docs: tighten the display-text notes

Name routeId among the canonical analyst IDs in CURRENT-STATE, say what the
changelog entry changes for users, and drop the comment that repeated the
canonical-field doc.

changelog.d/1280-text-issue-fix.md

@@ -1 +1,3 @@
-- Bound untrusted display text at output boundaries (asturksever, #1280).
+- Keep outside text in voice and MCP tool results to one line of 180
+  characters: ALPR tags, station names and other display fields (asturksever,
+  #1280).

docs/CURRENT-STATE.md

@@ -137,16 +137,13 @@ Stale fallback runs per response after the reservation is released, and disk
 writes finish asynchronously. Settled and rejected reservations are removed
 only while they still own their map entry.
 
-External ALPR tags, surveillance-tool display fields, voice context text and
-compact analyst strings collapse controls and whitespace before a final
-180-character cap (scene labels retain their 120-character cap). Empty ALPR
-values remain null and Unicode text is preserved without splitting a surrogate
-pair. Only display fields are normalized: canonical analyst identifiers
-(`id`, `layerKey`, `icao24`, `mmsi`, `noradId`, `registration`, `callsign`)
-pass through unchanged, because bikeshare uses the raw station name as its ID
-and numbered voice references resolve by that key. These fields remain
-untrusted source data in structured tool output; text normalization does not
-establish trust or eliminate prompt injection.
+External ALPR tags, surveillance-tool fields, voice context text and compact
+analyst strings become one line of at most 180 characters (scene labels: 120).
+Empty ALPR values stay null, and the cap never splits a surrogate pair.
+Canonical analyst identifiers such as `id` and `routeId` stay unchanged, because
+voice follow-ups match on them and bikeshare uses the raw station name as its
+ID. The text is still untrusted: normalization does not prevent prompt
+injection.
 
 Terrain height requests accept at most 64 points, matching the browser service's
 existing batch size and one bounded upstream chunk. Larger requests return HTTP

src/data/displayText.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/** Bounded, single-line external display text; it remains untrusted source data. */
+/** One-line text capped at `maxLength` without splitting a surrogate pair. Still untrusted. */
 export function normalizeDisplayText(value, maxLength = 180) {
   if (value == null || typeof value === 'object' || typeof value === 'function')
     return '';

src/voice/gevActions.js

@@ -5353,9 +5353,9 @@ const ANALYST_IDENTITY_FIELDS = Object.freeze([
 ]);
 
 /**
- * Analyst item keys that identify a record rather than describe it: the
- * referent registry, track_entity and locateLayerEntity match on them, so
- * display-text normalization must leave them byte-for-byte unchanged.
+ * Keys that identify an analyst record. The referent registry, track_entity,
+ * locateLayerEntity and follow-up filters match on them, so they skip
+ * display-text normalization.
  */
 const ANALYST_CANONICAL_FIELDS = new Set([
   'layerKey',
@@ -5405,9 +5405,7 @@ function compactAnalystItem(r) {
     } else compact[key] = r[key];
   }
   if (present(r.ageHours)) compact.ageHours = r.ageHours;
-  // Display text only: canonical keys are lookup identities (bikeshare uses
-  // the raw station name as its id), so the referent registry and
-  // locateLayerEntity must see them exactly as the layer reports them.
+  // Canonical keys stay raw: bikeshare's id is the raw station name.
   for (const key of Object.keys(compact)) {
     if (typeof compact[key] === 'string' && !ANALYST_CANONICAL_FIELDS.has(key))
       compact[key] = normalizeDisplayText(compact[key]);