureMember>` block matching the real feed's shape. */
+function cataloniaFeature({
+  fid,
+  lon,
+  lat,
+  carretera = '',
+  municipi = '',
+  pk = '',
+  link = '',
+  font = '',
+}) {
+  const pkTag = pk ? `<cite:pk>${pk}</cite:pk>` : '';
+  return (
+    `<gml:featureMember><cite:cameres fid="${fid}">` +
+    `<cite:geom><gml:Point srsName="http://www.opengis.net/gml/srs/epsg.xml#4326">` +
+    `<gml:coordinates xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml" decimal="." cs="," ts=" ">${lon},${lat}</gml:coordinates>` +
+    `</gml:Point></cite:geom>` +
+    `<cite:carretera>${carretera}</cite:carretera>` +
+    `<cite:municipi>${municipi}</cite:municipi>${pkTag}` +
+    `<cite:link>${link}</cite:link>` +
+    `<cite:font>${font}</cite:font>` +
+    `</cite:cameres></gml:featureMember>`
+  );
+}
+
+function cataloniaFeed(features) {
+  return (
+    '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><wfs:FeatureCollection xmlns:wfs="http://www.opengis.net/wfs">' +
+    features.join('') +
+    '</wfs:FeatureCollection>'
+  );
+}
+
+test('parseCataloniaXml extracts every field from a feature block', () => {
+  const xml = cataloniaFeed([
+    cataloniaFeature({
+      fid: 'cameres.fid-52bf6eca_1a0a06bea1c_386f',
+      lon: '2.1849528',
+      lat: '41.45989301',
+      carretera: 'C-58',
+      municipi: 'Nus Trinitat',
+      pk: '0.50',
+      link: 'http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/RenderService?sctidcam=nc87.gif',
+      font: 'SCT',
+    }),
+  ]);
+  const rows = parseCataloniaXml(xml);
+  assert.equal(rows.length, 1);
+  assert.deepEqual(rows[0], {
+    fid: 'cameres.fid-52bf6eca_1a0a06bea1c_386f',
+    lon: 2.1849528,
+    lat: 41.45989301,
+    carretera: 'C-58',
+    municipi: 'Nus Trinitat',
+    pk: '0.50',
+    link: 'http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/RenderService?sctidcam=nc87.gif',
+    font: 'SCT',
+  });
+});
+
+test('normalizeCataloniaImageUrl rewrites SCT RenderService links to the direct http TransitCamera URL', () => {
+  // RenderService always 302s to a hardcoded http:// Location (which
+  // fetchWithinHost refuses as a scheme downgrade), and mct.gencat.cat's TLS
+  // setup fails the handshake with Node's fetch regardless — TransitCamera
+  // over plain http is the only transport that actually works here, so we
+  // build that URL from RenderService's sctidcam id instead of registering
+  // the redirector.
+  assert.equal(
+    normalizeCataloniaImageUrl(
+      'http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/RenderService?sctidcam=nc87.gif',
+    ),
+    'http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/TransitCamera?nom=nc87.gif&visualitzacio=imatge',
+  );
+  assert.equal(
+    normalizeCataloniaImageUrl(
+      'https://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/RenderService?sctidcam=sc64.gif',
+    ),
+    'http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/TransitCamera?nom=sc64.gif&visualitzacio=imatge',
+    'an already-https RenderService link is rewritten the same way',
+  );
+  assert.equal(
+    normalizeCataloniaImageUrl('https://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/RenderService'),
+    '',
+    'a RenderService link with no sctidcam id is rejected',
+  );
+});
+
+test('normalizeCataloniaImageUrl accepts the other registered hosts, upgraded to https', () => {
+  assert.equal(
+    normalizeCataloniaImageUrl('http://www.bcn.cat/transit/imatges/a.gif'),
+    'https://www.bcn.cat/transit/imatges/a.gif',
+  );
+  assert.equal(
+    normalizeCataloniaImageUrl(
+      'https://emap.terrassa.cat/it_terrassa/cam02.jpeg',
+    ),
+    'https://emap.terrassa.cat/it_terrassa/cam02.jpeg',
+  );
+  assert.equal(
+    normalizeCataloniaImageUrl('https://evil.example.com/mct.gencat.cat.gif'),
+    '',
+    'a look-alike host is rejected',
+  );
+  assert.equal(
+    normalizeCataloniaImageUrl('https://unlisted-publisher.example/frame.gif'),
+    '',
+    'any host outside the allowlist is rejected',
+  );
+  assert.equal(normalizeCataloniaImageUrl(''), '');
+  assert.equal(normalizeCataloniaImageUrl('not a url'), '');
+});
+
+test('normalizeCataloniaImageUrl rejects credential-bearing URLs on every allowed host', () => {
+  // The hostname matches the allowlist, so only an explicit userinfo check
+  // stops catalog data injecting credentials into the frame request.
+  for (const link of [
+    'https://user:[email protected]/transit/imatges/a.gif',
+    'http://[email protected]/transit/imatges/a.gif',
+    'https://:[email protected]/it_terrassa/cam02.jpeg',
+    'http://user:[email protected]/mct2bo/RenderService?sctidcam=nc87.gif',
+  ]) {
+    assert.equal(normalizeCataloniaImageUrl(link), '', link);
+  }
+});
+
+test("normalizeCataloniaImageUrl rejects explicit ports and paths outside each host's frame directory", () => {
+  // An allowlisted hostname alone would let catalog data aim the frame
+  // request at another service or path on that host.
+  for (const link of [
+    'http://www.bcn.cat:8080/transit/imatges/a.gif',
+    'https://emap.terrassa.cat:8443/it_terrassa/cam02.jpeg',
+    'http://mct.gencat.cat:8080/mct2bo/RenderService?sctidcam=nc87.gif',
+    'http://www.bcn.cat/admin/a.gif',
+    'http://www.bcn.cat/transit/imatges/',
+    'http://www.bcn.cat/transit/imatges/sub/a.gif',
+    'http://www.bcn.cat/transit/imatges/../../admin/a.gif',
+    'https://emap.terrassa.cat/other/cam02.jpeg',
+    'http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/OtherService?sctidcam=nc87.gif',
+  ]) {
+    assert.equal(normalizeCataloniaImageUrl(link), '', link);
+  }
+});
+
+test('normalizeCataloniaImageUrl accepts only a bare image filename as the SCT sctidcam', () => {
+  for (const camId of [
+    '../../etc/passwd',
+    '..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd',
+    'nc87.png',
+    'nc87',
+    'nc87.gif/../x.gif',
+    'nc87.gif&nom=other.gif',
+    'nc-87.gif',
+  ]) {
+    const link = `http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/RenderService?sctidcam=${encodeURIComponent(camId)}`;
+    assert.equal(normalizeCataloniaImageUrl(link), '', camId);
+  }
+  assert.equal(
+    normalizeCataloniaImageUrl(
+      'http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/RenderService?sctidcam=CB10.JPEG',
+    ),
+    'http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/TransitCamera?nom=CB10.JPEG&visualitzacio=imatge',
+  );
+});
+
+test('decodeNumericEntities decodes decimal and hex references and leaves invalid ones as written', () => {
+  assert.equal(decodeNumericEntities('Llu&#237;s'), 'Lluís');
+  assert.equal(decodeNumericEntities('Llu&#xED;s &#x1F6A6;'), 'Lluís 🚦');
+  assert.equal(decodeNumericEntities('Llu&#XeD;s'), 'Lluís');
+  for (const raw of [
+    'a&#99999999999999999999999;b',
+    'a&#1114112;b',
+    'a&#x110000;b',
+    'a&#xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF;b',
+    'a&#55296;b',
+    'a&#xDFFF;b',
+    'a&#0;b',
+  ]) {
+    assert.equal(decodeNumericEntities(raw), raw, raw);
+  }
+});
+
+test('cataloniaCameraName joins road and municipality, skipping a redundant municipality', () => {
+  assert.equal(
+    cataloniaCameraName('C-58', 'Nus Trinitat'),
+    'C-58 (Nus Trinitat)',
+  );
+  assert.equal(
+    cataloniaCameraName('Plaça Urquinaona', 'Barcelona'),
+    'Plaça Urquinaona (Barcelona)',
+  );
+  assert.equal(
+    cataloniaCameraName('Barcelona Ronda Litoral', 'Barcelona'),
+    'Barcelona Ronda Litoral',
+  );
+  assert.equal(cataloniaCameraName('', ''), 'Càmera de trànsit');
+  assert.equal(cataloniaCameraName('C-58', ''), 'C-58');
+});
+
+test('Catalonia loader keeps SCT, Barcelona and Terrassa cameras with per-publisher credit', async (t) => {
+  quiet(t);
+  withEnv(t, { CCTV_CATALONIA_MAX_SOURCES: undefined });
+  const requested = [];
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async (url, init) => {
+    requested.push([String(url), init.redirect]);
+    const xml = cataloniaFeed([
+      cataloniaFeature({
+        fid: 'cameres.fid-1',
+        lon: '2.1849528',
+        lat: '41.45989301',
+        carretera: 'C-58',
+        municipi: 'Nus Trinitat',
+        pk: '0.50',
+        link: 'http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/RenderService?sctidcam=nc87.gif',
+        font: 'SCT',
+      }),
+      cataloniaFeature({
+        fid: 'cameres.fid-2',
+        lon: '2.17228212',
+        lat: '41.38890733',
+        carretera: 'Plaça Urquinaona',
+        municipi: 'Barcelona',
+        link: 'http://www.bcn.cat/transit/imatges/PlUrquinaona.gif?a=1',
+        font: 'IMI',
+      }),
+      cataloniaFeature({
+        fid: 'cameres.fid-3',
+        lon: '2.0111',
+        lat: '41.5636',
+        carretera: 'Cam02',
+        municipi: 'Terrassa',
+        link: 'https://emap.terrassa.cat/it_terrassa/cam02.jpeg?a=1',
+        font: 'Terrassa',
+      }),
+      // Rejected: link host not in the allowlist.
+      cataloniaFeature({
+        fid: 'cameres.fid-4',
+        lon: '2.0',
+        lat: '41.5',
+        link: 'https://example.com/fake.gif',
+        font: 'SCT',
+      }),
+      // Rejected: outside the Catalonia bounding box.
+      cataloniaFeature({
+        fid: 'cameres.fid-5',
+        lon: '-3.7',
+        lat: '40.4',
+        link: 'http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/RenderService?sctidcam=x.gif',
+        font: 'SCT',
+      }),
+    ]);
+    return new Response(xml, {
+      status: 200,
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/xml' },
+    });
+  });
+
+  const cameras = await loadCataloniaSourcesFromOpenData();
+
+  assert.deepEqual(requested, [[CATALONIA_CAMERAS_URL, 'manual']]);
+  assert.ok(
+    CATALONIA_CAMERAS_URL.startsWith('https://'),
+    'the catalog is fetched over https',
+  );
+  assert.deepEqual(
+    cameras.map((camera) => camera.id).sort(),
+    [
+      'cat-emap-terrassa-cat-it-terrassa-cam02-jpeg',
+      'cat-sct-nc87',
+      'cat-www-bcn-cat-transit-imatges-plurquinaona-gif',
+    ],
+    'the off-allowlist link (fid-4) and the out-of-bbox row (fid-5) are excluded',
+  );
+
+  const sct = cameras.find((c) => c.id === 'cat-sct-nc87');
+  assert.equal(sct.name, 'C-58 (Nus Trinitat)');
+  assert.equal(sct.provider, 'Servei Català de Trànsit');
+  assert.equal(sct.credit, '', 'SCT is the publisher, no separate credit');
+  assert.equal(
+    sct.url,
+    'http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/TransitCamera?nom=nc87.gif&visualitzacio=imatge',
+    'registers the direct, non-redirecting http frame URL, not the RenderService redirector',
+  );
+  assert.equal(sct.groundElevationM, 80);
+  assert.equal(sct.headingConfidence, 'low', 'the feed carries no heading');
+
+  const bcn = cameras.find(
+    (c) => c.id === 'cat-www-bcn-cat-transit-imatges-plurquinaona-gif',
+  );
+  assert.equal(bcn.credit, 'Ajuntament de Barcelona');
+  assert.equal(bcn.city, 'Barcelona');
+  assert.equal(bcn.groundElevationM, 20);
+
+  const terrassa = cameras.find(
+    (c) => c.id === 'cat-emap-terrassa-cat-it-terrassa-cam02-jpeg',
+  );
+  assert.equal(terrassa.credit, 'Ajuntament de Terrassa');
+  assert.equal(terrassa.groundElevationM, 270);
+});
+
+test('Catalonia loader fails soft on HTTP errors, empty payloads and network errors', async (t) => {
+  quiet(t);
+  let respond;
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', (...args) => respond(...args));
+  for (respond of [
+    async () => new Response('unavailable', { status: 503 }),
+    async () => new Response('<wfs:FeatureCollection></wfs:FeatureCollection>'),
+    async () => {
+      throw new TypeError('fetch failed');
+    },
+  ]) {
+    assert.deepEqual(await loadCataloniaSourcesFromOpenData(), []);
+  }
+});
+
+test('the Catalonia catalog fetch refuses redirects and oversized bodies', async (t) => {
+  t.mock.method(console, 'warn', () => {});
+  // A redirect is never followed: the list host cannot be steered or
+  // downgraded. Its body is a live stream, so the test also proves the
+  // refusal releases the transport.
+  const seen = [];
+  const redirected = streamingResponse({
+    status: 302,
+    headers: { location: 'http://www.gencat.cat/transit/opendata/cameres.xml' },
+  });
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async (url, init) => {
+    seen.push([String(url), init.redirect]);
+    return redirected.response;
+  });
+  assert.deepEqual(await loadCataloniaSourcesFromOpenData(), []);
+  assert.deepEqual(seen, [[CATALONIA_CAMERAS_URL, 'manual']]);
+  assert.equal(
+    redirected.state.cancelled,
+    true,
+    'the redirect body is cancelled',
+  );
+
+  // An HTTP error body is released too.
+  t.mock.restoreAll();
+  t.mock.method(console, 'warn', () => {});
+  const failed = streamingResponse({ status: 503 });
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async () => failed.response);
+  assert.deepEqual(await loadCataloniaSourcesFromOpenData(), []);
+  assert.equal(failed.state.cancelled, true, 'the error body is cancelled');
+
+  const validFeed = cataloniaFeed([
+    cataloniaFeature({
+      fid: 'cameres.fid-1',
+      lon: '2.1849528',
+      lat: '41.45989301',
+      carretera: 'C-58',
+      link: 'http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/RenderService?sctidcam=nc87.gif',
+      font: 'SCT',
+    }),
+  ]);
+
+  // A body that declares a size over the cap is refused rather than buffered,
+  // even though its actual content would parse.
+  t.mock.restoreAll();
+  t.mock.method(console, 'warn', () => {});
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async () => {
+    return new Response(validFeed, {
+      headers: {
+        'Content-Type': 'application/xml',
+        'content-length': String(CATALONIA_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES + 1),
+      },
+    });
+  });
+  assert.deepEqual(await loadCataloniaSourcesFromOpenData(), []);
+
+  // So is a body with no declared size that only turns out too long while
+  // streaming — a valid feed padded past the cap.
+  t.mock.restoreAll();
+  t.mock.method(console, 'warn', () => {});
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async () => {
+    const oversized =
+      validFeed + ' '.repeat(CATALONIA_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES + 1024);
+    return new Response(
+      new ReadableStream({
+        start(controller) {
+          controller.enqueue(new TextEncoder().encode(oversized));
+          controller.close();
+        },
+      }),
+      { headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/xml' } },
+    );
+  });
+  assert.deepEqual(await loadCataloniaSourcesFromOpenData(), []);
+});
+
+test('CCTV catalog merges Catalonia cameras and CCTV_CATALONIA_ENABLED=0 skips the request', async (t) => {
+  quiet(t);
+  const sourceRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(
+    path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gev-cctv-catalog-catalonia-'),
+  );
+  t.after(() => fs.rmSync(sourceRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+  withEnv(t, {
+    CCTV_SOURCES_FILE: undefined,
+    CCTV_SOURCES_JSON: undefined,
+    CCTV_FORCE_AUSTIN: undefined,
+    CCTV_PREFER_AUSTIN: undefined,
+    CCTV_MAX_SOURCES: undefined,
+    CCTV_CALTRANS_DISTRICTS: undefined,
+    CCTV_TFL_ENABLED: undefined,
+    CCTV_CATALONIA_ENABLED: undefined,
+    CCTV_CATALONIA_MAX_SOURCES: undefined,
+  });
+  const requested = [];
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async (url, init) => {
+    requested.push([String(url), init.redirect]);
+    if (String(url) !== CATALONIA_CAMERAS_URL) {
+      return new Response('unavailable', { status: 503 });
+    }
+    const xml = cataloniaFeed([
+      cataloniaFeature({
+        fid: 'cameres.fid-1',
+        lon: '2.1849528',
+        lat: '41.45989301',
+        link: 'http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/RenderService?sctidcam=nc87.gif',
+        font: 'SCT',
+      }),
+    ]);
+    return new Response(xml, { status: 200 });
+  });
+
+  const sources = await createCctvCatalog({ sourceRoot })();
+  assert.deepEqual(
+    sources.map((source) => source.id),
+    ['cat-sct-nc87'],
+  );
+
+  process.env.CCTV_CATALONIA_ENABLED = '0';
+  requested.length = 0;
+  assert.deepEqual(await createCctvCatalog({ sourceRoot })(), []);
+  assert.ok(requested.length > 0, 'the other live packs still load');
+  assert.equal(
+    requested.some(([url]) => url === CATALONIA_CAMERAS_URL),
+    false,
+    'a disabled pack makes no request',
+  );
+});
+
+/** The two SCT, one Barcelona and one Terrassa rows of a real feed snapshot,
+ * under one upstream run's `fid` prefix. */
+function snapshotFeed(fidPrefix) {
+  return cataloniaFeed([
+    cataloniaFeature({
+      fid: `cameres.fid-${fidPrefix}_386f`,
+      lon: '2.1849528',
+      lat: '41.45989301',
+      carretera: 'C-58',
+      link: 'http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/RenderService?sctidcam=nc87.gif',
+      font: 'SCT',
+    }),
+    cataloniaFeature({
+      fid: `cameres.fid-${fidPrefix}_b48`,
+      lon: '2.18',
+      lat: '41.46',
+      carretera: 'C-31',
+      link: 'http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/RenderService?sctidcam=nc85.gif',
+      font: 'SCT',
+    }),
+    cataloniaFeature({
+      fid: `cameres.fid-${fidPrefix}_1c2`,
+      lon: '2.17228212',
+      lat: '41.38890733',
+      carretera: 'Plaça Urquinaona',
+      municipi: 'Barcelona',
+      link: 'http://www.bcn.cat/transit/imatges/PlUrquinaona.gif?a=1',
+      font: 'IMI',
+    }),
+    cataloniaFeature({
+      fid: `cameres.fid-${fidPrefix}_1c3`,
+      lon: '2.0111',
+      lat: '41.5636',
+      municipi: 'Terrassa',
+      link: 'https://emap.terrassa.cat/it_terrassa/cam01.jpeg?a=1 &#13;',
+      font: 'Terrassa',
+    }),
+  ]);
+}
+
+async function loadFromFeed(t, xml) {
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async () => {
+    return new Response(xml, {
+      status: 200,
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/xml' },
+    });
+  });
+  try {
+    return await loadCataloniaSourcesFromOpenData();
+  } finally {
+    t.mock.restoreAll();
+  }
+}
+
+test('Catalonia camera ids survive an upstream restart that changes every fid', async (t) => {
+  quiet(t);
+  withEnv(t, { CCTV_CATALONIA_MAX_SOURCES: undefined });
+  // The fid embeds the upstream server-start stamp: the PR fixture's
+  // 1a0a06bea1c run and a later 1a140311953 run name the same cameras.
+  const before = await loadFromFeed(t, snapshotFeed('52bf6eca_1a0a06bea1c'));
+  const after = await loadFromFeed(t, snapshotFeed('52bf6eca_1a140311953'));
+  const ids = (cameras) => cameras.map((camera) => camera.id).sort();
+  assert.deepEqual(ids(before), [
+    'cat-emap-terrassa-cat-it-terrassa-cam01-jpeg',
+    'cat-sct-nc85',
+    'cat-sct-nc87',
+    'cat-www-bcn-cat-transit-imatges-plurquinaona-gif',
+  ]);
+  assert.deepEqual(ids(after), ids(before));
+});
+
+test('Catalonia loader collapses rows the feed repeats for one camera', async (t) => {
+  quiet(t);
+  withEnv(t, { CCTV_CATALONIA_MAX_SOURCES: undefined });
+  // The live feed lists nc85, cb5, cb10, cb25 and cd17 twice each, under
+  // different fids.
+  const row = (fid, camId) =>
+    cataloniaFeature({
+      fid,
+      lon: '2.18',
+      lat: '41.46',
+      carretera: 'C-31',
+      link: `http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/RenderService?sctidcam=${camId}`,
+      font: 'SCT',
+    });
+  const cameras = await loadFromFeed(
+    t,
+    cataloniaFeed([
+      row('cameres.fid-x_1', 'nc85.gif'),
+      row('cameres.fid-x_2', 'cb5.gif'),
+      row('cameres.fid-x_3', 'nc85.gif'),
+      row('cameres.fid-x_4', 'cb5.gif'),
+      row('cameres.fid-x_5', 'cb10.gif'),
+    ]),
+  );
+  assert.deepEqual(cameras.map((camera) => camera.id).sort(), [
+    'cat-sct-cb10',
+    'cat-sct-cb5',
+    'cat-sct-nc85',
+  ]);
+});
+
+test('Catalonia loader drops ported and bad-sctidcam links but keeps the rest', async (t) => {
+  quiet(t);
+  withEnv(t, { CCTV_CATALONIA_MAX_SOURCES: undefined });
+  const cameras = await loadFromFeed(
+    t,
+    cataloniaFeed([
+      cataloniaFeature({
+        fid: 'cameres.fid-x_1',
+        lon: '2.17',
+        lat: '41.39',
+        link: 'http://www.bcn.cat:8080/transit/imatges/PlUrquinaona.gif?a=1',
+        font: 'IMI',
+      }),
+      cataloniaFeature({
+        fid: 'cameres.fid-x_2',
+        lon: '2.0111',
+        lat: '41.5636',
+        link: 'https://emap.terrassa.cat:8443/it_terrassa/cam02.jpeg?a=1',
+        font: 'Terrassa',
+      }),
+      cataloniaFeature({
+        fid: 'cameres.fid-x_3',
+        lon: '2.18',
+        lat: '41.46',
+        link: 'http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/RenderService?sctidcam=../../etc/passwd',
+        font: 'SCT',
+      }),
+      cataloniaFeature({
+        fid: 'cameres.fid-x_4',
+        lon: '2.18',
+        lat: '41.46',
+        link: 'http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/RenderService?sctidcam=nc87.gif',
+        font: 'SCT',
+      }),
+    ]),
+  );
+  assert.deepEqual(
+    cameras.map((camera) => [camera.id, camera.url]),
+    [
+      [
+        'cat-sct-nc87',
+        'http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/TransitCamera?nom=nc87.gif&visualitzacio=imatge',
+      ],
+    ],
+  );
+});
+
+test('a malformed numeric entity in one row neither throws nor empties the Catalonia pack', async (t) => {
+  quiet(t);
+  withEnv(t, { CCTV_CATALONIA_MAX_SOURCES: undefined });
+  const cameras = await loadFromFeed(
+    t,
+    cataloniaFeed([
+      cataloniaFeature({
+        fid: 'cameres.fid-x_1',
+        lon: '2.18',
+        lat: '41.46',
+        carretera: 'C-31 &#99999999999999999999;',
+        municipi: 'Bad&#xD800;',
+        link: 'http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/RenderService?sctidcam=nc85.gif',
+        font: 'SCT',
+      }),
+      cataloniaFeature({
+        fid: 'cameres.fid-x_2',
+        lon: '2.18',
+        lat: '41.46',
+        carretera: 'Pla&#xE7;a Catalunya',
+        municipi: 'Llinars del Vall&#232;s',
+        link: 'http://mct.gencat.cat/mct2bo/RenderService?sctidcam=nc87.gif',
+        font: 'SCT',
+      }),
+    ]),
+  );
+  const byId = new Map(cameras.map((camera) => [camera.id, camera]));
+  assert.equal(cameras.length, 2);
+  assert.equal(
+    byId.get('cat-sct-nc85').name,
+    'C-31 &#99999999999999999999; (Bad&#xD800;)',
+    'an invalid reference is kept as written',
+  );
+  assert.equal(
+    byId.get('cat-sct-nc87').name,
+    'Plaça Catalunya (Llinars del Vallès)',
+  );
+});
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import {
  DEFAULT_TALLINN_MAX_SOURCES,
  DEFAULT_TARKTEE_MAX_SOURCES,
  DEFAULT_NSW_MAX_SOURCES,
+  DEFAULT_CATALONIA_MAX_SOURCES,
  DRIVEBC_WEBCAMS_URL,
 } from '../../server/providers/cctv/constants.js';
 import {
@@ -221,7 +222,7 @@ test('CCTV catalog merges DriveBC cameras and CCTV_DRIVEBC_ENABLED=0 skips the r
  );
 });

-test('default per-pack camera caps fit inside the default catalog cap', () => {
+test('default caps of the original packs fit inside the default catalog cap', () => {
  // Every default pack at its own cap (Warendorf ships 1 curated camera).
  const packs =
    DEFAULT_AUSTIN_MAX_SOURCES +
@@ -234,6 +235,7 @@ test('default per-pack camera caps fit inside the default catalog cap', () => {
    DEFAULT_TALLINN_MAX_SOURCES +
    DEFAULT_TARKTEE_MAX_SOURCES +
    DEFAULT_NSW_MAX_SOURCES +
+    DEFAULT_CATALONIA_MAX_SOURCES +
    1;
  assert.ok(
    packs <= DEFAULT_CCTV_MAX_SOURCES,
@@ -0,0 +1,367 @@
+import { test } from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import {
+  DEFAULT_KING_COUNTY_MAX_SOURCES,
+  KING_COUNTY_CAMERAS_URL,
+  KING_COUNTY_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES,
+} from '../../server/providers/cctv/constants.js';
+import { loadKingCountySourcesFromOpenData } from '../../server/providers/cctv/sources.js';
+import { normalizeSourceItem } from '../../server/providers/cctv/normalize.js';
+import { cctvProxy } from '../../server/providers/cctv.js';
+import { createCatalog } from '../layers/cctv/catalog.js';
+
+/** Set (or, for `undefined`, delete) environment variables for one test. */
+function withEnv(t, env) {
+  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(env)) {
+    const previous = process.env[name];
+    t.after(() => {
+      if (previous === undefined) delete process.env[name];
+      else process.env[name] = previous;
+    });
+    if (value === undefined) delete process.env[name];
+    else process.env[name] = value;
+  }
+}
+
+/** Silence the loaders' progress and failure logging. */
+function quiet(t) {
+  t.mock.method(console, 'log', () => {});
+  t.mock.method(console, 'warn', () => {});
+}
+
+/** A FeatureServer GeoJSON feature carrying the fields the loader reads. */
+function kingCountyFeature(id, lat, lon, overrides = {}) {
+  const { properties = {}, geometry } = overrides;
+  return {
+    type: 'Feature',
+    geometry:
+      geometry === undefined
+        ? { type: 'Point', coordinates: [lon, lat] }
+        : geometry,
+    properties: {
+      AssetID: id,
+      Location: `Road ${id} at Test Ave`,
+      ImageURL: `http://info.kingcounty.gov/transportation/kcdot/Roads/TrafficCameras/ImageHandler/Handler.ashx?id=cam${id}.jpg`,
+      Live: 1,
+      Model: '3950',
+      Manufacturer: 'Cohu',
+      Owner: 'King County',
+      CurrentStatus: 'Active',
+      ...properties,
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+test('King County loader keeps live county cameras and upgrades frame URLs to HTTPS', async (t) => {
+  quiet(t);
+  withEnv(t, { CCTV_KINGCOUNTY_MAX_SOURCES: undefined });
+  const requested = [];
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async (url) => {
+    requested.push(String(url));
+    return Response.json({
+      type: 'FeatureCollection',
+      features: [
+        kingCountyFeature(56, 47.70059, -122.02443, {
+          properties: {
+            Location: 'NE Novelty Hill Road at Trilogy Parkway NE',
+            // The live layer carries stray whitespace in model strings.
+            Model: 'Q6135-LE\n',
+            Manufacturer: 'Axis',
+          },
+        }),
+        // City-owned camera the county hosts: kept, owner becomes the credit.
+        kingCountyFeature(90, 47.674, -122.119, {
+          properties: { Owner: 'City of Newcastle', Model: null },
+        }),
+        // WSDOT-owned row: its frames are WSDOT-hosted, so it is skipped.
+        kingCountyFeature(70, 47.6, -122.3, { properties: { Owner: 'WSDOT' } }),
+        // Off-host frame, not live, retired, bad id, bad geometry, out of county.
+        kingCountyFeature(71, 47.6, -122.3, {
+          properties: { ImageURL: 'https://example.com/cam71.jpg' },
+        }),
+        kingCountyFeature(72, 47.6, -122.3, { properties: { Live: 0 } }),
+        kingCountyFeature(73, 47.6, -122.3, {
+          properties: { CurrentStatus: 'Retired' },
+        }),
+        kingCountyFeature('74', 47.6, -122.3),
+        kingCountyFeature(75, 47.6, -122.3, { geometry: null }),
+        kingCountyFeature(76, 34.05, -118.24),
+      ],
+    });
+  });
+
+  const cameras = await loadKingCountySourcesFromOpenData();
+
+  assert.deepEqual(requested, [KING_COUNTY_CAMERAS_URL]);
+  assert.deepEqual(cameras.map((camera) => camera.id).sort(), [
+    'kingcounty-56',
+    'kingcounty-90',
+  ]);
+
+  const novelty = cameras.find((camera) => camera.id === 'kingcounty-56');
+  assert.equal(novelty.name, 'NE Novelty Hill Road at Trilogy Parkway NE');
+  assert.equal(novelty.provider, 'King County Road Services');
+  assert.equal(
+    novelty.url,
+    'https://info.kingcounty.gov/transportation/kcdot/Roads/TrafficCameras/ImageHandler/Handler.ashx?id=cam56.jpg',
+  );
+  assert.equal(novelty.snapshotUrl, novelty.url);
+  assert.equal(novelty.feedType, 'image');
+  // Published hardware model rides along, whitespace-collapsed.
+  assert.equal(novelty.model, 'Q6135-LE');
+  assert.equal(novelty.manufacturer, 'Axis');
+  assert.equal(novelty.credit, '');
+  // No facing in the layer: id-hash fallback at low confidence.
+  assert.equal(novelty.headingConfidence, 'low');
+  assert.equal(novelty.fovDeg, 44);
+  assert.ok(novelty.headingDeg >= 0 && novelty.headingDeg < 360);
+
+  const newcastle = cameras.find((camera) => camera.id === 'kingcounty-90');
+  assert.equal(newcastle.credit, 'City of Newcastle');
+  assert.equal(newcastle.model, undefined);
+  // A manufacturer without a model identifies nothing, so it is dropped too.
+  assert.equal(newcastle.manufacturer, undefined);
+});
+
+test('normalizeSourceItem passes a hardware model through and omits it otherwise', () => {
+  const withModel = normalizeSourceItem({
+    id: 'kingcounty-56',
+    lat: 47.7,
+    lon: -122.0,
+    model: ' Q6135-LE ',
+    manufacturer: ' Axis ',
+  });
+  assert.equal(withModel.model, 'Q6135-LE');
+  assert.equal(withModel.manufacturer, 'Axis');
+
+  const withoutModel = normalizeSourceItem({
+    id: 'austin-1',
+    lat: 30.3,
+    lon: -97.7,
+  });
+  assert.equal(withoutModel.model, undefined);
+  assert.equal(withoutModel.manufacturer, undefined);
+  assert.equal(normalizeSourceItem({ id: 'x', model: '   ' }).model, undefined);
+});
+
+/** Drive the real `/api/cctv/sources` middleware and return its parsed body. */
+async function requestSources(plugin) {
+  let handler;
+  plugin.configureServer({
+    middlewares: {
+      use(_route, fn) {
+        handler = fn;
+      },
+    },
+  });
+  const res = {
+    writeHead(status, headers) {
+      Object.assign(this, { status, headers });
+    },
+    end(body) {
+      this.body = body;
+    },
+  };
+  await handler({ url: '/sources', method: 'GET' }, res);
+  assert.equal(res.status, 200);
+  return JSON.parse(res.body);
+}
+
+/** The browser catalog with the pose math stubbed out: only field
+ * passthrough is under test here. */
+function browserCatalog() {
+  const model = {
+    safeNumber: (value, fallback = NaN) =>
+      Number.isFinite(Number(value)) ? Number(value) : fallback,
+    normalizeHeading: (deg) => ((deg % 360) + 360) % 360,
+    clamp: (value, lo, hi) => Math.min(hi, Math.max(lo, value)),
+    headingFromId: () => 0,
+    normalizeFeedType: (type) => type,
+    ensureCameraPose: () => {},
+  };
+  return createCatalog({
+    state: {},
+    services: { locations: { CITY_POIS: {} } },
+    parts: { model },
+    source: {},
+  });
+}
+
+test('King County model and manufacturer survive the /api/cctv/sources boundary into the browser catalog', async (t) => {
+  quiet(t);
+  const root = mkdtempSync(path.join(tmpdir(), 'gev-kingcounty-'));
+  t.after(() => rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+  // No file/env catalog, so the live packs load; every pack but King County
+  // sees an upstream failure and contributes nothing.
+  withEnv(t, {
+    CCTV_SOURCES_FILE: undefined,
+    CCTV_SOURCES_JSON: undefined,
+    CCTV_FORCE_AUSTIN: undefined,
+    CCTV_PREFER_AUSTIN: undefined,
+    CCTV_KINGCOUNTY_ENABLED: undefined,
+    CCTV_KINGCOUNTY_MAX_SOURCES: undefined,
+    CCTV_MAX_SOURCES: undefined,
+  });
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async (url) => {
+    if (String(url) !== KING_COUNTY_CAMERAS_URL)
+      return new Response('', { status: 503 });
+    return Response.json({
+      type: 'FeatureCollection',
+      features: [
+        kingCountyFeature(56, 47.70059, -122.02443, {
+          properties: { Model: 'Q6135-LE\n', Manufacturer: 'Axis' },
+        }),
+        kingCountyFeature(90, 47.674, -122.119, {
+          properties: { Model: null, Manufacturer: 'Cohu' },
+        }),
+      ],
+    });
+  });
+
+  const body = await requestSources(cctvProxy({ sourceRoot: root }));
+  const served = new Map(body.sources.map((source) => [source.id, source]));
+  assert.deepEqual([...served.keys()].sort(), [
+    'kingcounty-56',
+    'kingcounty-90',
+  ]);
+  assert.equal(served.get('kingcounty-56').model, 'Q6135-LE');
+  assert.equal(served.get('kingcounty-56').manufacturer, 'Axis');
+  // Absent hardware is an explicit empty string on the wire, like
+  // headingConfidence, so consumers never have to probe for the key.
+  assert.equal(served.get('kingcounty-90').model, '');
+  assert.equal(served.get('kingcounty-90').manufacturer, '');
+
+  const cameras = browserCatalog().buildCatalogFromSources(body.sources);
+  const byId = new Map(cameras.map((camera) => [camera.id, camera]));
+  assert.equal(byId.get('kingcounty-56').model, 'Q6135-LE');
+  assert.equal(byId.get('kingcounty-56').manufacturer, 'Axis');
+  assert.equal(byId.get('kingcounty-90').model, '');
+  assert.equal(byId.get('kingcounty-90').manufacturer, '');
+});
+
+test('King County loader honors the max-sources cap', async (t) => {
+  quiet(t);
+  withEnv(t, { CCTV_KINGCOUNTY_MAX_SOURCES: '8' });
+  const features = [];
+  for (let i = 0; i < 24; i += 1) {
+    features.push(
+      kingCountyFeature(100 + i, 47.2 + i * 0.02, -122.4 + i * 0.02),
+    );
+  }
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async () =>
+    Response.json({ type: 'FeatureCollection', features }),
+  );
+
+  const cameras = await loadKingCountySourcesFromOpenData();
+  assert.equal(cameras.length, 8);
+});
+
+test('King County loader defaults its cap and survives upstream failure', async (t) => {
+  quiet(t);
+  withEnv(t, { CCTV_KINGCOUNTY_MAX_SOURCES: undefined });
+  assert.equal(DEFAULT_KING_COUNTY_MAX_SOURCES, 125);
+
+  t.mock.method(
+    globalThis,
+    'fetch',
+    async () => new Response('', { status: 503 }),
+  );
+  assert.deepEqual(await loadKingCountySourcesFromOpenData(), []);
+
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async () => {
+    throw new Error('network down');
+  });
+  assert.deepEqual(await loadKingCountySourcesFromOpenData(), []);
+});
+
+test('King County loader does not follow a redirected catalog', async (t) => {
+  quiet(t);
+  let init;
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async (_url, options) => {
+    init = options;
+    return new Response(
+      JSON.stringify({
+        type: 'FeatureCollection',
+        features: [kingCountyFeature(56, 47.70059, -122.02443)],
+      }),
+      { status: 302, headers: { Location: 'https://example.com/cams' } },
+    );
+  });
+
+  assert.deepEqual(await loadKingCountySourcesFromOpenData(), []);
+  assert.equal(init.redirect, 'manual');
+});
+
+test('King County loader rejects an oversized catalog', async (t) => {
+  quiet(t);
+  const features = [kingCountyFeature(56, 47.70059, -122.02443)];
+  const body = JSON.stringify({
+    type: 'FeatureCollection',
+    features,
+    padding: 'x'.repeat(KING_COUNTY_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES),
+  });
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async () => new Response(body));
+
+  assert.deepEqual(await loadKingCountySourcesFromOpenData(), []);
+});
+
+test('King County loader drops duplicate ids before the per-pack cap', async (t) => {
+  quiet(t);
+  withEnv(t, { CCTV_KINGCOUNTY_MAX_SOURCES: '8' });
+  // Repeats of the camera nearest the anchor would fill an 8-camera cap
+  // before the second, farther camera if duplicates reached prioritization.
+  const features = [];
+  for (let i = 0; i < 10; i += 1) {
+    features.push(kingCountyFeature(56, 47.4829, -122.2171));
+  }
+  features.push(kingCountyFeature(57, 47.70059, -122.02443));
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async () =>
+    Response.json({ type: 'FeatureCollection', features }),
+  );
+
+  const cameras = await loadKingCountySourcesFromOpenData();
+  assert.deepEqual(cameras.map((camera) => camera.id).sort(), [
+    'kingcounty-56',
+    'kingcounty-57',
+  ]);
+});
+
+test('King County loader omits vendor-generic model strings', async (t) => {
+  quiet(t);
+  withEnv(t, { CCTV_KINGCOUNTY_MAX_SOURCES: undefined });
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async () =>
+    Response.json({
+      type: 'FeatureCollection',
+      features: [
+        kingCountyFeature(61, 47.5, -122.2, {
+          properties: { Model: 'PTZ', Manufacturer: 'Bosch' },
+        }),
+        kingCountyFeature(62, 47.51, -122.2, {
+          properties: { Model: 'PTZ IP', Manufacturer: 'Cohu' },
+        }),
+        kingCountyFeature(63, 47.52, -122.2, {
+          properties: { Model: 'BOSCH/PTZ', Manufacturer: 'Bosch' },
+        }),
+        kingCountyFeature(64, 47.53, -122.2, {
+          properties: { Model: 'AUTODOME IP 5000', Manufacturer: 'Bosch' },
+        }),
+      ],
+    }),
+  );
+
+  const byId = new Map(
+    (await loadKingCountySourcesFromOpenData()).map((camera) => [
+      camera.id,
+      camera,
+    ]),
+  );
+  for (const id of ['kingcounty-61', 'kingcounty-62', 'kingcounty-63']) {
+    assert.equal(byId.get(id).model, undefined, id);
+    assert.equal(byId.get(id).manufacturer, undefined, id);
+  }
+  assert.equal(byId.get('kingcounty-64').model, 'AUTODOME IP 5000');
+  assert.equal(byId.get('kingcounty-64').manufacturer, 'Bosch');
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+import { test } from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import {
+  lithuaniaCameraToSource,
+  loadLithuaniaSources,
+  LITHUANIA_CAMERAS_URL,
+  LITHUANIA_LOCATIONS_URL,
+  LITHUANIA_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES,
+} from '../../server/providers/cctv/lithuania.js';
+import { createCctvCatalog } from '../../server/providers/cctv/catalog.js';
+
+const row = {
+  id: 72,
+  name: 'Vilnius A1 10,04',
+  x: 576154,
+  y: 6056867,
+  image:
+    'https://eismoinfo.lt/eismoinfo-backend/image-provider/camera/last?id=72',
+};
+const feature = {
+  id: '72',
+  points: [{ point: [54.642550940833566, 25.17981587877114] }],
+};
+const layers = [{ layer: 'VKR', features: [feature] }];
+
+test('Lithuania joins by ID and uses WGS84 latitude/longitude, never LKS-94 metres', () => {
+  const camera = lithuaniaCameraToSource(row, feature);
+  assert.equal(camera.id, 'lithuania-72');
+  assert.equal(camera.lat, 54.642550940833566);
+  assert.equal(camera.lon, 25.17981587877114);
+  assert.equal(camera.name, 'Vilnius A1 10,04');
+  assert.equal(camera.feedType, 'image');
+  assert.equal(camera.headingConfidence, 'low');
+  assert.equal(camera.url, row.image);
+  assert.match(camera.credit, /Via Lietuva/);
+});
+
+test('invalid joins, coordinates and image destinations cannot enter the proxy registry', () => {
+  for (const invalid of [
+    null,
+    { ...feature, id: '8' },
+    { ...feature, points: [] },
+    { ...feature, points: [{ point: [25.18, 54.64] }] },
+    { ...feature, points: [{ point: [576154, 6056867] }] },
+    { ...feature, points: [{ point: [null, 25] }] },
+  ]) {
+    assert.equal(lithuaniaCameraToSource(row, invalid), null);
+  }
+  for (const image of [
+    'http://eismoinfo.lt/eismoinfo-backend/image-provider/camera/last?id=72',
+    row.image.replace('eismoinfo.lt', 'eismoinfo.lt.evil.test'),
+    row.image.replace('https://', 'https://user:pass@'),
+    row.image.replace('id=72', 'id=8'),
+    'http://127.0.0.1/private',
+    '',
+    null,
+  ]) {
+    assert.equal(lithuaniaCameraToSource({ ...row, image }, feature), null);
+  }
+  assert.equal(
+    lithuaniaCameraToSource(
+      { ...row, image: row.image + '&extra=ignored' },
+      feature,
+    ).url,
+    row.image,
+  );
+  assert.equal(lithuaniaCameraToSource(null, feature), null);
+});
+
+function mockCatalogs(t) {
+  const requested = [];
+  t.mock.method(console, 'log', () => {});
+  t.mock.method(console, 'warn', () => {});
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async (url, options) => {
+    requested.push(String(url));
+    if (url === LITHUANIA_CAMERAS_URL) {
+      assert.equal(options.redirect, 'manual');
+      return Response.json([row, row, { ...row, id: 999 }]);
+    }
+    if (url === LITHUANIA_LOCATIONS_URL) return Response.json(layers);
+    return Response.json([]);
+  });
+  return requested;
+}
+
+test('loader deduplicates and omits cameras without matching published coordinates', async (t) => {
+  const requested = mockCatalogs(t);
+  assert.deepEqual(
+    (await loadLithuaniaSources()).map((c) => c.id),
+    ['lithuania-72'],
+  );
+  assert.deepEqual(
+    requested.sort(),
+    [LITHUANIA_CAMERAS_URL, LITHUANIA_LOCATIONS_URL].sort(),
+  );
+});
+
+/** Run one catalog refresh with CCTV_LITHUANIA_ENABLED set to `flag`
+ * (undefined leaves it unset), restoring the environment afterwards. */
+async function runCatalogWithLithuaniaFlag(t, flag) {
+  const requested = mockCatalogs(t);
+  const saved = process.env.CCTV_LITHUANIA_ENABLED;
+  try {
+    if (flag === undefined) delete process.env.CCTV_LITHUANIA_ENABLED;
+    else process.env.CCTV_LITHUANIA_ENABLED = flag;
+    const sources = await createCctvCatalog({ sourceRoot: '/nonexistent' })();
+    return { requested, sources };
+  } finally {
+    if (saved === undefined) delete process.env.CCTV_LITHUANIA_ENABLED;
+    else process.env.CCTV_LITHUANIA_ENABLED = saved;
+  }
+}
+
+test('CCTV_LITHUANIA_ENABLED=1 wires the Lithuania pack into the catalog', async (t) => {
+  const { sources } = await runCatalogWithLithuaniaFlag(t, '1');
+  assert.equal(
+    sources.find((c) => c.id === 'lithuania-72')?.cityId,
+    'lithuania',
+  );
+});
+
+// The camera endpoints are the eismoinfo.lt website backend, not a service the
+// open-data statement lists, so an install that has not opted in must never
+// contact them.
+for (const [label, flag] of [
+  ['an unset CCTV_LITHUANIA_ENABLED', undefined],
+  ['an empty CCTV_LITHUANIA_ENABLED', ''],
+  ['CCTV_LITHUANIA_ENABLED=0', '0'],
+  ['CCTV_LITHUANIA_ENABLED=true', 'true'],
+]) {
+  test(`${label} makes no Lithuania request`, async (t) => {
+    const { requested, sources } = await runCatalogWithLithuaniaFlag(t, flag);
+    assert.ok(requested.length > 0, 'the other packs still refreshed');
+    assert.equal(
+      requested.some((href) => href.includes('eismoinfo.lt')),
+      false,
+      'the pack never reaches its upstream',
+    );
+    assert.ok(!sources.some((c) => c.cityId === 'lithuania'));
+  });
+}
+
+test('a failed catalog cancels the sibling request instead of waiting for the timeout', async (t) => {
+  t.mock.method(console, 'warn', () => {});
+  let siblingSignal;
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async (url, options) => {
+    if (url === LITHUANIA_CAMERAS_URL) {
+      return new Response('', { status: 503 });
+    }
+    siblingSignal = options.signal;
+    // Never settles on its own; only an abort ends it.
+    return new Promise((_, reject) => {
+      options.signal.addEventListener('abort', () =>
+        reject(options.signal.reason),
+      );
+    });
+  });
+  assert.deepEqual(await loadLithuaniaSources(), []);
+  assert.equal(siblingSignal?.aborted, true);
+  assert.notEqual(siblingSignal.reason?.name, 'TimeoutError');
+});
+
+test('a redirected catalog is reported as not followed', async (t) => {
+  const warnings = [];
+  t.mock.method(console, 'warn', (...args) => warnings.push(args.join(' ')));
+  t.mock.method(
+    globalThis,
+    'fetch',
+    async () =>
+      new Response('', {
+        status: 302,
+        headers: { Location: 'http://127.0.0.1/' },
+      }),
+  );
+  assert.deepEqual(await loadLithuaniaSources(), []);
+  assert.ok(warnings.some((line) => /redirects are not followed/.test(line)));
+});
+
+test('failed, redirected, malformed and oversized catalogs degrade to an empty pack', async (t) => {
+  t.mock.method(console, 'warn', () => {});
+  for (const makeResponse of [
+    () => new Response('', { status: 503 }),
+    () =>
+      new Response('', {
+        status: 302,
+        headers: { Location: 'http://127.0.0.1/' },
+      }),
+    () => new Response('invalid json'),
+    () => Response.json({ unexpected: true }),
+    () =>
+      new Response('[]', {
+        headers: { 'Content-Length': String(LITHUANIA_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES + 1) },
+      }),
+  ]) {
+    t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async () => makeResponse());
+    assert.deepEqual(await loadLithuaniaSources(), []);
+  }
+});
@@ -38,6 +38,10 @@ const PROVIDER_STATIC_REFRESH_MS = Object.freeze({
  // collectionInterval, 600 s for every station sampled; polling faster only
  // re-fetches the same JPEG.
  fintraffic: 10 * 60 * 1000,
+  // Measured empirically (2026-09-15): polling the same SCT/Terrassa frame
+  // every 20s showed no change inside 64s but a new frame by ~90-150s later —
+  // matches the other highway packs' 3-minute cadence.
+  'servei català de trànsit': 3 * 60 * 1000,
 });

 /**
@@ -641,6 +641,10 @@ test('staticFrameRefreshMs follows known pack cadences and bounds explicit value
  assert.equal(staticFrameRefreshMs({ provider: 'TxDOT' }), 180_000);
  // Digitraffic publishes one weathercam frame per 600 s collection interval.
  assert.equal(staticFrameRefreshMs({ provider: 'Fintraffic' }), 600_000);
+  assert.equal(
+    staticFrameRefreshMs({ provider: 'Servei Català de Trànsit' }),
+    180_000,
+  );
  assert.equal(staticFrameRefreshMs({ frameRefreshMs: 5_000 }), 60_000);
  assert.equal(staticFrameRefreshMs({ frameRefreshMs: 3_000_000 }), 1_200_000);
  assert.equal(staticFrameRefreshMs({ provider: 'Unknown Provider' }), 300_000);
@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+// /api/cctv/media is the live-feed relay. A still camera used to be relayed
+// through it as well, by an ordinary redirect-following fetch with no content
+// type check and no body cap, which side-stepped everything /api/cctv/frame
+// enforces for the same URL. These pin that a still is refused there and only
+// reachable through /frame, while live feeds keep their relay.
+//
+// Run with: npm test   (node --test)
+import { test } from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { Readable } from 'node:stream';
+import { cctvProxy } from '../../server/providers/cctv.js';
+
+const STILL = {
+  id: 'still-fixture',
+  name: 'Still fixture',
+  lat: 30.27,
+  lon: -97.74,
+  feedType: 'image',
+  url: 'https://cams.upstream.invalid/still.jpg',
+};
+// 'jpg' normalizes to 'image'; the alias must not reopen the relay.
+const STILL_ALIAS = {
+  ...STILL,
+  id: 'still-alias',
+  feedType: 'jpg',
+  url: 'https://cams.upstream.invalid/alias.jpg',
+};
+const VIDEO = {
+  id: 'video-fixture',
+  name: 'Video fixture',
+  lat: 30.27,
+  lon: -97.74,
+  feedType: 'video',
+  url: 'https://cams.upstream.invalid/live.mp4',
+};
+const MJPEG = {
+  id: 'mjpeg-fixture',
+  name: 'MJPEG fixture',
+  lat: 30.27,
+  lon: -97.74,
+  feedType: 'mjpeg',
+  url: 'https://cams.upstream.invalid/live.mjpg',
+};
+
+/** A minimal upstream Response with a streaming body. */
+function upstreamResponse({ status = 200, headers = {}, body = 'payload' }) {
+  const store = new Map(
+    Object.entries(headers).map(([key, value]) => [key.toLowerCase(), value]),
+  );
+  return {
+    ok: status >= 200 && status < 300,
+    status,
+    headers: { get: (name) => store.get(String(name).toLowerCase()) ?? null },
+    body: Readable.toWeb(Readable.from([Buffer.from(String(body))])),
+  };
+}
+
+/** Collects what a handler wrote, the way a Node ServerResponse would. */
+function recordingResponse() {
+  const chunks = [];
+  let finished;
+  const done = new Promise((resolve) => {
+    finished = resolve;
+  });
+  const res = {
+    statusCode: 0,
+    headers: {},
+    writableEnded: false,
+    body: '',
+    writeHead(status, headers) {
+      res.statusCode = status;
+      res.headers = headers || {};
+    },
+    write(chunk) {
+      chunks.push(Buffer.from(chunk));
+      return true;
+    },
+    end(chunk) {
+      if (chunk) chunks.push(Buffer.from(chunk));
+      res.writableEnded = true;
+      res.body = Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8');
+      finished();
+    },
+    on() {},
+    once() {},
+    emit() {},
+    destroy() {},
+  };
+  return { res, done };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Mount the real provider over the fixture cameras and answer every upstream
+ * request from the supplied function.
+ */
+function mount(t, respond) {
+  const before = {
+    json: process.env.CCTV_SOURCES_JSON,
+    file: process.env.CCTV_SOURCES_FILE,
+    austin: process.env.CCTV_FORCE_AUSTIN,
+    serverKey: process.env.GOOGLE_MAPS_SERVER_API_KEY,
+    browserKey: process.env.GOOGLE_MAPS_API_KEY,
+  };
+  process.env.CCTV_SOURCES_JSON = JSON.stringify([
+    STILL,
+    STILL_ALIAS,
+    VIDEO,
+    MJPEG,
+  ]);
+  process.env.CCTV_SOURCES_FILE = 'absent-source-file.json';
+  process.env.CCTV_FORCE_AUSTIN = '0';
+  // No Street View key: a /frame miss lands on the synthetic billboard rather
+  // than a network call this file does not model.
+  delete process.env.GOOGLE_MAPS_SERVER_API_KEY;
+  delete process.env.GOOGLE_MAPS_API_KEY;
+  const nativeFetch = globalThis.fetch;
+  const requests = [];
+  globalThis.fetch = async (url, init = {}) => {
+    requests.push({ url: String(url), redirect: init.redirect });
+    return respond({ url: String(url), init });
+  };
+  t.after(() => {
+    globalThis.fetch = nativeFetch;
+    for (const [name, value] of [
+      ['CCTV_SOURCES_JSON', before.json],
+      ['CCTV_SOURCES_FILE', before.file],
+      ['CCTV_FORCE_AUSTIN', before.austin],
+      ['GOOGLE_MAPS_SERVER_API_KEY', before.serverKey],
+      ['GOOGLE_MAPS_API_KEY', before.browserKey],
+    ]) {
+      if (value === undefined) delete process.env[name];
+      else process.env[name] = value;
+    }
+  });
+
+  let handler = null;
+  cctvProxy().configureServer({
+    middlewares: {
+      use: (_route, fn) => {
+        handler = fn;
+      },
+    },
+  });
+  assert.ok(handler, 'the CCTV provider must mount a middleware');
+
+  const call = async (path) => {
+    const { res, done } = recordingResponse();
+    await handler({ url: path, headers: {}, method: 'GET', on() {} }, res);
+    await done;
+    return res;
+  };
+  const health = async (id) => {
+    const res = await call('/health');
+    return JSON.parse(res.body).cameras.find((entry) => entry.id === id);
+  };
+  return { call, health, requests };
+}
+
+test('a still camera is refused by /media without any upstream request', async (t) => {
+  // Everything the old relay would have done with this camera: redirect to a
+  // private address, then answer with HTML.
+  const app = mount(t, ({ url }) =>
+    url.includes('169.254.169.254')
+      ? upstreamResponse({
+          headers: { 'content-type': 'text/html' },
+          body: '<html>metadata</html>',
+        })
+      : upstreamResponse({
+          status: 302,
+          headers: { location: 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/' },
+          body: '',
+        }),
+  );
+  for (const camera of [STILL, STILL_ALIAS]) {
+    const res = await app.call(`/media/${camera.id}`);
+    assert.equal(res.statusCode, 404, camera.id);
+    assert.equal(res.headers['Content-Type'], 'application/json');
+    assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(res.body), {
+      error: 'No live media for this camera; use the frame endpoint',
+    });
+    assert.doesNotMatch(res.body, /metadata/);
+    // Being asked on the wrong route is not a camera fault.
+    assert.equal(await app.health(camera.id), undefined);
+  }
+  assert.deepEqual(app.requests, [], 'a still camera reached its upstream');
+});
+
+test('an unregistered camera id is refused by /media the same way', async (t) => {
+  const app = mount(t, () => {
+    throw new Error('an unknown camera must not fetch');
+  });
+  const res = await app.call('/media/not-a-camera');
+  assert.equal(res.statusCode, 404);
+  assert.equal(app.requests.length, 0);
+});
+
+test('a video camera is still relayed by /media', async (t) => {
+  const app = mount(t, () =>
+    upstreamResponse({
+      headers: { 'content-type': 'video/mp4', 'content-length': '5' },
+      body: 'video',
+    }),
+  );
+  const res = await app.call(`/media/${VIDEO.id}`);
+  assert.equal(res.statusCode, 200);
+  assert.equal(res.headers['Content-Type'], 'video/mp4');
+  assert.equal(res.headers['X-CCTV-Source'], 'live-media');
+  assert.equal(res.body, 'video');
+  assert.deepEqual(
+    app.requests.map(({ url }) => url),
+    [VIDEO.url],
+  );
+  assert.equal((await app.health(VIDEO.id)).status, 'ok');
+});
+
+test('an MJPEG camera is still relayed by /media', async (t) => {
+  const app = mount(t, () =>
+    upstreamResponse({
+      headers: { 'content-type': 'multipart/x-mixed-replace; boundary=frame' },
+      body: '--frame',
+    }),
+  );
+  const res = await app.call(`/media/${MJPEG.id}`);
+  assert.equal(res.statusCode, 200);
+  assert.match(res.headers['Content-Type'], /^multipart\/x-mixed-replace/);
+  assert.equal(res.body, '--frame');
+  assert.deepEqual(
+    app.requests.map(({ url }) => url),
+    [MJPEG.url],
+  );
+});
+
+test('a still camera is still served through /frame with its bounded fetch', async (t) => {
+  const app = mount(t, () =>
+    upstreamResponse({
+      headers: { 'content-type': 'image/jpeg' },
+      body: 'jpeg-bytes',
+    }),
+  );
+  const res = await app.call(`/frame/${STILL.id}`);
+  assert.equal(res.statusCode, 200);
+  assert.equal(res.headers['Content-Type'], 'image/jpeg');
+  assert.equal(res.headers['X-CCTV-Source'], 'upstream-image');
+  assert.equal(res.body, 'jpeg-bytes');
+  assert.deepEqual(app.requests, [{ url: STILL.url, redirect: 'manual' }]);
+});
+
+test('/frame does not follow a still camera off its origin', async (t) => {
+  // The protection /media used to bypass, shown on the route that keeps it.
+  const app = mount(t, ({ url }) =>
+    url === STILL.url
+      ? upstreamResponse({
+          status: 302,
+          headers: { location: 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/' },
+          body: '',
+        })
+      : upstreamResponse({
+          headers: { 'content-type': 'image/jpeg' },
+          body: 'private',
+        }),
+  );
+  const res = await app.call(`/frame/${STILL.id}`);
+  assert.equal(res.statusCode, 200);
+  assert.equal(res.headers['X-CCTV-Source'], 'synthetic');
+  assert.doesNotMatch(res.body, /private/);
+  assert.deepEqual(
+    app.requests.map(({ url }) => url),
+    [STILL.url],
+  );
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,423 @@
+import { test } from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+
+import {
+  parseRescuCameraList,
+  torontoCameraToSource,
+  loadTorontoSourcesFromOpenData,
+} from '../../server/providers/cctv/sources.js';
+import {
+  TORONTO_RESCU_LIST_URL,
+  TORONTO_RESCU_IMAGE_ORIGIN,
+  TORONTO_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES,
+  DEFAULT_CCTV_MAX_SOURCES,
+} from '../../server/providers/cctv/constants.js';
+import { CAMERA_CODE_MAX_CHARS } from '../../server/providers/cctv/normalize.js';
+import { allocateSourceCap } from '../../server/providers/cctv/cap.js';
+import { createCctvCatalog } from '../../server/providers/cctv/catalog.js';
+
+/**
+ * A response whose body is a live stream, plus a flag that flips when the
+ * stream is cancelled. A rejection path that returns without cancelling holds
+ * the transport open, so the flag is what the refusal tests actually assert.
+ */
+const streamingResponse = (init = {}) => {
+  const state = { cancelled: false };
+  const body = new ReadableStream({
+    start(controller) {
+      controller.enqueue(new TextEncoder().encode('j'));
+    },
+    cancel() {
+      state.cancelled = true;
+    },
+  });
+  return { response: new Response(body, init), state };
+};
+
+/** One RESCU row, shaped like the live `tmcearthcameras.json` payload. */
+const row = (overrides = {}) => ({
+  Number: '8048',
+  Name: 'BATHURST ST & BLOOR ST W',
+  Latitude: '43.665249',
+  Longitude: '-79.41114',
+  D1: 'n',
+  D2: 'e',
+  D3: 's',
+  D4: 'w',
+  Group: 'Arterial',
+  ...overrides,
+});
+
+/** The city wraps the list in a JSONP callback; this is that envelope. */
+const jsonp = (rows) =>
+  `jsonTMCEarthCamerasCallback(${JSON.stringify({ Data: rows })});`;
+
+test('a RESCU row maps to a source on the constructed frame URL', () => {
+  const source = torontoCameraToSource(row());
+  assert.equal(source.id, 'toronto-8048');
+  assert.equal(source.name, 'BATHURST ST & BLOOR ST W');
+  assert.equal(source.city, 'Toronto');
+  assert.equal(source.cityId, 'toronto');
+  assert.equal(source.provider, 'City of Toronto');
+  assert.equal(source.lat, 43.665249);
+  assert.equal(source.lon, -79.41114);
+  assert.equal(source.feedType, 'image');
+  assert.equal(source.sourceKind, 'toronto-rescu-open-data');
+  assert.equal(
+    source.license,
+    'Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence – Toronto',
+  );
+  assert.equal(
+    source.url,
+    `${TORONTO_RESCU_IMAGE_ORIGIN}loc8048.jpg`,
+    'the documented loc####.jpg convention',
+  );
+  assert.equal(source.url, source.snapshotUrl);
+  assert.ok(source.url.startsWith(TORONTO_RESCU_IMAGE_ORIGIN));
+});
+
+test('the frame URL is built from the camera number, never read from the payload', () => {
+  // The list carries no URL field at all, so an added one must stay inert: the
+  // frame proxy is pinned to the city origin by construction.
+  const planted = torontoCameraToSource(
+    row({
+      url: 'https://evil.example/x.jpg',
+      snapshotUrl: 'https://evil.example/x.jpg',
+      Url: 'https://evil.example/x.jpg',
+    }),
+  );
+  assert.equal(planted.url, `${TORONTO_RESCU_IMAGE_ORIGIN}loc8048.jpg`);
+  assert.equal(planted.snapshotUrl, planted.url);
+
+  // A number that is not plain digits cannot reach the URL builder: path
+  // traversal and absolute URLs are refused outright rather than escaped.
+  for (const Number_ of [
+    '../../etc/passwd',
+    '8048/../../x',
+    'https://evil.example/1',
+    '80 48',
+    '8048.jpg',
+    '-8048',
+    '',
+    '   ',
+    null,
+  ]) {
+    assert.equal(
+      torontoCameraToSource(row({ Number: Number_ })),
+      null,
+      `refused: ${String(Number_)}`,
+    );
+  }
+});
+
+test('the comparison directions never become a camera heading', () => {
+  // D1-D4 are the city's *comparison image* directions (static 2016 reference
+  // stills served from ComparisonImages/), not a facing for the live frame:
+  // these cameras pan. The letters read like a compass and map trivially onto
+  // one (n -> 0, w -> 270), so the temptation to wire them up is real — and a
+  // heading derived from them would be confidently wrong for every camera in
+  // the city. Nobody may "fix" this.
+  const base = torontoCameraToSource(row());
+  for (const dirs of [
+    { D1: 'n', D2: 'e', D3: 's', D4: 'w' },
+    { D1: '', D2: 'e', D3: '', D4: 'w' },
+    { D1: '', D2: '', D3: '', D4: '' },
+    { D1: 's', D2: '', D3: '', D4: '' },
+  ]) {
+    const source = torontoCameraToSource(row(dirs));
+    assert.equal(source.headingConfidence, 'low');
+    assert.ok(Number.isFinite(source.headingDeg));
+    // Same id, same fallback heading, whatever the directions say.
+    assert.equal(source.headingDeg, base.headingDeg);
+  }
+});
+
+test('the two cameras at one intersection are kept apart', () => {
+  // 8047 and 8048 are both "BATHURST ST & BLOOR ST W", five metres apart. They
+  // are distinct units, so both survive, and the id-hash fallback fans their
+  // gizmos apart instead of stacking them on one bearing.
+  const a = torontoCameraToSource(
+    row({ Number: '8047', Latitude: '43.665223', Longitude: '-79.411083' }),
+  );
+  const b = torontoCameraToSource(row());
+  assert.equal(a.id, 'toronto-8047');
+  assert.equal(b.id, 'toronto-8048');
+  assert.notEqual(a.url, b.url);
+  assert.notEqual(a.headingDeg, b.headingDeg);
+});
+
+test('rows outside Toronto and unusable geometry are dropped', () => {
+  // Calgary: a plausible lat/lon, but not a Toronto camera.
+  assert.equal(
+    torontoCameraToSource(row({ Latitude: '51.0453', Longitude: '-114.1413' })),
+    null,
+  );
+  // Null island, and the empty strings that would become it.
+  assert.equal(
+    torontoCameraToSource(row({ Latitude: '0', Longitude: '0' })),
+    null,
+  );
+  assert.equal(
+    torontoCameraToSource(row({ Latitude: '', Longitude: '' })),
+    null,
+  );
+  assert.equal(
+    torontoCameraToSource(row({ Latitude: 'north', Longitude: 'west' })),
+    null,
+  );
+  assert.equal(torontoCameraToSource({}), null);
+  assert.equal(torontoCameraToSource(null), null);
+});
+
+test('a nameless row still gets a label', () => {
+  const source = torontoCameraToSource(row({ Name: '   ' }));
+  assert.equal(source.name, 'Toronto Camera 8048');
+});
+
+test('the JSONP envelope is unwrapped, and only that envelope', () => {
+  assert.deepEqual(parseRescuCameraList(jsonp([row()])), [row()]);
+  // Whitespace and a missing trailing semicolon are both tolerated.
+  assert.equal(
+    parseRescuCameraList(`\n  ${jsonp([row()]).replace(/;$/, '')}  \n`).length,
+    1,
+  );
+  // Should the city ever drop the wrapper, the bare document still parses.
+  assert.equal(
+    parseRescuCameraList(JSON.stringify({ Data: [row()] })).length,
+    1,
+  );
+
+  // Anything else yields no cameras rather than a thrown loader.
+  for (const text of [
+    'otherCallback({"Data":[]})',
+    'jsonTMCEarthCamerasCallback(',
+    'jsonTMCEarthCamerasCallback({"Data":',
+    '{"Data":"not-an-array"}',
+    '{"nope":[]}',
+    '<html>503</html>',
+    '',
+    null,
+  ]) {
+    assert.deepEqual(parseRescuCameraList(text), [], `rejected: ${text}`);
+  }
+});
+
+test('the loader reads the keyless list and collapses duplicate numbers', async (t) => {
+  t.mock.method(console, 'log', () => {});
+  const requested = [];
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async (url) => {
+    requested.push(String(url));
+    return new Response(
+      jsonp([
+        row(),
+        // Same camera number twice: one camera, not two.
+        row({ Name: 'BATHURST ST & BLOOR ST W (duplicate)' }),
+        row({
+          Number: '8001',
+          Name: 'YORK ST & BREMNER BLVD / RAPTORS WAY',
+          Latitude: '43.643120',
+          Longitude: '-79.381386',
+        }),
+        row({ Number: '../evil' }),
+      ]),
+    );
+  });
+  const cameras = await loadTorontoSourcesFromOpenData();
+  assert.deepEqual(requested, [TORONTO_RESCU_LIST_URL]);
+  assert.deepEqual(
+    cameras.map((camera) => camera.id),
+    // Nearest downtown first: York & Bremner is at the core, Bathurst & Bloor
+    // is three kilometres out.
+    ['toronto-8001', 'toronto-8048'],
+  );
+  assert.equal(cameras[1].name, 'BATHURST ST & BLOOR ST W');
+});
+
+test('an upstream failure yields an empty pack and releases the response', async (t) => {
+  t.mock.method(console, 'warn', () => {});
+  // A 503 can still arrive with a streaming body; returning without cancelling
+  // it would hold the connection until the socket times out.
+  const failed = streamingResponse({ status: 503 });
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async () => failed.response);
+  assert.deepEqual(await loadTorontoSourcesFromOpenData(), []);
+  assert.equal(failed.state.cancelled, true, 'the failed body is cancelled');
+
+  t.mock.restoreAll();
+  t.mock.method(console, 'warn', () => {});
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async () => {
+    throw new Error('network down');
+  });
+  assert.deepEqual(await loadTorontoSourcesFromOpenData(), []);
+});
+
+test('the list fetch refuses redirects and oversized bodies', async (t) => {
+  t.mock.method(console, 'warn', () => {});
+  // A redirect is never followed: the list host cannot be steered. Its body is
+  // a live stream, so the test also proves the refusal releases the transport.
+  const seen = [];
+  const redirected = streamingResponse({
+    status: 302,
+    headers: { location: 'https://evil.example/cameras.json' },
+  });
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async (url, init) => {
+    seen.push([String(url), init.redirect]);
+    return redirected.response;
+  });
+  assert.deepEqual(await loadTorontoSourcesFromOpenData(), []);
+  assert.deepEqual(seen, [[TORONTO_RESCU_LIST_URL, 'manual']]);
+  assert.equal(
+    redirected.state.cancelled,
+    true,
+    'the redirect body is cancelled',
+  );
+
+  // A body over the cap is refused rather than buffered.
+  t.mock.restoreAll();
+  t.mock.method(console, 'warn', () => {});
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async () => {
+    return new Response(jsonp([row()]), {
+      headers: {
+        'content-length': String(TORONTO_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES + 1),
+      },
+    });
+  });
+  assert.deepEqual(await loadTorontoSourcesFromOpenData(), []);
+
+  // So is a body that only declares its size once it is already too long.
+  t.mock.restoreAll();
+  t.mock.method(console, 'warn', () => {});
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async () => {
+    const oversized = 'x'.repeat(TORONTO_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES + 1024);
+    return new Response(
+      new ReadableStream({
+        start(controller) {
+          controller.enqueue(new TextEncoder().encode(oversized));
+          controller.close();
+        },
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+  assert.deepEqual(await loadTorontoSourcesFromOpenData(), []);
+});
+
+test('the unselected label is the intersection, trimmed to the code width', () => {
+  assert.equal(torontoCameraToSource(row()).code, 'BATHURST ST & BLOOR ST W');
+  const long = torontoCameraToSource(
+    row({
+      Name: 'BAYVIEW AVE & POTTERY RD / PRIVATE ACCESS @ 620m SOUTH OF - 550 BAYVIEW AVE (EVERGREEN)',
+    }),
+  );
+  assert.ok(long.code.length <= CAMERA_CODE_MAX_CHARS);
+  assert.ok(long.code.endsWith('…'));
+  assert.ok(long.code.startsWith('BAYVIEW AVE & POTTERY'));
+});
+
+test('a reduced catalog cap thins every pack instead of dropping Toronto', () => {
+  // Toronto merges last in LIVE_PACKS, so a positional slice would delete it
+  // outright. The round-robin allocation must give it its share.
+  const lane = (name, count) => ({
+    name,
+    sources: Array.from({ length: count }, (_, i) => ({ id: `${name}-${i}` })),
+  });
+  const { sources, packs } = allocateSourceCap(
+    [lane('austin', 250), lane('calgary', 215), lane('toronto', 336)],
+    30,
+  );
+  assert.equal(sources.length, 30);
+  assert.deepEqual(
+    packs.map((p) => [p.name, p.kept]),
+    [
+      ['austin', 10],
+      ['calgary', 10],
+      ['toronto', 10],
+    ],
+  );
+  // Toronto contributes its own highest-priority cameras, in its own order.
+  assert.deepEqual(
+    sources.filter((s) => s.id.startsWith('toronto-')).map((s) => s.id),
+    Array.from({ length: 10 }, (_, i) => `toronto-${i}`),
+  );
+});
+
+/**
+ * Serve the RESCU list to the Toronto endpoint and an empty payload to every
+ * other pack, so one catalog refresh exercises the registration without
+ * reaching the network. Returns the URLs that were requested.
+ */
+const runCatalogWithMockedUpstreams = async (t) => {
+  const requested = [];
+  t.mock.method(console, 'log', () => {});
+  t.mock.method(console, 'warn', () => {});
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async (url) => {
+    const href = String(url);
+    requested.push(href);
+    if (href === TORONTO_RESCU_LIST_URL) {
+      return new Response(
+        jsonp([
+          row({
+            Number: '8001',
+            Name: 'YORK ST & BREMNER BLVD / RAPTORS WAY',
+            Latitude: '43.643120',
+            Longitude: '-79.381386',
+          }),
+          row(),
+        ]),
+      );
+    }
+    return Response.json([]);
+  });
+  const sources = await createCctvCatalog({ sourceRoot: '/nonexistent' })();
+  return { requested, sources };
+};
+
+test('the pack is registered, so its cameras reach the served catalog', async (t) => {
+  const saved = { ...process.env };
+  try {
+    delete process.env.CCTV_SOURCES_FILE;
+    delete process.env.CCTV_SOURCES_JSON;
+    delete process.env.CCTV_TORONTO_ENABLED;
+    const { requested, sources } = await runCatalogWithMockedUpstreams(t);
+    assert.ok(
+      requested.includes(TORONTO_RESCU_LIST_URL),
+      'the registered lane reaches its upstream',
+    );
+    assert.deepEqual(
+      sources.filter((s) => s.cityId === 'toronto').map((s) => s.id),
+      ['toronto-8001', 'toronto-8048'],
+      'Toronto cameras reach the served catalog through the registered lane',
+    );
+  } finally {
+    for (const key of Object.keys(process.env)) {
+      if (!(key in saved)) delete process.env[key];
+    }
+    Object.assign(process.env, saved);
+  }
+});
+
+test('CCTV_TORONTO_ENABLED=0 keeps the lane from being loaded at all', async (t) => {
+  const saved = { ...process.env };
+  try {
+    delete process.env.CCTV_SOURCES_FILE;
+    delete process.env.CCTV_SOURCES_JSON;
+    process.env.CCTV_TORONTO_ENABLED = '0';
+    const { requested, sources } = await runCatalogWithMockedUpstreams(t);
+    assert.equal(
+      requested.includes(TORONTO_RESCU_LIST_URL),
+      false,
+      'the disabled lane never reaches its upstream',
+    );
+    assert.deepEqual(
+      sources.filter((s) => s.cityId === 'toronto'),
+      [],
+    );
+  } finally {
+    for (const key of Object.keys(process.env)) {
+      if (!(key in saved)) delete process.env[key];
+    }
+    Object.assign(process.env, saved);
+  }
+});
+
+test('the shipped catalog ceiling is not raised to make room for this pack', () => {
+  assert.equal(DEFAULT_CCTV_MAX_SOURCES, 4000);
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
+import { test } from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import fs from 'node:fs';
+import os from 'node:os';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { createCctvCatalog } from '../../server/providers/cctv/catalog.js';
+import {
+  DEFAULT_WSDOT_MAX_SOURCES,
+  WSDOT_CAMERAS_URL,
+  WSDOT_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES,
+} from '../../server/providers/cctv/constants.js';
+import {
+  loadWsdotSourcesFromOpenData,
+  webMercatorToWgs84,
+} from '../../server/providers/cctv/sources.js';
+
+/** Set (or, for `undefined`, delete) environment variables for one test. */
+function withEnv(t, env) {
+  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(env)) {
+    const previous = process.env[name];
+    t.after(() => {
+      if (previous === undefined) delete process.env[name];
+      else process.env[name] = previous;
+    });
+    if (value === undefined) delete process.env[name];
+    else process.env[name] = value;
+  }
+}
+
+/** Silence the loaders' progress and failure logging. */
+function quiet(t) {
+  t.mock.method(console, 'log', () => {});
+  t.mock.method(console, 'warn', () => {});
+}
+
+/** Web Mercator metres for a WGS84 coordinate (inverse of the loader's math). */
+function mercator(lat, lon) {
+  const R = 6378137;
+  return {
+    x: (lon * Math.PI * R) / 180,
+    y: R * Math.log(Math.tan(Math.PI / 4 + (lat * Math.PI) / 360)),
+  };
+}
+
+/** A `Cameras.json` point feature carrying the fields the loader reads. */
+function wsdotFeature(id, lat, lon, overrides = {}) {
+  const { attributes = {}, geometry } = overrides;
+  return {
+    attributes: {
+      CameraID: id,
+      CameraTitle: `Camera ${id}`,
+      CompassDirection: 'N',
+      ImageURL: `https://images.wsdot.wa.gov/nw/${id}.jpg`,
+      ...attributes,
+    },
+    geometry: geometry === undefined ? mercator(lat, lon) : geometry,
+  };
+}
+
+/** Serialize a payload for the mocked fetch as raw Windows-1252 bytes. */
+function cp1252Response(payload) {
+  const text = JSON.stringify(payload);
+  const bytes = new Uint8Array(text.length);
+  for (let i = 0; i < text.length; i += 1) {
+    const code = text.charCodeAt(i);
+    // U+2013 EN DASH is 0x96 in Windows-1252 — the byte the live feed ships.
+    bytes[i] = code === 0x2013 ? 0x96 : code;
+  }
+  return new Response(bytes, {
+    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+  });
+}
+
+test('webMercatorToWgs84 recovers WGS84 degrees from layer geometry', () => {
+  // Real feature from the live layer: I-5 at the Interstate Bridge.
+  const { lat, lon } = webMercatorToWgs84(-13656007.102, 5719738.545);
+  assert.ok(Math.abs(lat - 45.62) < 0.05, `lat ${lat}`);
+  assert.ok(Math.abs(lon - -122.675) < 0.05, `lon ${lon}`);
+});
+
+test('WSDOT loader keeps official-host cameras and maps compass directions', async (t) => {
+  quiet(t);
+  withEnv(t, { CCTV_WSDOT_MAX_SOURCES: undefined });
+  const requested = [];
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async (url) => {
+    requested.push(String(url));
+    return cp1252Response({
+      features: [
+        wsdotFeature(1001, 47.6097, -122.3331, {
+          attributes: {
+            // The 0x2013 below is serialized as the feed's 0x96 byte.
+            CameraTitle: 'I-5 – Seattle, looking south',
+            CompassDirection: 'S',
+          },
+        }),
+        wsdotFeature(9059, 47.66, -117.43, {
+          attributes: { CompassDirection: 'B' },
+        }),
+        // Partner-hosted frame (Oregon DOT): skipped, never proxied.
+        wsdotFeature(1002, 45.62, -122.675, {
+          attributes: {
+            ImageURL: 'https://www.tripcheck.com/RoadCams/cams/bridge.jpg',
+          },
+        }),
+        // Bad rows: non-integer id, missing geometry, out-of-state point.
+        wsdotFeature('1003', 47.6, -122.3),
+        wsdotFeature(1004, 47.6, -122.3, { geometry: null }),
+        wsdotFeature(1005, 34.05, -118.24),
+      ],
+    });
+  });
+
+  const cameras = await loadWsdotSourcesFromOpenData();
+
+  assert.deepEqual(requested, [WSDOT_CAMERAS_URL]);
+  // Exactly the two valid official-host cameras survive; the partner-hosted
+  // frame and the malformed rows are dropped.
+  assert.deepEqual(cameras.map((camera) => camera.id).sort(), [
+    'wsdot-1001',
+    'wsdot-9059',
+  ]);
+
+  const seattle = cameras.find((camera) => camera.id === 'wsdot-1001');
+  assert.equal(seattle.name, 'I-5 – Seattle, looking south');
+  assert.equal(seattle.provider, 'WSDOT');
+  assert.equal(seattle.url, 'https://images.wsdot.wa.gov/nw/1001.jpg');
+  assert.equal(seattle.snapshotUrl, seattle.url);
+  assert.equal(seattle.feedType, 'image');
+  assert.equal(seattle.headingDeg, 180);
+  assert.equal(seattle.headingConfidence, 'high');
+  assert.equal(seattle.fovDeg, 56);
+  assert.ok(Math.abs(seattle.lat - 47.6097) < 0.001);
+  assert.ok(Math.abs(seattle.lon - -122.3331) < 0.001);
+
+  // `B` (both directions) carries no single facing: id-hash fallback at low
+  // confidence, with the low-confidence pose personality.
+  const spokane = cameras.find((camera) => camera.id === 'wsdot-9059');
+  assert.equal(spokane.headingConfidence, 'low');
+  assert.equal(spokane.fovDeg, 44);
+  assert.ok(spokane.headingDeg >= 0 && spokane.headingDeg < 360);
+});
+
+test('WSDOT loader maps every CompassDirection code', async (t) => {
+  quiet(t);
+  withEnv(t, { CCTV_WSDOT_MAX_SOURCES: undefined });
+  const codes = {
+    N: 0,
+    NE: 45,
+    E: 90,
+    SE: 135,
+    S: 180,
+    SW: 225,
+    W: 270,
+    NW: 315,
+    // Lower-case and padded codes are the same code.
+    ' nw ': 315,
+  };
+  // The live feed's no-facing codes, plus an unknown one.
+  const noFacing = ['B', 'O', null, 'BW'];
+  const entries = [...Object.keys(codes), ...noFacing];
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async () =>
+    cp1252Response({
+      features: entries.map((code, i) =>
+        wsdotFeature(3000 + i, 47.0 + i * 0.05, -122.9 + i * 0.05, {
+          attributes: { CompassDirection: code },
+        }),
+      ),
+    }),
+  );
+
+  const cameras = await loadWsdotSourcesFromOpenData();
+  const byId = new Map(cameras.map((camera) => [camera.id, camera]));
+  entries.forEach((code, i) => {
+    const camera = byId.get(`wsdot-${3000 + i}`);
+    if (code in codes) {
+      assert.equal(camera.headingDeg, codes[code], `heading for ${code}`);
+      assert.equal(camera.headingConfidence, 'high', `confidence for ${code}`);
+      assert.equal(camera.fovDeg, 56, `pose personality for ${code}`);
+    } else {
+      assert.equal(camera.headingConfidence, 'low', `confidence for ${code}`);
+      assert.equal(camera.fovDeg, 44, `pose personality for ${code}`);
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+test('WSDOT loader honors the max-sources cap', async (t) => {
+  quiet(t);
+  withEnv(t, { CCTV_WSDOT_MAX_SOURCES: '8' });
+  const features = [];
+  for (let i = 0; i < 24; i += 1) {
+    features.push(wsdotFeature(2000 + i, 47.0 + i * 0.05, -122.9 + i * 0.05));
+  }
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async () => cp1252Response({ features }));
+
+  const cameras = await loadWsdotSourcesFromOpenData();
+  assert.equal(cameras.length, 8);
+});
+
+test('WSDOT loader defaults its cap and survives upstream failure', async (t) => {
+  quiet(t);
+  withEnv(t, { CCTV_WSDOT_MAX_SOURCES: undefined });
+  assert.equal(DEFAULT_WSDOT_MAX_SOURCES, 250);
+
+  t.mock.method(
+    globalThis,
+    'fetch',
+    async () => new Response('', { status: 503 }),
+  );
+  assert.deepEqual(await loadWsdotSourcesFromOpenData(), []);
+
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async () => {
+    throw new Error('network down');
+  });
+  assert.deepEqual(await loadWsdotSourcesFromOpenData(), []);
+});
+
+test('the catalog fetch refuses a redirect and cancels its body', async (t) => {
+  quiet(t);
+  // A redirect is never followed, and its still-open body is cancelled.
+  const seen = [];
+  const state = { cancelled: false };
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async (url, init) => {
+    seen.push([String(url), init.redirect]);
+    const body = new ReadableStream({
+      start(controller) {
+        controller.enqueue(new TextEncoder().encode('{'));
+      },
+      cancel() {
+        state.cancelled = true;
+      },
+    });
+    return new Response(body, {
+      status: 302,
+      headers: { location: 'https://evil.example/Cameras.json' },
+    });
+  });
+  assert.deepEqual(await loadWsdotSourcesFromOpenData(), []);
+  assert.deepEqual(seen, [[WSDOT_CAMERAS_URL, 'manual']]);
+  assert.equal(state.cancelled, true, 'the redirect body is cancelled');
+});
+
+test('the catalog fetch refuses a body over the byte cap', async (t) => {
+  quiet(t);
+  // A valid catalog padded past the cap is refused rather than buffered.
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async () => {
+    const text = JSON.stringify({
+      features: [wsdotFeature(1001, 47.6097, -122.3331)],
+    });
+    const padded = text + ' '.repeat(WSDOT_MAX_CATALOG_BYTES);
+    return new Response(
+      new ReadableStream({
+        start(controller) {
+          controller.enqueue(new TextEncoder().encode(padded));
+          controller.close();
+        },
+      }),
+      { headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } },
+    );
+  });
+  assert.deepEqual(await loadWsdotSourcesFromOpenData(), []);
+});
+
+test('CCTV_WSDOT_ENABLED=0 skips the WSDOT request', async (t) => {
+  quiet(t);
+  const sourceRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(
+    path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gev-cctv-catalog-'),
+  );
+  t.after(() => fs.rmSync(sourceRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+  withEnv(t, {
+    CCTV_SOURCES_FILE: undefined,
+    CCTV_SOURCES_JSON: undefined,
+    CCTV_FORCE_AUSTIN: undefined,
+    CCTV_PREFER_AUSTIN: undefined,
+    CCTV_MAX_SOURCES: undefined,
+    CCTV_WSDOT_ENABLED: undefined,
+    CCTV_WSDOT_MAX_SOURCES: undefined,
+  });
+  const requested = [];
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async (url) => {
+    requested.push(String(url));
+    // Every other live pack is down; only WSDOT answers.
+    return String(url) === WSDOT_CAMERAS_URL
+      ? cp1252Response({ features: [wsdotFeature(1001, 47.6097, -122.3331)] })
+      : new Response('unavailable', { status: 503 });
+  });
+
+  const sources = await createCctvCatalog({ sourceRoot })();
+  assert.deepEqual(
+    sources.map((source) => source.id),
+    ['wsdot-1001'],
+  );
+
+  process.env.CCTV_WSDOT_ENABLED = '0';
+  requested.length = 0;
+  assert.deepEqual(await createCctvCatalog({ sourceRoot })(), []);
+  assert.ok(requested.length > 0, 'the other live packs still load');
+  assert.equal(
+    requested.includes(WSDOT_CAMERAS_URL),
+    false,
+    'a disabled pack makes no request',
+  );
+});
@@ -162,6 +162,44 @@ test('malformed, duplicate, oversized, future and expired status is rejected rat
  assert.deepEqual(parseCycloneStatus({ activeStorms: [] }, NOW), []);
 });

+test('advisories published before their nominal time are accepted, far-future ones are not', () => {
+  // NHC wrote the 03:00Z advisory at 02:34Z.
+  const early = Date.UTC(2026, 8, 16, 2, 34);
+  assert.equal(parseCycloneStatus(status(), early)[0].issuedAt, TIME);
+  assert.throws(
+    () => parseCycloneStatus(status(), Date.UTC(2026, 8, 16, 1, 25)),
+    /invalid_cyclone_data/,
+  );
+});
+
+test('advisory and position times are bounded at 90 minutes ahead and 12 hours old', () => {
+  const MINUTE = 60_000;
+  const at = (offsetMs) => new Date(NOW + offsetMs).toISOString();
+  const fields = {
+    issuedAt: (value) =>
+      status({
+        forecastAdvisory: {
+          advNum: '010',
+          issuance: value,
+          url: 'https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/text/MIATCMEP5.shtml',
+        },
+      }),
+    positionAt: (value) => status({ lastUpdate: value }),
+  };
+  for (const [field, payload] of Object.entries(fields)) {
+    for (const offset of [90 * MINUTE, -12 * 60 * MINUTE]) {
+      const [storm] = parseCycloneStatus(payload(at(offset)), NOW);
+      assert.equal(storm[field], at(offset), `${field} ${offset}`);
+    }
+    for (const offset of [90 * MINUTE + 1, -12 * 60 * MINUTE - 1])
+      assert.throws(
+        () => parseCycloneStatus(payload(at(offset)), NOW),
+        /invalid_cyclone_data/,
+        `${field} ${offset}`,
+      );
+  }
+});
+
 test('coherent geometry is retained with holes/dateline while older advisory geometry is omitted', () => {
  const storms = parseCycloneStatus(status(), NOW);
  const parts = collections();
@@ -248,12 +248,38 @@ export const DATA_CREDITS = [
      '<a href="https://www.digitraffic.fi/en/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">digitraffic.fi</a>, ' +
      'license CC BY 4.0',
  },
+  {
+    key: 'lithuania-cctv',
+    html:
+      // Opt-in: the camera endpoints are the eismoinfo.lt website backend, not
+      // among the services Via Lietuva's open-data statement lists (its
+      // conditions: attribution, reuse on the same terms).
+      'Road-camera stills (Lithuania, when enabled): ' +
+      '<a href="https://eismoinfo.lt/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Via Lietuva / Eismoinfo</a>; periodically updated images',
+  },
  {
    key: 'calgary-cctv',
    html:
      'Traffic cameras (Calgary): contains information licensed under the ' +
      '<a href="https://data.calgary.ca/stories/s/Open-Calgary-Terms-of-Use/u45n-7awa" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Open Government Licence – City of Calgary</a>',
  },
+  {
+    key: 'catalonia-cctv',
+    html:
+      'CCTV cameras &amp; frames (Catalonia): ' +
+      '<a href="https://transit.gencat.cat/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Servei Català de Trànsit</a> ' +
+      '(Llicència oberta d’ús d’informació - Catalunya); some cameras are supplied by partners ' +
+      '(Ajuntament de Barcelona, Ajuntament de Terrassa), each named in the CCTV panel',
+  },
+  {
+    key: 'kingcounty-cctv',
+    html:
+      'CCTV cameras &amp; frames (King County, WA): King County Road Services — ' +
+      '<a href="https://kingcounty.gov/en/dept/local-services/roads" target="_blank" rel="noopener">kingcounty.gov</a>, ' +
+      'per the ' +
+      '<a href="https://kingcounty.gov/en/dept/kcit/data-information-services/gis-center/about/terms-conditions-copyrights" target="_blank" rel="noopener">KCGIS Center terms</a>. ' +
+      'Partner-city cameras hosted on the county image handler (e.g. Newcastle) name their owner in the CCTV panel.',
+  },
  {
    key: 'vegvesen-cctv',
    html:
@@ -268,6 +294,12 @@ export const DATA_CREDITS = [
      '<a href="https://webcams.nyctmc.org/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">NYC DOT Traffic Management Center</a>. ' +
      NYC_DOT_DISCLAIMER,
  },
+  {
+    key: 'toronto-cctv',
+    html:
+      'Traffic cameras (Toronto): contains information licensed under the ' +
+      '<a href="https://www.toronto.ca/city-government/data-research-maps/open-data/open-data-licence/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Open Government Licence – Toronto</a>',
+  },
  {
    key: 'gbfs',
    html:
@@ -371,6 +403,16 @@ export const DATA_CREDITS = [
      '<a href="https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/data/open-data/open-government-licence-bc" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Open Government Licence – British Columbia</a>. ' +
      'Some cameras are supplied by partners (TransLink, the City of Vancouver, the City of Surrey, Parks Canada and others); each names its provider in the CCTV panel.',
  },
+  {
+    key: 'wsdot-cctv',
+    html:
+      'CCTV cameras &amp; frames (Washington State): ' +
+      '<a href="https://wsdot.wa.gov/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Washington State Department of Transportation</a> ' +
+      '(<a href="https://wsdot.com/travel/real-time/cameras" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Travel Center</a>), ' +
+      'used per the ' +
+      '<a href="https://wsdot.wa.gov/about/policies/travel-information-disclaimer" target="_blank" rel="noopener">WSDOT travel information disclaimer</a> ' +
+      '(low-volume public feed; catalog cached, frames proxied on demand)',
+  },
  {
    key: 'tallinn-cctv',
    html:
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import test from 'node:test';
+import {
+  defaultGatewayFromRouteTable,
+  unwritableRootWarning,
+  resolveTrustedPeers,
+} from '../scripts/docker-start.mjs';
+
+// The shape of /proc/net/route inside a bridge-networked container:
+// little-endian hex addresses, the default route first, an interface route
+// after.
+const BRIDGE_ROUTES = [
+  'Iface\tDestination\tGateway \tFlags\tRefCnt\tUse\tMetric\tMask\t\tMTU\tWindow\tIRTT',
+  'eth0\t00000000\t0100A8C0\t0003\t0\t0\t0\t00000000\t0\t0\t0',
+  'eth0\t0000A8C0\t00000000\t0001\t0\t0\t0\t00F0FFFF\t0\t0\t0',
+  '',
+].join('\n');
+
+test('the container gateway is decoded from the kernel routing table', () => {
+  assert.equal(defaultGatewayFromRouteTable(BRIDGE_ROUTES), '192.168.0.1', 'little-endian hex, default route only');
+  assert.equal(
+    defaultGatewayFromRouteTable(BRIDGE_ROUTES.replace('0100A8C0', '011FAC')),
+    null,
+    'a malformed gateway field is not an address',
+  );
+  assert.equal(
+    defaultGatewayFromRouteTable(BRIDGE_ROUTES.replace('\t0003\t', '\t0002\t')),
+    null,
+    'a default route that is not up is ignored',
+  );
+  assert.equal(
+    defaultGatewayFromRouteTable(BRIDGE_ROUTES.replace('0100A8C0', '00000000')),
+    null,
+    'a zero gateway is not an address',
+  );
+  assert.equal(
+    defaultGatewayFromRouteTable(
+      BRIDGE_ROUTES.split('\n').filter((line) => !line.includes('00000000\t0100A8C0')).join('\n'),
+    ),
+    null,
+    '--network none has no default route and must not invent one',
+  );
+  assert.equal(defaultGatewayFromRouteTable(''), null);
+  assert.equal(defaultGatewayFromRouteTable(undefined), null);
+});
+
+test('an operator list wins, and no gateway trusts nothing', () => {
+  assert.equal(resolveTrustedPeers({ env: {}, routeTable: BRIDGE_ROUTES }), '192.168.0.1');
+  assert.equal(resolveTrustedPeers({ env: { GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS: ' 10.9.8.7 ' }, routeTable: BRIDGE_ROUTES }), '10.9.8.7');
+  assert.equal(
+    resolveTrustedPeers({ env: { GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS: '  ' }, routeTable: BRIDGE_ROUTES }),
+    '192.168.0.1',
+    'a blank override falls through to the gateway',
+  );
+  assert.equal(resolveTrustedPeers({ env: {}, routeTable: '' }), '', 'loopback-only when there is no gateway');
+});
+
+test('an unwritable checkout is named at start instead of failing quietly', () => {
+  const ids = { owner: { uid: 0, gid: 0 }, runAs: { uid: 1000, gid: 1000 } };
+  assert.equal(unwritableRootWarning({ root: '/app', writable: true, ...ids }), null, 'a writable checkout says nothing');
+  const warning = unwritableRootWarning({ root: '/app', writable: false, ...ids });
+  assert.match(warning, /owned by 0:0/, 'names the owner');
+  assert.match(warning, /runs as 1000:1000/, 'names the ids the container runs as');
+  assert.match(warning, /chown -R 1000:1000/, 'offers handing the checkout to the container user first');
+  assert.match(warning, /env UID=0 GID=0 docker compose up/, 'or the env form, which bash does not ignore');
+});
+
+test('the Docker install path keeps its loopback-only, launcher-owned contract', () => {
+  const dockerfile = readFileSync(new URL('../Dockerfile', import.meta.url), 'utf8');
+  assert.match(dockerfile, /^CMD \["node", "scripts\/docker-start\.mjs"\]$/m, 'the launcher is the container entry point');
+
+  const compose = readFileSync(new URL('../compose.yaml', import.meta.url), 'utf8');
+  assert.match(compose, /^\s+- "127\.0\.0\.1:4173:4173"$/m, 'the port is published on the host loopback only');
+  assert.doesNotMatch(compose, /GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS/, 'trust is derived at launch, never hard-coded');
+  assert.doesNotMatch(compose, /network_mode/, 'the container keeps its own network namespace');
+});
@@ -133,6 +133,32 @@ const LOCAL_HOSTNAMES = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1', '[::1]']);
 /** Socket addresses that count as this machine. */
 const LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set(['127.0.0.1', '::1', '::ffff:127.0.0.1']);

+/**
+ * Whether a socket address is one the operator has explicitly declared to be
+ * this machine through GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS: a comma-separated list of
+ * EXACT addresses, never wildcards, prefixes or hostnames. Unset trusts
+ * nothing, which is every launcher but one.
+ *
+ * The shipped use is the Docker launcher (scripts/docker-start.mjs). A port
+ * published on the host's loopback still reaches the container FROM the
+ * container network's gateway, never from 127.0.0.1, so the loopback check
+ * alone refuses the very machine running the server. Admitting that one
+ * address relaxes nothing else: the sharing, Host, Origin, Content-Type and
+ * proxy-header checks all still apply to it.
+ */
+function isTrustedPeerAddress(remoteAddress, env) {
+  const normalize = (value) =>
+    String(value || '')
+      .trim()
+      .toLowerCase()
+      .replace(/^::ffff:/, '');
+  const address = normalize(remoteAddress);
+  if (!address) return false;
+  return String(env?.GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS || '')
+    .split(',')
+    .some((entry) => entry.trim() !== '' && normalize(entry) === address);
+}
+
 /** Parse an exact local request authority from a Host header. */
 function localAuthority(hostHeader, protocol) {
  const raw = String(hostHeader || '')
@@ -231,7 +257,9 @@ export function isSharingEnabled(env = {}) {
 *    outright — a credential-writing endpoint has no business existing on a
 *    shared instance, and tunnel traffic reaches the server FROM loopback, so
 *    the socket check below cannot carry that boundary alone;
- *  - loopback socket: refuses LAN peers when the server is bound wide;
+ *  - loopback socket: refuses LAN peers when the server is bound wide. The
+ *    only exception is an exact address listed in
+ *    GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS, and every check below still applies to it;
 *  - local Host header: tunnel and DNS-rebinding traffic carries a foreign
 *    Host even when the socket says loopback;
 *  - exact same Origin on POST: a hostile web page can make a browser POST to
@@ -285,7 +313,10 @@ export function admitKeySetupRequest({
      code: 'sharing',
    };
  }
-  if (!LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(String(remoteAddress || ''))) {
+  if (
+    !LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(String(remoteAddress || '')) &&
+    !isTrustedPeerAddress(remoteAddress, env)
+  ) {
    return {
      ok: false,
      status: 403,
@@ -259,6 +259,23 @@ test('the admission gate refuses every non-local shape, one assertion per refusa
  assert.equal(admitKeySetupRequest({ ...local, env: { PINOKIO_SHARE_LOCAL: '1' } }).ok, false, 'LAN sharing disables the surface');
  // A LAN peer reaching a wide-bound server.
  assert.equal(admitKeySetupRequest({ ...local, remoteAddress: '192.168.1.20' }).ok, false, 'non-loopback socket refused');
+  // A container publishes its port on the host's loopback, yet the host's own
+  // browser still arrives from the container network's gateway. Only an exact
+  // address the operator listed admits it, and nothing else is relaxed.
+  const trusted = { GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS: ' 10.0.0.9 , 172.29.73.1 ' };
+  const gateway = { ...local, remoteAddress: '172.29.73.1' };
+  assert.equal(admitKeySetupRequest(gateway).ok, false, 'container gateway refused without the opt-in');
+  assert.equal(admitKeySetupRequest({ ...gateway, env: trusted }).ok, true, 'listed peer admitted');
+  assert.equal(admitKeySetupRequest({ ...gateway, remoteAddress: '::ffff:172.29.73.1', env: trusted }).ok, true, 'IPv4-mapped form of a listed peer admitted');
+  assert.equal(admitKeySetupRequest({ ...local, remoteAddress: '192.168.1.20', env: trusted }).ok, false, 'unlisted peer still refused');
+  assert.equal(admitKeySetupRequest({ ...gateway, env: { GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS: '*' } }).ok, false, 'wildcards are not addresses');
+  assert.equal(admitKeySetupRequest({ ...gateway, env: { GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS: '172.29.73.0/24' } }).ok, false, 'prefixes are not addresses');
+  assert.equal(admitKeySetupRequest({ ...gateway, env: { GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS: '' } }).ok, false, 'an empty list trusts nothing');
+  assert.equal(admitKeySetupRequest({ ...gateway, env: { GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS: ' , , ' } }).ok, false, 'blank entries trust nothing');
+  assert.equal(admitKeySetupRequest({ ...gateway, env: { ...trusted, PINOKIO_SHARE_LOCAL: '1' } }).ok, false, 'sharing still disables the surface for a listed peer');
+  assert.equal(admitKeySetupRequest({ ...gateway, env: trusted, hostHeader: 'abc.trycloudflare.com' }).ok, false, 'a listed peer still needs a local Host');
+  assert.equal(admitKeySetupRequest({ ...gateway, env: trusted, origin: 'https://evil.example' }).ok, false, 'a listed peer still needs the exact Origin');
+  assert.equal(admitKeySetupRequest({ ...gateway, env: trusted, proxyHeaders: { 'x-forwarded-for': '203.0.113.5' } }).ok, false, 'a listed peer still refuses proxied requests');
  // Tunnel and DNS-rebinding traffic carries a foreign Host over a loopback socket.
  assert.equal(admitKeySetupRequest({ ...local, hostHeader: 'abc.trycloudflare.com' }).ok, false, 'foreign Host refused');
  assert.equal(admitKeySetupRequest({ ...local, hostHeader: 'workstation.local:4173' }).ok, false, 'non-localhost hostnames refused');
@@ -204,6 +204,8 @@ export function createCatalog({ state: layerState, services, parts, source }) {
            ? source.groundHeights
            : null,
        poseSource,
+        model: String(source.model || ''),
+        manufacturer: String(source.manufacturer || ''),
      };
      parts.model.ensureCameraPose(camera);
      catalog.push(camera);
@@ -275,10 +275,12 @@ export class FlightRecords {
    return { icao24, prevMeta, meta, groundFlipped, fixEpochMs };
  }

-  absence(id, { complete, likelyLanded }) {
-    // Partial admissions do not prove absence, but retention remains bounded.
+  absence(id, { complete, retainIds, likelyLanded }) {
+    // Partial admissions and position-less rows do not prove absence, but
+    // retention remains bounded; a likely-landed position-less contact
+    // still takes the landed limit.
    if (
-      !complete &&
+      (!complete || (retainIds?.has(id) && !likelyLanded)) &&
      Date.now() - (this.data.get(id)?.observedReceiptMs ?? 0) < 300000
    )
      return 'retain';
@@ -107,6 +107,30 @@ test('ground transitions preserve last render height while a surface cell is col
  assert.equal(next.meta.wasAirborne, true);
 });

+test('complete snapshots age out vanished aircraft and retain position-less ones unless landed', () => {
+  const store = records();
+  for (const id of ['abc123', 'def456', 'ghi789'])
+    store.receive(observation({ id, reference: id }), view());
+  // abc123 and ghi789 are still listed without a position; def456 vanished.
+  const absent = (id, likelyLanded = false) =>
+    store.absence(id, {
+      complete: true,
+      retainIds: new Set(['abc123', 'ghi789']),
+      likelyLanded,
+    });
+  assert.deepEqual(
+    [absent('def456'), absent('def456'), absent('def456')],
+    ['stale', 'stale', 'remove'],
+  );
+  assert.equal(absent('abc123'), 'retain');
+  assert.equal(store.missingPolls.has('abc123'), false);
+  // A landed contact that lost its position takes the landed fast-cull.
+  assert.equal(absent('ghi789', true), 'remove');
+  // Position-less retention stays bounded like partial admission.
+  store.data.get('abc123').observedReceiptMs = Date.now() - 300001;
+  assert.equal(absent('abc123'), 'stale');
+});
+
 test('civil emergency status follows the latest poll instead of sticking', () => {
  const store = records();
  const first = store.receive(observation({ squawk: '7700' }), view());
@@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ export function createFlightSnapshotRenderer({
      if (currentIcaos.has(icao24)) continue;
      const absence = records.absence(icao24, {
        complete: snapshot.complete,
+        retainIds: snapshot.retainIds,
        likelyLanded: queries._likelyLanded(icao24),
      });
      if (absence === 'retain') continue;
@@ -7,10 +7,12 @@ import {
  finite,
 } from './contract.js';

+const openSkyId = (row) =>
+  Array.isArray(row) ? cleanText(row[0]).toLowerCase() : '';
+
 /** Normalize the OpenSky state-vector route, including its regional fallback. */
 export function normalizeOpenSkyAircraft(row) {
-  if (!Array.isArray(row)) return null;
-  const id = cleanText(row[0]).toLowerCase();
+  const id = openSkyId(row);
  if (!id || !coordinates(row[6], row[5])) return null;
  return {
    id,
@@ -77,6 +79,16 @@ export function normalizeReadsbAircraft(row, snapshotTimeMs) {
  };
 }

+/**
+ * OpenSky allows null longitude/latitude for a contact that is still
+ * broadcasting. Strict nulls also reject rows truncated before the position.
+ */
+function openSkyUnpositionedId(row) {
+  return Array.isArray(row) && row[5] === null && row[6] === null
+    ? openSkyId(row)
+    : '';
+}
+
 export function openSkySnapshot(
  payload,
  {
@@ -96,6 +108,7 @@ export function openSkySnapshot(
      return record;
    },
    'OpenSky',
+    openSkyUnpositionedId,
  );
  const observedAtMs = epoch(payload?.time, 1000);
  const ageMs = observedAtMs == null ? null : Math.max(0, now - observedAtMs);
@@ -56,17 +56,30 @@ export function coordinates(latitude, longitude) {
  );
 }

-/** Admit a snapshot atomically; an all-invalid nonempty feed is unavailable. */
-export function admitRecords(rows, normalize, label) {
+/**
+ * Admit a snapshot atomically; an all-invalid nonempty feed is unavailable.
+ * `unpositionedId(row)` names a rejected row that is a valid contact without
+ * a position: it is returned in `retainIds` and does not make the snapshot
+ * incomplete.
+ */
+export function admitRecords(rows, normalize, label, unpositionedId) {
  if (!Array.isArray(rows))
    throw new LiveSourceError('malformed', `Malformed ${label} response`);
  const records = [];
  const ids = new Set();
+  const retainIds = new Set();
+  let unpositioned = 0;
  for (const row of rows) {
    const record = normalize(row);
    if (record && !ids.has(record.id)) {
      records.push(record);
      ids.add(record.id);
+    } else if (!record) {
+      const id = unpositionedId?.(row);
+      if (id) {
+        retainIds.add(id);
+        unpositioned += 1;
+      }
    }
  }
  if (rows.length && !records.length) {
@@ -74,7 +87,8 @@ export function admitRecords(rows, normalize, label) {
  }
  return {
    records,
-    complete: records.length === rows.length,
+    retainIds,
+    complete: records.length + unpositioned === rows.length,
    rejectedCount: rows.length - records.length,
  };
 }
@@ -67,6 +67,50 @@ test('mixed-invalid and duplicate admissions are explicitly incomplete; all-inva
  assert.equal(openSkySnapshot({ states: [] }).complete, true);
 });

+test('position-less OpenSky rows are seen, not missing; malformed rows stay incomplete', () => {
+  // OpenSky's spec allows null longitude/latitude; every live /states/all
+  // carries such rows.
+  const unpositioned = ['DEF456', ...aircraft.slice(1)];
+  unpositioned[5] = null;
+  unpositioned[6] = null;
+  const snapshot = openSkySnapshot({ states: [aircraft, unpositioned] });
+  assert.equal(snapshot.records.length, 1);
+  assert.equal(snapshot.complete, true);
+  assert.deepEqual([...snapshot.retainIds], ['def456']);
+  assert.equal(snapshot.rejectedCount, 1);
+  const malformed = [...aircraft];
+  malformed[5] = 181;
+  const garbled = openSkySnapshot({
+    states: [aircraft, unpositioned, malformed],
+  });
+  assert.equal(garbled.complete, false);
+  assert.deepEqual([...garbled.retainIds], ['def456']);
+  // No usable id, only half a position, a truncated row, or no row at all.
+  for (const row of [
+    [' ', ...unpositioned.slice(1)],
+    Object.assign([...unpositioned], { 5: -97 }),
+    ['DEF456'],
+    null,
+  ])
+    assert.equal(openSkySnapshot({ states: [aircraft, row] }).complete, false);
+  // Repeated position-less rows stay complete.
+  const repeated = openSkySnapshot({
+    states: [aircraft, unpositioned, unpositioned],
+  });
+  assert.equal(repeated.complete, true);
+  // A feed with no positions at all still cannot prove absence.
+  assert.throws(() => openSkySnapshot({ states: [unpositioned] }), {
+    code: 'malformed',
+  });
+  // Military readsb admission keeps its existing semantics.
+  const military = readsbSnapshot(
+    { ac: [{ hex: 'abc123', lat: 30, lon: -97 }, { hex: 'def456' }] },
+    { observedAtMs: null },
+  );
+  assert.equal(military.complete, false);
+  assert.equal(military.retainIds.size, 0);
+});
+
 test('readsb units and position/contact ages are normalized once against the source epoch', () => {
  const row = normalizeReadsbAircraft(
    {