The /api/military-installations endpoint was the last keyless proxy without the admitSameSite gate that protects terrain, CCTV, traffic, places, and Celestrak. A cross-site <img>, foreign Origin, opaque origin, or reverse-proxy-forwarded request now receives 403 before any Overpass query. Same-origin app requests and bare tool requests continue to work. Adds 4 integration tests (cross-site refused, same-origin admitted, bare tool admitted, proxied refused) following the terrainHeightsBounds test pattern.
3.4 KiB
Summary
Adds the admitSameSite cross-site gate to /api/military-installations, as offered in the #975 merge comment.
This was the last keyless proxy endpoint without the gate. After this change, every proxy that sends queries upstream now refuses cross-site browser requests before doing any work.
| Endpoint | Gate before this PR | Gate after |
|---|---|---|
/api/terrain/heights |
✅ admitSameSite (#975) | ✅ |
/api/cctv/frame/:id |
✅ admitSameSite (#922) | ✅ |
/api/traffic/* |
✅ admitSameSite | ✅ |
/api/google/* |
✅ admitSameSite | ✅ |
/api/gemini/* |
✅ admitSameSite | ✅ |
/api/space/satellites |
✅ admitSameSite | ✅ |
/api/overpass |
✅ admitSameSite | ✅ |
/api/military-installations |
❌ none | ✅ admitSameSite |
The problem
A cross-site page (or an <img> tag from any website) can query /api/military-installations and trigger upstream Overpass requests on the user's behalf. The endpoint has a rate limiter (90/min), but no cross-site gate — so a hostile page can burn through the user's Overpass quota and exfiltrate the response data.
Every other proxy in the codebase already refuses these shapes. Military-installations was the gap.
The fix
Two lines in server/providers/military-installations.js:
import { makeRateLimiter, clientKey } from './common/rate-limit.js';
+import { admitSameSite } from './common/same-site.js';
if (req.method !== 'GET') {
res.writeHead(405, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Method Not Allowed' }));
return;
}
+ if (admitSameSite(req, res)) return;
const url = new URL(req.url, 'http://localhost');
Same pattern as terrain.js, cctv.js, traffic.js, google.js, etc. Gate runs before the rate limiter, so refused requests never consume quota.
scripts/package-boundaries.json updated to declare server/providers/common/same-site.js and src/localRequestGate.mjs as owned modules of military-installations-provider.
Tests
New file: src/militaryInstallationsGate.test.mjs — 4 integration tests following the terrainHeightsBounds.test.mjs pattern:
✔ cross-site browser requests are refused with 403 (2.4ms)
✔ same-origin browser request is admitted (not 403) (5.3ms)
✔ bare tool request (no Origin, no Sec-Fetch) is admitted (0.9ms)
✔ proxied same-origin requests are refused (proxy headers present) (0.5ms)
Tested shapes:
Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site(the<img>case) → 403Sec-Fetch-Site: same-site(cross-origin sibling) → 403Origin: https://evil.example(fetch from hostile page) → 403Origin: null(sandboxed iframe) → 403X-Forwarded-For+Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site(proxied cross-site) → 403- Same-origin with matching
Origin→ admitted - No
Origin, noSec-Fetch(curl / Node) → admitted - Proxy headers with
same-origin→ 403
All 4 tests fail on main and pass with the fix.
Validation
node --test src/localRequestGate.test.mjs src/militaryInstallationsGate.test.mjs: 18 tests, 18 pass, 0 failnpm run check:boundaries: pass (military-installations-provider: 15 owned modules)npm run check:import-directions: pass- Changelog fragment in
changelog.d/military-installations-cross-site-gate.md