diff --git a/.env.example b/.env.example index 7ece07f3c..9096a8533 100644 --- a/.env.example +++ b/.env.example @@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ AISSTREAM_API_KEY= # CCTV_FORCE_AUSTIN= # force live default sources when a source-pack JSON is configured # Optional: comma-separated Overpass URLs; use only instances you run or pay for. +# Also enables voice place search (osm_query, "hospitals in Kathmandu"). OVERPASS_UPSTREAMS= # Optional: place-lookup endpoints. Lookups try bundled data first, then the diff --git a/DATA_SOURCES.md b/DATA_SOURCES.md index 7d668c0d6..b96648d7d 100644 --- a/DATA_SOURCES.md +++ b/DATA_SOURCES.md @@ -193,6 +193,7 @@ The optional Local ADS-B layer and the broadcast-FM receiver use radio you recei - **Mapped installations.** OpenFreeMap military polygons use a bundled Overture/OSM name index; wide views show named points. Optional operator-configured Overpass and explicit Google Places searches keep their own source paths. Mapped data does not establish current activity or complete coverage. - **Place search.** Named-place fly-to uses Google Geocoding when a Maps key is configured, then Photon (`PHOTON_URL`; unset uses the public instance, empty disables it), then `/api/geocode` (Nominatim search) when neither answers. `/api/geocode` and the voice outline route `/api/geocode/outline` share one Nominatim queue (`NOMINATIM_URL`; unset, empty and invalid values disable it; an operator must explicitly select an authorized endpoint): one request at a time at least 1.1 s apart, an identifying `User-Agent` and `Referer`, a short queue that refuses a burst, a pause after 429/403/5xx answers (honouring `Retry-After` in full), at most one retry after a network failure, and a per-install daily cap on public-instance requests (`NOMINATIM_DAILY_CAP`, default 50). Processes using the same installation state file hold one lock through the actual fetch invocation and recording the next public start, with the daily slot persisted before invocation; restarts share that count, spacing and any pause. An unfinished dispatch marker fails closed until operator recovery; it is never automatically reclaimed. Public access fails closed if the state file cannot be read, locked, written or semantically validated. This coordination does not span independent installations or state directories and does not establish an application-wide public-service allowance or authorize public use. An operator-selected non-public endpoint is outside the public cap, spacing and durable-state requirement; an upstream cooldown is kept with the endpoint that returned it rather than leaking across operator URLs. Answers are cached on disk (outlines 90 days, places 30 days, no-results 24 hours); failures are not cached. Outlines are looked up only for an explicit ask, after bundled data and any configured Overpass, and only results whose type suits the ask are used. Administrative outline responses expose country/admin-1/admin-2 identity only when the selected Nominatim row has a recognized, unambiguous address type consistent with its own name; numeric rank, ambiguous types, missing fields and contradictory names do not manufacture identity. It is not used for systematic or bulk queries. - **Street and building outlines.** Voice street highlights, pointed-at buildings and grounds use the OpenFreeMap vector tiles the traffic layer already loads. Traffic and outlines share one bounded pending fetch/decode owner per immutable XYZ tile; materialized outline geometry is charged to the retained-byte ceiling and capped by coordinate count. Consumer result caches and request lifetimes remain independent, while eviction or explicit teardown cancels queued idle projections and releases their decoded owner. No Overpass request is made unless `OVERPASS_UPSTREAMS` is configured. Named grounds require a returned name matching the selected place, except that an ask whose head noun names a kind of grounds (a school, university or college, hospital, cemetery, stadium or zoo) may use the part of the smallest unnamed tile area of that class that holds the resolved place; a differently named area never answers. Other anonymous landcover polygons cannot establish identity, so unsupported grounds stay unavailable rather than borrowing a nearby POI name. +- **Voice areas and place search.** Voice areas (`resolve_area`) use the same outline sources as voice outlines. Voice place search (`osm_query`, `/api/osm/features`) runs only on an operator-configured Overpass: a fixed list of kinds, a bounded box and result count, one query at a time, answers cached for a day. It never uses Nominatim. - **Cockpit regional briefing.** `/api/regional-brief` rounds aircraft coordinates into 0.1° cache cells, caches results for five minutes, and resolves physical regions from bundled public-domain Natural Earth polygons without reverse-geocoding requests. Google News RSS is queried with the resolved locality/region first; GDELT is used only when that RSS query fails or is empty. Google's published Google News terms restrict that source to personal, noncommercial use, so commercial deployments must disable/replace it or obtain separate permission; GDELT permits commercial dataset use with citation. The Data attribution popover identifies the active headline sources; article links retain publisher attribution. Headlines are location-query matches, not verified incidents, risk rankings, or evidence that a location is safe. Empty, partial, stale, and unavailable source states remain distinct. Open-Meteo supplies current conditions independently of the news source. `WX OFF` disables cockpit weather rendering only; the Local Info briefing still fetches its source-backed weather values and displays the required linked Open-Meteo credit. - **Dynamic weather presentation.** While cockpit mode is active, `/api/weather-effects` requests current Open-Meteo observations for the aircraft/camera location, rounds coordinates into 0.1° cache cells, caches results for five minutes, and may retain a stale observation for up to 30 minutes during a transient outage. WMO condition code selects the visual family; observed cloud cover, precipitation, visibility, wind speed, and wind direction bound its strength and motion. Missing or expired weather renders no synthetic atmospheric effect, and normal globe view never renders the weather overlay. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index a130ad116..edb3f3669 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -447,6 +447,7 @@ Twenty layers and map sources. **Eighteen have a keyless path.** Some offer addi | 🚌 **Transit** | Live buses, trams, metros, trains and ferries with delayed playback between reports, selected-vehicle trails, and mode-coloured DETECT labels — Boston, Austin, Minneapolis, Helsinki, the Netherlands, Norway, South East Queensland, and nine in Ontario: Toronto (surface vehicles; the subway publishes no positions), Mississauga, Hamilton, Durham Region, York Region, Guelph, Burlington, Barrie and Kingston | Operator GTFS-Realtime feeds | 🟢 | | 🚲 **Bikeshare** | Live station availability | GBFS | 🟢 | | 🧭 **Directions** | Click A and B on the globe for a street-following drive, walk or cycle route draped on the terrain with turn-by-turn steps — then FLY the camera along it. No key, no geocoder, no mic | OSRM on FOSSGIS servers (OpenStreetMap) | 🟢 | +| ⌖ **OSM Places** | Voice place search ("hospitals in Kathmandu") from OpenStreetMap, drawn as numbered points that follow-up questions can filter. Needs your own Overpass server (`OVERPASS_UPSTREAMS`); off otherwise | | 🔥 **Active Fires** | Live NASA FIRMS detections, trailing 24h | NASA FIRMS | 🟡 | | 🚀 **Space Missions** | Rolling 30-day launches with payload, stage, and recovery detail | Launch Library 2 | 🟢 (🔴 optional paid token raises the allowance) | | 🎖️ **Mapped Installations** | Viewport-bounded military-site context from community mapping — incomplete by nature, and labeled that way | OpenStreetMap | 🟢 | @@ -456,7 +457,7 @@ Twenty layers and map sources. **Eighteen have a keyless path.** Some offer addi **Weather, keyless.** **Wind** animates 10 m forecast flow from NOAA GFS or ECMWF IFS, with an optional color field and a reading at map center. **Rain radar**, **Satellite clouds** and **Lightning density** are observations on one history timeline in the **WEATHER** panel (step back, **Play**, **Latest**); **Cyclone advisories** draw NHC and CPHC positions, forecast tracks and cones. On Google 3D Tiles the observed layers float above the city as translucent shells, sharpened around your view. -In the app, **Data Layers** groups them as Movement, Cameras, Infrastructure, Events, Weather and Audio; Directions sits in the separate **Utilities** panel with Draw and Import. +In the app, **Data Layers** groups them as Movement, Cameras, Infrastructure, Events, Weather and Audio; Directions and OSM Places sit in the separate **Utilities** panel with Draw and Import. **The basemap ladder — what each tier buys you:** diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md index 6b248ddef..6b7455c11 100644 --- a/SECURITY.md +++ b/SECURITY.md @@ -74,13 +74,14 @@ The data proxies under `server/providers/` are written so the browser cannot tur - **No verbatim client headers upstream.** The CCTV media route is the one route that relays a request header (`Range`, for video seeking). It is parsed and canonicalized before it is forwarded: one `bytes=` range only, with every accepted form — explicit span, open-ended and suffix — bounded to the same 64 MiB ceiling the relay applies to a declared response body. Multi-range, malformed, inverted and non-`bytes` values are dropped and the request proceeds without a `Range`, as RFC 7233 §3.1 prescribes. Bounding the request bounds what is asked for: a response that declares no length — live streamed media, or a chunked body from an upstream that ignores the `Range` — has no ceiling. An upstream request the browser has stopped waiting for is cancelled rather than left running, whether the viewer leaves before the headers arrive or during the body. - **Transit fetches registered feeds only.** `/api/transit/vehicles/` resolves the id against `src/data/transitFeeds.js`; the browser never supplies a URL, and a feed that is registered but disabled does not resolve at all. Redirects are followed manually and each hop is validated against the feed's own https origin before it is requested, so an off-origin or downgraded hop is refused rather than contacted. Bodies are capped at 8 MB, the protobuf is decoded server-side under entity-count and string-length ceilings, a differential feed is refused, and snapshots live 15 s in memory with no disk cache. A per-feed admission limiter and a failure cooldown ladder bound what this process can ask of any operator. - **Local receiver feeds are operator-configured and local-only.** `/api/local-receivers/aircraft` reads only the `aircraft.json` URLs in the server's `LOCAL_RECEIVER_FEEDS`; the browser never supplies an address. Each host must pass the shared tap address rule (`src/data/tapAddress.js`: loopback, RFC1918, `localhost`, `*.local`; no link-local, IPv6 or other names), the scheme must be http(s), the path must end in `aircraft.json`, and credentials, queries and fragments are refused. Invalid entries are logged at startup and never fetched. Reads use a 2 s timeout, refuse redirects, cap bodies at 2 MB and share one read per second; responses name each feed by band only and never carry upstream error text. +- **Voice place search runs only on the operator's Overpass.** `/api/osm/features` answers only when `OVERPASS_UPSTREAMS` is set and never falls back to a public instance. The client sends a curated preset id, a box, a mode and a limit; the server writes and quotes the Overpass query itself, so no client or model text reaches it. Boxes are capped (36 deg² for a count, 4 deg² for a listing), as are the feature limit, the Overpass timeout and memory, and the response bytes read. Each client (IPv6 clients keyed by /64, as on `/api/overpass`) runs one search at a time and two run at once in all, under a per-client rate limit (12/min) and a global one (30/min); a search gets 22 s across every configured endpoint in turn (Overpass itself is told 20 s), which ends before the voice answer stops waiting at 25 s. The route sits behind the cross-site gate below. Answers are cached in memory and on disk (`.gev-cache/osm-features/`, at most 400 entries and 256 MB, kept a day), keyed to the configured instance so a repointed `OVERPASS_UPSTREAMS` never serves the old one's answers; a malformed answer is never cached. - **Validated response formats.** Proxied bodies are relayed only in the format the route serves. CCTV frames and the Street View fallback accept JPEG, PNG, GIF, WebP and AVIF only, sent under their canonical type; any other type falls through to the next fallback. Live CCTV media must match its feed kind (`video/mp4`, `video/webm`, or `multipart/x-mixed-replace` with a boundary) before it is relayed or the camera counts as healthy, and its redirects stay on the registered origin. GBFS bodies must parse as JSON and are re-serialized as `application/json; charset=utf-8`. Camera catalog URLs are pinned by parsed URL — scheme, exact host, no credentials, default port, and a normalized path inside the agency's image directory — and a redirect on a pinned host must stay inside the same directory. Every `/api/cctv` route uses the keyless cross-site checks described below, so cameras stay reachable behind a reverse proxy; a request carrying forwarding headers never reaches the key-bearing Street View fallback and gets the placeholder frame instead, as when no key is configured. - **Consistent API response headers.** Every `/api` response, including errors, partial content, Host refusals and unknown routes, carries `Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox` and `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` (`apiResponseHeadersPlugin` in `build/vite.js`, installed ahead of the Host check). A route that sets its own policy adds it as a further policy; it never replaces this one. - **Response-size caps and timeouts** on proxied responses. - **Sanitized errors** — internal error details are not echoed back to clients. - **Coalesced OAuth refresh** and cached successful responses only (OpenSky). - **Redacted debug logging.** The voice debug log (`.gev-logs/`, gitignored) strips API keys, bearer tokens, client secrets, and image data URLs before writing. -- **Cross-site gate on cost/log endpoints.** The cost-bearing (`/api/realtime/token`, `/api/openai/hud-summary`, `/api/google/nearby-places`, `/api/google/text-search`), quota-bearing (`/api/mapillary/*`, with a per-IP limit on tiles, and `/api/tomtom/*`, backed by its persistent daily tile budget) and log (`/api/realtime/debug-log`) endpoints refuse cross-site browser requests: a foreign or opaque `Origin`, a `Sec-Fetch-Site` other than `same-origin`/`none` (this is what blocks an ``/navigation that carries no `Origin`), or any reverse-proxy/CDN forwarding header returns `403`. Non-browser loopback tools (the repo QA harnesses POST the token endpoint with no `Origin`) and the explicit `HOST=0.0.0.0` LAN opt-in keep working — the gate deliberately does not require a loopback remote address; that stricter requirement belongs only to the credential panel (`admitKeySetupRequest`). The Host check (`allowedHosts`, applied by `hostCheckPlugin` ahead of every route, since Vite's own check runs only after plugin middleware) rejects a rebinding `Host` before any handler runs, in every mode, and the gate is defense in depth behind it: the LAN opt-in keeps that check and accepts only IP addresses, `localhost` and names listed in `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS`. **Limit:** a name you list there is trusted like the app's own address, so list only names you control. The keyless map routes (`/api/terrain/heights` and `/api/overpass`) use the same cross-site checks, minus the forwarding-header refusal: they guard only per-client quotas and caches, not a key or a bill, and the map needs both to render behind a reverse proxy. `/api/overpass` also admits at most 300 POSTs a minute per peer (IPv6 peers keyed by /64) and 900 a minute across all remote peers before it reads a body. A direct loopback request — a loopback socket with none of the forwarding headers `hasProxySignals` checks (`Forwarded`, `Via`, `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Forwarded-Host`, `X-Forwarded-Port`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`, `X-Real-IP`, `CF-Connecting-IP`, `CF-Ray`) — draws on its own per-peer admission window, so remote peers cannot exhaust the owner's admission. A reverse proxy on the same machine must add at least one of those headers (Caddy and Cloudflare do by default; nginx needs `proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;`, plus `proxy_set_header Host $http_host;` and `proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;` so the `Origin` check matches), or its traffic is indistinguishable from the owner's and shares the owner's window. With one, its requests are then counted as remote, in one bucket per proxy socket — the forwarded client address is never trusted as identity — so all users behind one proxy share 300/min. The isolation needs a loopback socket: under the default Docker bridge network every host-side client, the owner included, arrives from the container gateway and is one remote peer. **Limit:** this isolates admission only. The upstream budget (90 requests/min per client key, 300/min across all clients) is shared, so once remote traffic has used the global upstream budget, an owner request that misses the cache can still get `429`, or `503` when remote misses hold every upstream concurrency slot; cache hits are unaffected. The CCTV routes (`/api/cctv/*`) use the same keyless checks; their one key-bearing step, the Street View fallback, is skipped for any request with forwarding headers. +- **Cross-site gate on cost/log endpoints.** The cost-bearing (`/api/realtime/token`, `/api/openai/hud-summary`, `/api/google/nearby-places`, `/api/google/text-search`), quota-bearing (`/api/mapillary/*`, with a per-IP limit on tiles, and `/api/tomtom/*`, backed by its persistent daily tile budget) and log (`/api/realtime/debug-log`) endpoints refuse cross-site browser requests: a foreign or opaque `Origin`, a `Sec-Fetch-Site` other than `same-origin`/`none` (this is what blocks an ``/navigation that carries no `Origin`), or any reverse-proxy/CDN forwarding header returns `403`. Non-browser loopback tools (the repo QA harnesses POST the token endpoint with no `Origin`) and the explicit `HOST=0.0.0.0` LAN opt-in keep working — the gate deliberately does not require a loopback remote address; that stricter requirement belongs only to the credential panel (`admitKeySetupRequest`). The Host check (`allowedHosts`, applied by `hostCheckPlugin` ahead of every route, since Vite's own check runs only after plugin middleware) rejects a rebinding `Host` before any handler runs, in every mode, and the gate is defense in depth behind it: the LAN opt-in keeps that check and accepts only IP addresses, `localhost` and names listed in `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS`. **Limit:** a name you list there is trusted like the app's own address, so list only names you control. The keyless map routes (`/api/terrain/heights`, `/api/overpass` and voice place search's `/api/osm/features`, which spends the same operator Overpass) use the same cross-site checks, minus the forwarding-header refusal: they guard only per-client quotas and caches, not a key or a bill, and the map and voice need them to work behind a reverse proxy. `/api/overpass` also admits at most 300 POSTs a minute per peer (IPv6 peers keyed by /64) and 900 a minute across all remote peers before it reads a body. A direct loopback request — a loopback socket with none of the forwarding headers `hasProxySignals` checks (`Forwarded`, `Via`, `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Forwarded-Host`, `X-Forwarded-Port`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`, `X-Real-IP`, `CF-Connecting-IP`, `CF-Ray`) — draws on its own per-peer admission window, so remote peers cannot exhaust the owner's admission. A reverse proxy on the same machine must add at least one of those headers (Caddy and Cloudflare do by default; nginx needs `proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;`, plus `proxy_set_header Host $http_host;` and `proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;` so the `Origin` check matches), or its traffic is indistinguishable from the owner's and shares the owner's window. With one, its requests are then counted as remote, in one bucket per proxy socket — the forwarded client address is never trusted as identity — so all users behind one proxy share 300/min. The isolation needs a loopback socket: under the default Docker bridge network every host-side client, the owner included, arrives from the container gateway and is one remote peer. **Limit:** this isolates admission only. The upstream budget (90 requests/min per client key, 300/min across all clients) is shared, so once remote traffic has used the global upstream budget, an owner request that misses the cache can still get `429`, or `503` when remote misses hold every upstream concurrency slot; cache hits are unaffected. The CCTV routes (`/api/cctv/*`) use the same keyless checks; their one key-bearing step, the Street View fallback, is skipped for any request with forwarding headers. - **Full Content-Security-Policy.** The dev and preview servers send a real CSP (`script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' blob:` plus the YouTube, Facebook and X scripts the Nepal event's embedded media loads and the Maps JavaScript API that Street View runs on, with a matching `frame-src` for their players and posts: no inline script and no other script origin; `blob:` covers the object URLs Cesium's bundled workers bootstrap through in the built app), alongside the existing `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and `frame-ancestors 'none'`. `'unsafe-eval'` stays because Knockout, bundled inside Cesium's widgets package, resolves the global object with `eval` at load time and the globe does not initialize without it; styles permit `'unsafe-inline'` and Google Fonts because Vite's dev client injects `