fix(mcp): accept only direct local requests at /mcp

The /mcp route now applies the same proxy and sharing checks as Provider
Settings: requests carrying forwarding headers, or arriving while launcher
sharing is on, are refused. The Host must name the port the request reached
and a browser Origin must match that host exactly. The proxy and sharing
checks move into shared helpers in keySetupCore; Provider Settings behaves
as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
Sameh KhamisandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-10-02 19:47:37 -07:00
1 parent f7d3db5875
commit fec93aa817
5 files changed
+113 -32

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+44 -21
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@@ -184,6 +184,48 @@ export function parseWindowsUserSid(stdout) {
: null;
}
/** Headers that reverse proxies, tunnels and CDNs add to a request. */
export const PROXY_SIGNAL_HEADERS = Object.freeze([
'forwarded',
'via',
'x-forwarded-for',
'x-forwarded-host',
'x-forwarded-port',
'x-forwarded-proto',
'x-real-ip',
'cf-connecting-ip',
'cf-ray',
]);
/**
* Whether a request carries reverse-proxy or CDN forwarding headers, so it
* did not originate on this machine whatever its socket says. `headers` is
* keyed by lower-case header name.
*/
export function hasProxySignals(headers = {}) {
return PROXY_SIGNAL_HEADERS.some(
(name) => String(headers[name] || '').trim() !== '',
);
}
/**
* Whether the launcher has sharing on. Every sharing signal the launcher
* recognizes (scripts/pinokio-preflight.mjs) counts, so the two sets cannot
* drift apart. One DELIBERATE divergence: preflight is a boot check that
* treats an empty PINOKIO_SHARE_VAR as sharing-on (fail closed before Start),
* but here an empty/unset value is the NORMAL git-clone and Pinokio state, so
* a bare/sentinel value is not sharing; only a real tunnel var is.
*/
export function isSharingEnabled(env = {}) {
const shareVar = String(env.PINOKIO_SHARE_VAR ?? '').trim();
return (
['PINOKIO_SHARE_CLOUDFLARE', 'PINOKIO_SHARE_LOCAL'].some((name) =>
/^(1|true)$/i.test(String(env[name] || '').trim()),
) ||
(shareVar !== '' && shareVar !== '__gev_sharing_disabled__')
);
}
/**
* The admission gate for the Provider Settings endpoints — pure, exported so
* every refusal below is pinned by a unit assertion rather than a review note.
@@ -219,20 +261,7 @@ export function admitKeySetupRequest({
// on this machine, whatever its socket says. Refuse them outright as defense
// in depth — the shipped tunnel (Pinokio) is force-closed at boot, so these
// only appear when someone has deliberately fronted the dev server.
const PROXY_SIGNALS = [
'forwarded',
'via',
'x-forwarded-for',
'x-forwarded-host',
'x-forwarded-port',
'x-forwarded-proto',
'x-real-ip',
'cf-connecting-ip',
'cf-ray',
];
if (
PROXY_SIGNALS.some((name) => String(proxyHeaders[name] || '').trim() !== '')
) {
if (hasProxySignals(proxyHeaders)) {
return {
ok: false,
status: 403,
@@ -249,13 +278,7 @@ export function admitKeySetupRequest({
// tunnel var is. This is defense in depth regardless: the loopback+Host checks
// below independently refuse LAN/tunnel traffic, and under Pinokio the launcher
// refuses to boot at all when sharing is genuinely on.
const shareVar = String(env.PINOKIO_SHARE_VAR ?? '').trim();
const sharingEnabled =
['PINOKIO_SHARE_CLOUDFLARE', 'PINOKIO_SHARE_LOCAL'].some((name) =>
/^(1|true)$/i.test(String(env[name] || '').trim()),
) ||
(shareVar !== '' && shareVar !== '__gev_sharing_disabled__');
if (sharingEnabled) {
if (isSharingEnabled(env)) {
return {
ok: false,
status: 403,