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Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream/main' into fix/363-geocode-proxy

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# Conflicts:
#	SECURITY.md
#	server/providers/places/google.js
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Niccolò Saggese committed 2026-10-05 09:26:08 +02:00
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SECURITY.md
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@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ The golden rule: **secret-bearing API keys stay on the server side.** The dev/pr
| Key | Where it lives | How the browser uses it |
|-----|----------------|--------------------------|
| `OPENAI_API_KEY` | Server only | Browser fetches a short-lived **ephemeral** Realtime session token from `/api/realtime/token`; the real key never ships |
| `AISSTREAM_API_KEY` | Server only | Server holds the AISStream websocket; browser polls the same-origin `/api/ais-live` cache |
| OpenSky OAuth (`OPENSKY_CLIENT_ID/SECRET`) | Server only | Server mints + refreshes the token behind `/api/opensky` |
| `AISSTREAM_API_KEY` | Server only | Server holds the AISStream websocket; browser polls the same-origin `/api/vessels` cache |
| OpenSky OAuth (`OPENSKY_CLIENT_ID/SECRET`) | Server only | Server mints + refreshes the token behind `/api/flights` |
| `GOOGLE_MAPS_SERVER_API_KEY` (optional, #33) | Server only | Server calls Places (`/api/google/nearby-places`, `/api/google/text-search`), Geocoding (`/api/google/geocode`, `/api/google/reverse-geocode`) and the Street View fallback with this key; falls back to `GOOGLE_MAPS_API_KEY` when unset |
### Two deliberately client-side keys — restrict them
@@ -71,14 +71,16 @@ The data proxies under `server/providers/` are written so the browser cannot tur
- **Sanitized errors** — internal error details are not echoed back to clients.
- **Coalesced OAuth refresh** and cached successful responses only (OpenSky).
- **Redacted debug logging.** The voice debug log (`.gev-logs/`, gitignored) strips API keys, bearer tokens, client secrets, and image data URLs before writing.
- **Cross-site gate on cost/log endpoints.** The cost-bearing (`/api/realtime/token`, `/api/openai/hud-summary`, `/api/google/nearby-places`, `/api/google/text-search`) and log (`/api/realtime/debug-log`) endpoints refuse cross-site browser requests: a foreign or opaque `Origin`, a `Sec-Fetch-Site` other than `same-origin`/`none` (this is what blocks an `<img>`/navigation that carries no `Origin`), or any reverse-proxy/CDN forwarding header returns `403`. Non-browser loopback tools (the repo QA harnesses POST the token endpoint with no `Origin`) and the explicit `HOST=0.0.0.0` LAN opt-in keep working — the gate deliberately does not require a loopback remote address; that stricter requirement belongs only to the credential panel (`admitKeySetupRequest`). The Host check (`allowedHosts`, applied by `hostCheckPlugin` ahead of every route, since Vite's own check runs only after plugin middleware) rejects a rebinding `Host` before any handler runs, in every mode, and the gate is defense in depth behind it: the LAN opt-in keeps that check and accepts only IP addresses, `localhost` and names listed in `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS`. **Limit:** a name you list there is trusted like the app's own address, so list only names you control.
- **Full Content-Security-Policy.** The dev and preview servers send a real CSP (`script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' blob:` plus the YouTube, Facebook and X scripts the Nepal event's embedded media loads, with a matching `frame-src` for their players and posts: no inline script and no other script origin; `blob:` covers the object URLs Cesium's bundled workers bootstrap through in the built app), alongside the existing `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and `frame-ancestors 'none'`. `'unsafe-eval'` stays because Knockout, bundled inside Cesium's widgets package, resolves the global object with `eval` at load time and the globe does not initialize without it; styles permit `'unsafe-inline'` and Google Fonts because Vite's dev client injects `<style>` elements.
## Network exposure — the operator threat model
The dev server is a **key broker**: every server-side key above is spendable by anyone who can send HTTP requests to it. That shapes the defaults:
- **Local-only by default.** `./scripts/dev-fresh.sh` (and the Vite config itself) bind to `localhost`, so only your machine can reach the server — and only local names are accepted (`allowedHosts` stays restricted, which also blunts DNS-rebinding tricks).
- **Local-only by default.** `./scripts/dev-fresh.sh` (and the Vite config itself) bind to `localhost`, so only your machine can reach the server — and only local names are accepted (`allowedHosts` stays restricted, which also blunts DNS-rebinding tricks). Binding to all interfaces keeps that restriction: IP addresses and `localhost` work, and LAN hostnames must be listed in `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS` (for example `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS=globe.lan`); suffix and wildcard entries are ignored.
- **LAN exposure is an explicit opt-in**: `HOST=0.0.0.0 ./scripts/dev-fresh.sh`. The launcher prints a prominent warning plus your LAN URL. Understand what opting in means: **every device on that network can drive the proxies and spend your OpenAI / Google / OpenSky / AISStream / TomTom / FIRMS quota** for as long as the server runs. Do this only on networks you trust.
- **App-level throttles (opt-in):** `GEV_RATELIMIT_OPENAI_PER_MIN` and `GEV_RATELIMIT_GOOGLE_PER_MIN` cap the cost-bearing endpoints per client IP per minute (over-limit requests receive a sanitized `429`). They are **per-IP, process-local, in-memory guards** — they reset on restart and are **not billing caps**.
- **App-level throttles (on by default):** `GEV_RATELIMIT_OPENAI_PER_MIN` (default `30`) and `GEV_RATELIMIT_GOOGLE_PER_MIN` (default `120`) — the values the Pinokio build already ships — cap the cost-bearing endpoints per client IP per minute (over-limit requests receive a sanitized `429`). Both defaults sit well above what the app itself generates; set either to exactly `0` to run unthrottled. They are **per-IP, process-local, in-memory guards** — they reset on restart, a caller with several addresses gets a bucket per address, and they are **not billing caps**.
- **Provider-side budgets are the real backstop.** For hard spend protection, configure limits where the money is: OpenAI platform usage limits, Google Cloud budget alerts + per-API quotas, and equivalent controls for any other keyed provider.
- **Pinokio LAN and Cloudflare sharing are refused.** The current supported
Pinokio release re-reads sharing state when an app registers its Open URL and
@@ -90,6 +92,15 @@ The dev server is a **key broker**: every server-side key above is spendable by
loopback only. Use a separately reviewed authentication proxy for remote
access and keep provider-side quotas as the spend backstop.
## MCP server and panel
God's Eye View's tools are also served to MCP clients: over stdio (`npm run mcp`) and at `/mcp` on the development and preview servers.
- **`/mcp` answers only direct local requests**: a loopback connection naming a loopback host on the port it reached, a browser `Origin` (when sent) from that same host, no proxy forwarding headers, and launcher sharing off. It accepts only JSON, so a web page cannot post to it cross-site. This is transport safety, not authentication: any program on your machine can use the tools, and some of them spend the same provider quotas as the app.
- **What the panel's requests can reach.** In clients that display MCP Apps, the panel loads the app through the `panel_request` tool, which requests paths on the app's server. It is marked for the panel only and requires a key that each MCP server puts in its panel page, which keeps it from clients that list tools to the model without loading the panel. That key is not access control: any MCP client can read the panel page, key included, and then reach the app's files and data routes through `panel_request`, much as its other tools reach the data. Provider Settings, credential and model endpoints, `/mcp` and the development server's internal routes are refused to every caller.
- **The panel carries the two browser keys.** The panel build (`npm run build:panel`) includes the same Google Maps key and Cesium ion token as the app, and they run inside the client's panel page, on the client's site. A key restricted by HTTP referrer must also allow that page, or the panel cannot load tiles. To keep the app's own keys narrower, build the panel with separately restricted keys in the environment of `npm run build:panel`.
- **Embed mode is not framable by default.** `?embed=1` documents keep `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and `frame-ancestors 'none'` unless `GEV_EMBED_FRAME_ANCESTORS` names the pages that may frame them; a framing page can change what the app shows. Other documents can never be framed.
## Scope & expectations
- The Vite server is a **development/preview** server. If you expose it beyond localhost, put it behind your own auth/proxy and review the bindings (see the threat model above).