mirror of
https://github.com/bilawalsidhu/gods-eye-view.git
synced 2026-11-04 18:34:02 +00:00
570 lines
20 KiB
JavaScript
570 lines
20 KiB
JavaScript
/**
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* Key setup ("POWER UP") — the pure core.
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*
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* One registry and pure functions; its only import is the proxy-header check
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* shared with the other local gates (localRequestGate.mjs). The dev server's
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* /api/setup endpoints (vite.config.js) and the in-app panel (keySetup.js)
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* are both thin shells over this module, so what a key is called, what it
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* unlocks, and how a .env line is written each live in exactly one place.
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*
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* Nothing here touches the filesystem, the network, or process.env — callers
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* pass environments in and write text out, which is also what makes every
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* behavior below unit-testable.
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*/
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import { hasProxySignals } from './localRequestGate.mjs';
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/** Longest accepted key/token value. Real provider keys are all far shorter. */
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export const KEY_SETUP_VALUE_LIMIT = 512;
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/** Most env vars accepted in one save. The registry defines ten. */
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export const KEY_SETUP_UPDATE_LIMIT = 16;
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/** Header line written above keys the panel appends to a .env file. */
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export const KEY_SETUP_APPEND_HEADER =
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'# Keys added by the in-app POWER UP panel';
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/**
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* Provider credentials, in display order — most magic per
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* minute first. `tier` mirrors the README's color legend: 'metered' (🔴) is a
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* billing-enabled account, 'free' (🟡) is a register-and-paste key.
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* `clientExposed` marks the keys that are injected into the browser
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* bundle by design (restrict them at the provider, per SECURITY.md).
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* `hidden` keeps advanced configuration out of the panel and missing-key count.
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*/
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export const KEY_SETUP_KEYS = Object.freeze([
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Object.freeze({
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id: 'google-maps',
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title: 'GOOGLE MAPS',
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unlocks: 'The photorealistic 3D planet, place search + Street View',
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getUrl: 'https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/tile/get-api-key',
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envVars: Object.freeze(['GOOGLE_MAPS_API_KEY']),
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tier: 'metered',
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clientExposed: true,
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}),
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Object.freeze({
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id: 'google-maps-server',
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title: 'GOOGLE MAPS — SERVER',
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unlocks: 'Places context + Street View fallback; optional separate key',
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getUrl:
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'https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/places/web-service/get-api-key',
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envVars: Object.freeze(['GOOGLE_MAPS_SERVER_API_KEY']),
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tier: 'metered',
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hidden: true,
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}),
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Object.freeze({
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id: 'openai',
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title: 'OPENAI',
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unlocks: 'Voice control — API key or ChatGPT OAuth',
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getUrl: 'https://platform.openai.com/api-keys',
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envVars: Object.freeze(['OPENAI_API_KEY']),
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tier: 'metered',
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}),
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Object.freeze({
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id: 'aisstream',
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title: 'AISSTREAM',
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unlocks: 'Live ships, worldwide',
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getUrl: 'https://aisstream.io',
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envVars: Object.freeze(['AISSTREAM_API_KEY']),
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tier: 'free',
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}),
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Object.freeze({
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id: 'firms',
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title: 'NASA FIRMS',
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unlocks: 'Live active-fire detections',
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getUrl: 'https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/api/map_key/',
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envVars: Object.freeze(['FIRMS_MAP_KEY']),
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tier: 'free',
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}),
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Object.freeze({
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id: 'tomtom',
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title: 'TOMTOM',
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unlocks: 'Real live traffic (keyless runs a simulation)',
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getUrl: 'https://my.tomtom.com/keys',
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envVars: Object.freeze(['TOMTOM_API_KEY']),
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tier: 'free',
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}),
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Object.freeze({
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id: 'cesium-ion',
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title: 'CESIUM ION',
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unlocks: 'Bing imagery map stacks + world terrain',
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getUrl: 'https://ion.cesium.com/tokens',
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envVars: Object.freeze(['CESIUM_ION_TOKEN']),
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tier: 'free',
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clientExposed: true,
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}),
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Object.freeze({
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id: 'opensky',
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title: 'OPENSKY',
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unlocks: 'More flight-polling credits (anonymous works without)',
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getUrl: 'https://opensky-network.org',
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envVars: Object.freeze(['OPENSKY_CLIENT_ID', 'OPENSKY_CLIENT_SECRET']),
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tier: 'free',
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}),
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Object.freeze({
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id: 'mapillary',
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title: 'MAPILLARY',
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unlocks:
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'Street-level imagery and coverage in the Street Level layer. Free: register an app in the Mapillary developer dashboard and paste its Client Token',
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getUrl: 'https://www.mapillary.com/dashboard/developers',
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envVars: Object.freeze(['MAPILLARY_CLIENT_TOKEN']),
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tier: 'free',
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clientExposed: true,
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}),
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Object.freeze({
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id: 'launch-library',
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title: 'LAUNCH LIBRARY',
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unlocks: 'Higher space-missions request allowance',
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getUrl: 'https://thespacedevs.com',
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envVars: Object.freeze(['LL2_API_TOKEN']),
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tier: 'free',
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}),
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]);
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/** Hostnames a Provider Settings request may arrive under or originate from. */
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const LOCAL_HOSTNAMES = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1', '[::1]']);
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/** Socket addresses that count as this machine. */
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const LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set(['127.0.0.1', '::1', '::ffff:127.0.0.1']);
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/**
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* Whether a socket address is one the operator has explicitly declared to be
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* this machine through GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS: a comma-separated list of
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* EXACT addresses, never wildcards, prefixes or hostnames. Unset trusts
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* nothing, which is every launcher but one.
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*
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* The shipped use is the Docker launcher (scripts/docker-start.mjs). A port
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* published on the host's loopback still reaches the container FROM the
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* container network's gateway, never from 127.0.0.1, so the loopback check
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* alone refuses the very machine running the server. Admitting that one
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* address relaxes nothing else: the sharing, Host, Origin, Content-Type and
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* proxy-header checks all still apply to it.
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*/
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function isTrustedPeerAddress(remoteAddress, env) {
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const normalize = (value) =>
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String(value || '')
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.trim()
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.toLowerCase()
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.replace(/^::ffff:/, '');
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const address = normalize(remoteAddress);
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if (!address) return false;
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return String(env?.GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS || '')
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.split(',')
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.some((entry) => entry.trim() !== '' && normalize(entry) === address);
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}
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/** Parse an exact local request authority from a Host header. */
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function localAuthority(hostHeader, protocol) {
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const raw = String(hostHeader || '')
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.trim()
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.toLowerCase();
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const scheme = String(protocol || '').toLowerCase();
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if (!raw || !['http:', 'https:'].includes(scheme) || /[\s/?#@]/.test(raw))
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return null;
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try {
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const parsed = new URL(`${scheme}//${raw}`);
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return LOCAL_HOSTNAMES.has(parsed.hostname.toLowerCase())
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? parsed.origin
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: null;
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} catch {
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return null;
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}
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}
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/** True only for a subprocess that exited normally and successfully. */
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export function commandCompletedSuccessfully(result) {
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return !!result && !result.error && !result.signal && result.status === 0;
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}
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/** Parse one RFC-4180-shaped CSV record, sufficient for `whoami /fo csv`. */
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function parseCsvRecord(text) {
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const source = String(text || '')
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.replace(/^\uFEFF/, '')
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.trim();
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if (!source || /[\r\n]/.test(source)) return null;
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const fields = [];
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let field = '';
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let quoted = false;
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for (let i = 0; i < source.length; i += 1) {
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const char = source[i];
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if (quoted) {
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if (char === '"' && source[i + 1] === '"') {
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field += '"';
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i += 1;
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} else if (char === '"') {
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quoted = false;
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} else {
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field += char;
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}
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} else if (char === '"' && field === '') {
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quoted = true;
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} else if (char === ',') {
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fields.push(field);
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field = '';
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} else {
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field += char;
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}
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}
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if (quoted) return null;
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fields.push(field);
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return fields;
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}
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/**
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* Extract the current token's user SID from `whoami /user /fo csv /nh`.
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* The SID must be the second CSV field and a user-shaped local/domain or Entra
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* SID; matching an SID-looking account name or a broad group SID is forbidden.
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*/
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export function parseWindowsUserSid(stdout) {
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const fields = parseCsvRecord(stdout);
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if (!fields || fields.length !== 2) return null;
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const sid = fields[1].trim();
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return /^(?:S-1-5-21-(?:\d+-){3}\d+|S-1-12-1-(?:\d+-){3}\d+)$/i.test(sid)
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? sid
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: null;
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}
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/**
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* Whether the launcher has sharing on. Every sharing signal the launcher
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* recognizes (scripts/pinokio-preflight.mjs) counts, so the two sets cannot
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* drift apart. One DELIBERATE divergence: preflight is a boot check that
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* treats an empty PINOKIO_SHARE_VAR as sharing-on (fail closed before Start),
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* but here an empty/unset value is the NORMAL git-clone and Pinokio state, so
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* a bare/sentinel value is not sharing; only a real tunnel var is.
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*/
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export function isSharingEnabled(env = {}) {
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const shareVar = String(env.PINOKIO_SHARE_VAR ?? '').trim();
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return (
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['PINOKIO_SHARE_CLOUDFLARE', 'PINOKIO_SHARE_LOCAL'].some((name) =>
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/^(1|true)$/i.test(String(env[name] || '').trim()),
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) ||
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(shareVar !== '' && shareVar !== '__gev_sharing_disabled__')
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);
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}
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/**
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* The admission gate for the Provider Settings endpoints — pure, exported so
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* every refusal below is pinned by a unit assertion rather than a review note.
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*
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* Why each check exists:
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* - sharing signals: any tunnel/LAN sharing mode disables the surface
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* outright — a credential-writing endpoint has no business existing on a
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* shared instance, and tunnel traffic reaches the server FROM loopback, so
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* the socket check below cannot carry that boundary alone;
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* - loopback socket: refuses LAN peers when the server is bound wide. The
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* only exception is an exact address listed in
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* GEV_KEY_SETUP_TRUSTED_PEERS, and every check below still applies to it;
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* - local Host header: tunnel and DNS-rebinding traffic carries a foreign
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* Host even when the socket says loopback;
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* - exact same Origin on POST: a hostile web page can make a browser POST to
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* localhost, and a non-browser caller must not bypass that boundary merely
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* by omitting the header;
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* - JSON Content-Type on POST: forces cross-origin browsers into a CORS
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* preflight this server never answers, closing the simple-request CSRF
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* write primitive.
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*
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* @returns {{ok: true} | {ok: false, status: number, error: string}}
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*/
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export function admitKeySetupRequest({
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method,
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remoteAddress,
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hostHeader,
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protocol = 'http:',
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origin,
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contentType,
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proxyHeaders = {},
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env = {},
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} = {}) {
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// A request carrying reverse-proxy / CDN forwarding headers did not originate
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// on this machine, whatever its socket says. Refuse them outright as defense
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// in depth — the shipped tunnel (Pinokio) is force-closed at boot, so these
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// only appear when someone has deliberately fronted the dev server.
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if (hasProxySignals(proxyHeaders)) {
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return {
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ok: false,
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status: 403,
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error: 'Provider Settings does not answer proxied requests',
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};
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}
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// Every sharing signal the launcher recognizes (scripts/pinokio-preflight.mjs)
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// also disables this surface — so the gate's set is complete, not a subset the
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// two files could drift apart on. One DELIBERATE divergence: preflight is a
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// boot check that treats an empty PINOKIO_SHARE_VAR as sharing-on (fail closed
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// before Start), but here an empty/unset value is the NORMAL git-clone and
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// Pinokio state — treating it as sharing would disable Provider Settings for
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// every ordinary launch. So a bare/sentinel value is not sharing; only a real
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// tunnel var is. This is defense in depth regardless: the loopback+Host checks
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// below independently refuse LAN/tunnel traffic, and under Pinokio the launcher
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// refuses to boot at all when sharing is genuinely on.
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if (isSharingEnabled(env)) {
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return {
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ok: false,
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status: 403,
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error: 'Provider Settings is disabled while sharing is enabled',
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};
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}
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if (
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!LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(String(remoteAddress || '')) &&
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!isTrustedPeerAddress(remoteAddress, env)
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) {
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return {
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ok: false,
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status: 403,
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error: 'Provider Settings answers only the machine running the server',
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};
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}
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const authority = localAuthority(hostHeader, protocol);
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if (!authority) {
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return {
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ok: false,
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status: 403,
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error: 'Provider Settings answers only local hostnames',
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};
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}
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if (
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method === 'POST' &&
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(origin === undefined || origin === null || origin === '')
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) {
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return {
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ok: false,
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status: 403,
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error: 'Provider Settings requires an exact local Origin',
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};
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}
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if (origin !== undefined && origin !== null && origin !== '') {
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let parsedOrigin;
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try {
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parsedOrigin = new URL(String(origin));
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} catch {
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return { ok: false, status: 403, error: 'Unrecognized Origin refused' };
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}
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const exactOrigin =
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parsedOrigin.username === '' &&
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parsedOrigin.password === '' &&
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parsedOrigin.pathname === '/' &&
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parsedOrigin.search === '' &&
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parsedOrigin.hash === '' &&
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parsedOrigin.origin === authority;
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if (!exactOrigin) {
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return {
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ok: false,
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status: 403,
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error: 'Cross-origin requests are refused',
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};
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}
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}
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if (
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method === 'POST' &&
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!String(contentType || '')
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.toLowerCase()
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.startsWith('application/json')
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) {
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return {
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ok: false,
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status: 415,
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error: 'Content-Type must be application/json',
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};
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}
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return { ok: true };
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}
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/** @returns {Set<string>} every env var the panel is allowed to write. */
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export function knownKeySetupEnvVars() {
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const names = new Set();
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for (const entry of KEY_SETUP_KEYS) {
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for (const envVar of entry.envVars) names.add(envVar);
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}
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return names;
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}
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/** Tooltip guidance for a control gated by one registry entry. */
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export function keySetupRequirement(id) {
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const entry = KEY_SETUP_KEYS.find((candidate) => candidate.id === id);
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if (!entry || entry.hidden) return '';
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return `Needs ${entry.envVars.join(' + ')} — add it in Provider Settings`;
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}
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/**
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* Key guidance that also names switched-off sources whose key is already set.
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* @param {string} requirement What `keySetupRequirement` said ('' allowed).
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* @param {Array<{label: string, requiresKeyId?: string|null}>} [alternatives]
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*/
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export function keySetupWithAlternatives(requirement, alternatives = []) {
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const options = alternatives.map(({ label, requiresKeyId }) => {
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const entry = KEY_SETUP_KEYS.find(
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(candidate) => candidate.id === requiresKeyId,
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);
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const name = entry
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? entry.title
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.toLowerCase()
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.replace(/\b\w/g, (letter) => letter.toUpperCase())
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: null;
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return name ? `light ${label} to use your ${name} key` : `light ${label}`;
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});
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if (!options.length) return requirement;
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const offer = `or ${options.join(', or ')}`;
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return requirement ? `${requirement}, ${offer}` : offer.replace(/^or l/, 'L');
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}
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/**
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* Decide whether a live provider value belongs to a source outside the store
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* Provider Settings is allowed to edit. `wasExternalAtBoot` carries source
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* provenance without carrying the credential itself; it closes the otherwise
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* undecidable case where an exported value and a dotenv assignment happen to
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* contain the same bytes.
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* @param {{effectiveValue: unknown, storedValue: unknown, wasExternalAtBoot?: boolean}} input
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*/
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export function isKeySetupExternallyManaged({
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effectiveValue,
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storedValue,
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wasExternalAtBoot = false,
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} = {}) {
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const effective = String(effectiveValue ?? '').trim();
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const stored = String(storedValue ?? '').trim();
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return effective !== '' && (wasExternalAtBoot || effective !== stored);
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}
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/**
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* Build the status payload the panel renders from: the registry, plus
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* per-entry `set` resolved against the given environment. It never includes
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* a value, suffix, or other credential material.
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* @param {Record<string, string|undefined>} env e.g. process.env
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*/
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export function keySetupStatus(env = {}) {
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const keys = KEY_SETUP_KEYS.filter((entry) => !entry.hidden).map((entry) => {
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const values = entry.envVars.map((name) => String(env[name] ?? '').trim());
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const set = values.every((value) => value.length > 0);
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return {
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id: entry.id,
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title: entry.title,
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unlocks: entry.unlocks,
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getUrl: entry.getUrl,
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envVars: [...entry.envVars],
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tier: entry.tier,
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clientExposed: Boolean(entry.clientExposed),
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set,
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};
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});
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return {
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keys,
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setCount: keys.filter((key) => key.set).length,
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total: keys.length,
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};
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}
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/**
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* Validate a POST body into a clean {ENV_VAR: value} map, or say exactly why
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* not. Values must be single-line printable ASCII with no spaces — every real
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* provider credential is — which is also what makes the raw `KEY=value` line
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* below safe to write without quoting rules. A `null` value means REMOVE:
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* the writer comments the assignment back out, returning the file to its
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* template state for that key.
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* @param {unknown} body Parsed JSON from the request.
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*/
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export function validateKeySetupUpdates(body) {
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if (!body || typeof body !== 'object' || Array.isArray(body)) {
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return {
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ok: false,
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error: 'Body must be a JSON object of {ENV_VAR: value}',
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};
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}
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const entries = Object.entries(body);
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if (entries.length === 0) return { ok: false, error: 'No keys provided' };
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if (entries.length > KEY_SETUP_UPDATE_LIMIT) {
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|
return {
|
|
ok: false,
|
|
error: `At most ${KEY_SETUP_UPDATE_LIMIT} keys per save`,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
const known = knownKeySetupEnvVars();
|
|
const updates = {};
|
|
for (const [name, raw] of entries) {
|
|
if (!known.has(name)) return { ok: false, error: `Unknown key: ${name}` };
|
|
if (raw === null) {
|
|
updates[name] = null;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (typeof raw !== 'string')
|
|
return { ok: false, error: `${name} must be a string` };
|
|
const value = raw.trim();
|
|
if (!value) return { ok: false, error: `${name} is empty` };
|
|
if (value.length > KEY_SETUP_VALUE_LIMIT) {
|
|
return {
|
|
ok: false,
|
|
error: `${name} is longer than any real key (${KEY_SETUP_VALUE_LIMIT} max)`,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
if (!/^[\x21-\x7e]+$/.test(value)) {
|
|
return {
|
|
ok: false,
|
|
error: `${name} may only contain printable characters with no spaces`,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
// Reject the dotenv metacharacters that would round-trip WRONG when written
|
|
// unquoted (# starts a comment, quotes redelimit, $ expands, backslash and
|
|
// backtick are escapes) — so a saved value can never differ from what Node's
|
|
// parseEnv and Vite's expansion read back. Real provider keys never contain
|
|
// these; they are base64url / hex / JWT alphabets.
|
|
if (/[#"'$\\`]/.test(value)) {
|
|
return {
|
|
ok: false,
|
|
error: `${name} contains a character that is not valid in a key (#, quotes, $, \\, or backtick)`,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
updates[name] = value;
|
|
}
|
|
return { ok: true, updates };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Upsert `KEY=value` lines into dotenv text, disturbing nothing else.
|
|
*
|
|
* Placement, per key: the LAST active assignment is replaced in place (last
|
|
* is what dotenv parsing lets win); failing that, the last commented-out
|
|
* assignment is uncommented in place, so a file copied from .env.example
|
|
* keeps its curated shape; failing both, the line is appended at the end
|
|
* under one shared header. Every untouched line — comments, blanks, other
|
|
* keys — survives byte for byte, and the result always ends in a newline.
|
|
*
|
|
* A `null` value REMOVES: every active assignment for that key is commented
|
|
* back out (`# KEY=`), returning the file to its template shape; a key with
|
|
* no active assignment is left untouched.
|
|
* @param {string} text Existing file content ('' births a new file).
|
|
* @param {Record<string, string|null>} updates Validated {ENV_VAR: value} map.
|
|
*/
|
|
export function upsertDotenvValues(text, updates) {
|
|
const source = typeof text === 'string' ? text : '';
|
|
const lines = source.length ? source.split(/\r?\n/) : [];
|
|
const additions = [];
|
|
for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(updates)) {
|
|
const active = new RegExp(`^\\s*(?:export\\s+)?${name}\\s*=`);
|
|
const commented = new RegExp(`^\\s*#\\s*(?:export\\s+)?${name}\\s*=`);
|
|
if (value === null) {
|
|
lines.forEach((line, index) => {
|
|
if (active.test(line)) lines[index] = `# ${name}=`;
|
|
});
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
const assignment = `${name}=${value}`;
|
|
let lastActive = -1;
|
|
let lastCommented = -1;
|
|
lines.forEach((line, index) => {
|
|
if (active.test(line)) lastActive = index;
|
|
else if (commented.test(line)) lastCommented = index;
|
|
});
|
|
if (lastActive >= 0) lines[lastActive] = assignment;
|
|
else if (lastCommented >= 0) lines[lastCommented] = assignment;
|
|
else additions.push(assignment);
|
|
}
|
|
if (additions.length) {
|
|
while (lines.length && lines[lines.length - 1].trim() === '') lines.pop();
|
|
if (!lines.some((line) => line.trim() === KEY_SETUP_APPEND_HEADER)) {
|
|
if (lines.length) lines.push('');
|
|
lines.push(KEY_SETUP_APPEND_HEADER);
|
|
}
|
|
lines.push(...additions);
|
|
}
|
|
const joined = lines.join('\n');
|
|
if (!joined) return '';
|
|
return joined.endsWith('\n') ? joined : `${joined}\n`;
|
|
}
|