Files
gods-eye-view/build/vite.js
T
Sameh Khamis b75db874c6 Read API paths and forwarded requests as the router does
The router reads an absolute-form target's path without resolving dot
segments, so a target such as http://host/api/../x still reaches /api
middleware. Take that path the same way when deciding whether the API
response headers apply.

The Street View fallback now treats any forwarding header as forwarded, even
an empty one, before it spends the key.
2026-10-21 15:43:29 -07:00

190 lines
7.6 KiB
JavaScript

import { applicationHtmlPlugin } from './application-html.js';
import cesium from 'vite-plugin-cesium';
import { DEFAULT_ALLOWED_HOSTS, hostCheckPlugin } from './allowedHosts.js';
import { embedFramingPlugin } from './embed-framing.js';
import { panelBuildPlugin } from './panel.js';
/**
* Content-Security-Policy for every document the dev/preview server serves.
* No inline script is permitted, and the only foreign script origins are the
* three that the Bhote Koshi event's embedded media needs (YouTube, Facebook
* and X), which frame-src matches for their players and posts. 'unsafe-eval' is
* required: Knockout (bundled inside @cesium/widgets) resolves the global
* object with `(0, eval)("this")` at module load, and without it the Cesium
* widget never initializes (verified in headless Chrome). It also covers
* Cesium's WASM decoders. `blob:` is required in the built app: Cesium's
* bundled workers bootstrap through `importScripts(blob:...)`, which a worker
* checks against script-src (the dev server loads them by URL instead).
* Widen any other directive only for a real violation.
*/
export const BROWSER_CSP = [
"default-src 'self'",
// The Bhote Koshi event's embedded media: the YouTube player API, the
// Facebook video SDK and X's post widget (src/data/bhoteKoshiEmbeddedMedia.js);
// and the Maps JavaScript API that Street Level's Google Street View runs on.
"script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' blob: https://www.youtube.com https://connect.facebook.net https://platform.twitter.com https://maps.googleapis.com",
"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com",
"font-src 'self' data: https://fonts.gstatic.com",
"img-src 'self' data: blob: https:",
"media-src 'self' blob: https:",
"connect-src 'self' blob: data: https: wss: ws:",
"worker-src 'self' blob:",
"child-src 'self' blob:",
// The same media's players and posts, which load in frames.
"frame-src 'self' blob: https://www.youtube-nocookie.com https://www.youtube.com https://www.facebook.com https://platform.twitter.com",
"manifest-src 'self'",
"object-src 'none'",
"base-uri 'self'",
"form-action 'self'",
"frame-ancestors 'none'",
].join('; ');
/** Response headers shared by the dev and preview servers. */
export const BROWSER_HEADERS = Object.freeze({
'X-Frame-Options': 'DENY',
'Content-Security-Policy': BROWSER_CSP,
// Responses are only ever used as the type the server declares.
'X-Content-Type-Options': 'nosniff',
});
/**
* Content-Security-Policy for every `/api` response. API routes return data,
* never a document, so a response opened directly in a tab gets no origin and
* can load nothing.
*/
export const API_CSP = "default-src 'none'; sandbox";
/** Response headers every `/api` response carries. */
export const API_HEADERS = Object.freeze({
'Content-Security-Policy': API_CSP,
'X-Content-Type-Options': 'nosniff',
});
/**
* Whether a request reaches an `/api` mount, by the router's own rule: the
* prefix compared without case and followed by the end, `/` or `.`. The router
* reads an absolute-form target's path without resolving dot segments, so the
* path is taken here the same way (scheme and authority dropped, backslashes as
* slashes), alongside the raw and the fully parsed path; any match counts.
*/
function isApiPath(url) {
const raw = String(url || '/');
const target = raw
.trim()
.split(/[?#]/, 1)[0]
.replace(/\\/g, '/')
.replace(/^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:(?:\/\/[^/]*)?/i, '');
let parsed = '';
try {
parsed = new URL(raw, 'http://localhost').pathname;
} catch {
/* the unparsed paths still decide */
}
return [raw.split(/[?#]/, 1)[0], target, parsed].some((path) =>
/^\/api(?:$|[/.])/i.test(path),
);
}
/**
* Vite plugin that sets API_HEADERS on every API response before any other
* middleware runs, so success, error, partial, refused and unknown-route
* answers all carry them. Vite's `server.headers` and `preview.headers` only
* reach the documents and assets Vite serves itself. A route may still add
* headers; a route's own Content-Security-Policy is sent as an additional
* policy, which can only restrict further, never replace this one.
*/
export function apiResponseHeadersPlugin() {
const install = (server) => {
server.middlewares.use((req, res, next) => {
if (!isApiPath(req.url)) return next();
for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(API_HEADERS))
res.setHeader(name, value);
const setHeader = res.setHeader.bind(res);
res.setHeader = (name, value) =>
String(name).toLowerCase() === 'content-security-policy' &&
String(value) !== API_CSP
? setHeader(name, `${API_CSP}, ${value}`)
: setHeader(name, value);
next();
});
};
return {
name: 'api-response-headers',
enforce: 'pre',
configureServer: install,
configurePreviewServer: install,
};
}
/** Build browser assets with explicit inputs; never load environment or providers. */
export function createBrowserViteConfig({
plugins = [],
publicDir,
googleApiKey,
cesiumToken,
mapillaryToken,
host = 'localhost',
port = 4173,
allowedHosts = DEFAULT_ALLOWED_HOSTS,
command,
} = {}) {
return {
plugins: [
// First, so every API response, including a Host refusal, carries them.
apiResponseHeadersPlugin(),
// Next, so no provider route answers a Host the server does not allow.
hostCheckPlugin(),
cesium(),
applicationHtmlPlugin(),
...plugins,
embedFramingPlugin(),
panelBuildPlugin(),
],
...(publicDir === undefined ? {} : { publicDir }),
// A production build must not clean the dependency cache a running dev
// server is still serving optimized module URLs from.
...(command === 'build' ? { cacheDir: 'node_modules/.vite-build' } : {}),
optimizeDeps: {
// First reached through the SDR worker or a dynamic import. Pre-bundle
// them at startup so first use cannot invalidate already-transformed
// URLs with Vite's "Outdated Optimize Dep" 504 response.
include: [
'@jtarrio/signals/demod/demodulator.js',
'@jtarrio/signals/demod/modes.js',
'@jtarrio/webrtlsdr/rtlsdr.js',
'egm96-universal',
// Loaded on demand when the first street-level image opens.
'mapillary-js',
],
},
server: {
host: host || 'localhost',
port: parseInt(port, 10) || 4173,
// A wildcard bind only chooses interfaces; it never disables Vite's
// Host-header check. LAN hostnames are added explicitly (see
// build/allowedHosts.js); IP addresses are always accepted.
allowedHosts: [...allowedHosts],
fs: {
deny: ['.env', '.env.*', '*.{crt,pem}', '**/.git/**', '**/ENVIRONMENT'],
},
// These headers protect the document containing Provider Settings and
// give the whole page a real Content-Security-Policy (BROWSER_CSP).
// Embed-mode documents are framable instead: embed-framing.js rewrites
// only the frame-ancestors directive and keeps the rest of the policy.
headers: BROWSER_HEADERS,
},
// The preview server serves the same documents, so it carries the same
// framing + CSP hardening (one constant, no drift).
preview: { headers: BROWSER_HEADERS },
define: {
'import.meta.env.GOOGLE_MAPS_API_KEY': JSON.stringify(googleApiKey),
'import.meta.env.CESIUM_ION_TOKEN': JSON.stringify(cesiumToken),
// Mapillary client tokens are public by design (see SECURITY.md).
'import.meta.env.MAPILLARY_CLIENT_TOKEN': JSON.stringify(
mapillaryToken ?? '',
),
},
build: { chunkSizeWarningLimit: 1500 },
};
}