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fix(server): admit reverse-proxied same-origin terrain requests
Review follow-up on #975. The shared same-site gate refuses any forwarding header, which is right for routes that spend a key, but terrain is keyless and needed for rendering: behind the reverse proxy the README documents, every /api/terrain/heights chunk got 403 and fell back to the geoid. Terrain now uses admitSameSiteKeyless, which keeps the Sec-Fetch-Site and exact-Origin checks (comparing Origin against a single X-Forwarded-Proto scheme) but does not refuse forwarding headers. The shared admitSameSite gate is unchanged for every other route. The changelog entry moves to changelog.d/975-terrain-cross-site-gate.md. Co-authored-by: daikaginza <[email protected]>
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@@ -41,3 +41,48 @@ export function sameSiteGated(handler) {
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return handler(req, res, next);
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};
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}
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/**
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* Proxy header values arrive client-controlled; read one only when it is a
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* single scheme token, never a comma-separated chain.
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* @param {import('node:http').IncomingMessage} req
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* @returns {'http:'|'https:'}
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*/
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function forwardedProtocol(req) {
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if (req.socket?.encrypted) return 'https:';
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const proto = String(req.headers?.['x-forwarded-proto'] || '')
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.trim()
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.toLowerCase();
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return proto === 'https' ? 'https:' : 'http:';
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}
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/**
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* Cross-site gate for keyless routes the map needs in order to render
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* (`/api/terrain/heights`). It refuses the same cross-site browser shapes as
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* `admitSameSite` (a `Sec-Fetch-Site` other than same-origin/none, a foreign
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* or opaque `Origin`) but does not refuse reverse-proxy forwarding headers:
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* those protect credentials and spend, which a keyless route has neither of,
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* and refusing them would break rendering for an instance served behind the
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* reverse proxy the README documents. A single `X-Forwarded-Proto` supplies
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* the scheme an `Origin` is compared against. That header cannot be attached
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* to a cross-site browser request without a CORS preflight this server never
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* answers, and `Sec-Fetch-Site` is still enforced regardless.
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* @param {import('node:http').IncomingMessage} req
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* @param {import('node:http').ServerResponse} res
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* @returns {boolean} True when a 403 was sent.
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*/
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export function admitSameSiteKeyless(req, res) {
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const verdict = admitSameSiteRequest({
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hostHeader: req.headers?.host,
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protocol: forwardedProtocol(req),
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origin: req.headers?.origin,
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secFetchSite: req.headers?.['sec-fetch-site'],
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proxyHeaders: {},
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});
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if (verdict.ok) return false;
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res.statusCode = verdict.status;
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res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');
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res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-store');
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res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: verdict.error }));
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return true;
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}
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