diff --git a/DATA_SOURCES.md b/DATA_SOURCES.md index 39232184f..7d668c0d6 100644 --- a/DATA_SOURCES.md +++ b/DATA_SOURCES.md @@ -98,6 +98,8 @@ How to read this: | **Burlington Transit** (opendata.burlington.ca) | Transit layer live vehicles, Burlington ON | Burlington Transit realtime data under the City of Burlington Open Data Terms of Use, which permit any lawful purpose. The terms are revocable and must travel with the data, so the credit links them. Route ids are internal keys and are joined to the City’s published GTFS. | Credit to the City of Burlington plus a link to its Open Data Terms of Use, which the licence requires | | **Radio Browser** | Geolocated internet-radio station directory and station-level tags | Public-domain directory data under PDDL 1.0; individual broadcaster stream terms apply | "Radio Browser" plus a link to the selected broadcaster | | **Re:Earth Terrain** (Mapterhorn) | Terrain (keyless globe stacks — OSM etc. — + `/api/terrain/heights` ellipsoidal-height lookups) | Terrain mesh: CC BY 4.0; geoid: EGM2008 (NGA, public domain) | "Terrain (keyless globe stacks): Re:Earth Terrain / Mapterhorn (CC BY 4.0) / EGM2008 (NGA)" | +| **OpenSeaMap** (`tiles.openseamap.org`) | Sea Marks layer: raster overlay of buoys, lighthouses and ports (#10) | Chart tiles CC BY-SA 2.0; data ODbL 1.0 via OpenStreetMap | "Sea marks © OpenSeaMap contributors (CC BY-SA 2.0) · Data © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL)" | +| **OpenSnowMap** (`www.opensnowmap.org`) | Ski Pistes layer: raster overlay of ski runs and lifts (#10) | Tiles CC BY-SA; data ODbL 1.0 via OpenStreetMap; bulk tile download forbidden without prior agreement | "Ski pistes © www.opensnowmap.org (CC BY-SA) · Data © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL)" | | **OSRM on the FOSSGIS routing servers** (`routing.openstreetmap.de`) | Street-following routes for the Directions layer and voice route annotations, via `/api/route` | [FOSSGIS routing usage policy](https://routing.openstreetmap.de/about.html): "Display the required attribution and display a link to 'fix the map'", "Use a valid user agent and, if applicable, a correct referrer", "One request per second max", "No scraping, no heavy usage". The full policy is the German [FOSSGIS Nutzungsbedingungen](https://www.fossgis.de/arbeitsgruppen/osm-server/nutzungsbedingungen/); FOSSGIS also states that the server may be embedded in your own pages but "eine gewerbliche Nutzung ist nur mit Einschränkungen erlaubt" (commercial use only with restrictions). Route data derives from OpenStreetMap (ODbL 1.0) | "Routing: OSRM on the FOSSGIS servers" + a "fix the map" link — shown in the Data attribution popover | ### Local receiver input (not fetched from a service) @@ -118,6 +120,7 @@ The optional Local ADS-B layer and the broadcast-FM receiver use radio you recei - **Freeway Bureau, MOTC (Taiwan).** National freeway cameras from the Freeway Bureau's keyless [CCTV static table](https://tisvcloud.freeway.gov.tw/history/motc20/CCTV.xml) in the MOTC 2.0 standard, refreshed daily and fetched at runtime (never bundled). Freeway Bureau traffic data is published under the [Open Government Data License, Taiwan (Version 1.0)](https://data.gov.tw/license), which permits reuse, including commercial reuse, with attribution; the app credits the Freeway Bureau, MOTC, names the dataset and links the licence, as its attribution exhibit asks. The table publishes each camera's MJPEG stream on one of four official camera servers (`cctvn`, `cctvn5`, `cctvc`, `cctvs` under `freeway.gov.tw`). The frame proxy relays single images, so each published stream URL is mapped to the same server's single-JPEG path for the same camera number (`/abs2mjpg/bmjpg` → `/abs2mjpg/jpg`, `/live-view/mjpg/video.cgi` → `/live-view/jpg/image.cgi`); only those exact HTTPS pairs are registered, and the still path is not itself listed in the table. These are on-demand snapshots, not continuous video. Camera headings are low-confidence estimates. No API key is required. The table host does not answer from some networks outside Taiwan (the camera servers do); there the pack is empty, logs one warning and retries hourly. On by default; `CCTV_TAIWAN_ENABLED=0` skips the pack, and `CCTV_TAIWAN_MAX_SOURCES` defaults to 600 (bounded to 1–2000). - **Google Maps Platform.** You supply your own API key and are bound by [Google's ToS](https://cloud.google.com/maps-platform/terms). Google Maps Content (tiles, geocodes, places) **may not be cached, stored, rehosted, or committed** — this app only ever uses it live, which is the compliant pattern. The "Google" attribution is displayed on the globe and must stay visible. Restrict your key (see [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md)). +- **Sea Marks and Ski Pistes (#10).** Two keyless raster overlay layers under Infrastructure, OpenSeaMap sea marks and OpenSnowMap ski pistes, requested tile by tile as the camera views them, with no prefetch, bulk download or caching on our side (OpenSnowMap forbids bulk tile download without prior agreement). They drape on the globe on the OSM and Bing stacks and on the Google Photorealistic tileset on Google 3D (see `src/maps/imageryHost.js`). OpenRailwayMap and OpenInfraMap, also requested in #10, are not included: OpenRailwayMap's tile server only answers requests whose Referer is its own site, and OpenInfraMap serves vector tiles that need a vector rendering pipeline. - **OpenSky Network.** Its license is **non-commercial**, and operational use of the REST API in a live product can require a prior written agreement with OpenSky — even for non-profit/government use. If you deploy this commercially, contact OpenSky for your own terms. The flights layer is a toggle and runs anonymously by default. - **adsb.lol flight fallback.** When OpenSky is unavailable and no last-good OpenSky response exists, the server requests a cached, capped 250 nm adsb.lol point snapshot around the current camera subpoint. This is regional observed context, not worldwide completeness; provenance is exposed in the Flights stats/context row. Military ICAOs remain reconciled through the existing dedicated military registry rather than duplicated. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 47cdf9535..8aeb6d580 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ Keep the `env`: bash treats `UID` as read-only, so a plain `UID=1026` in front o On SELinux hosts (Fedora, RHEL), compose mounts the checkout with `:z` so the container may read it; Docker may relabel the checkout for container access, which can take a moment on a large checkout. Without that, the start fails with `Cannot find module '/app/scripts/docker-start.mjs'`. -Behind a reverse proxy, put your keys in `.env` or pass them as environment variables - Provider Settings refuses proxied requests on purpose - and add the hostname you serve it on, for example `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS=globe.example.lan` (see [Sharing an instance](#-sharing-an-instance)). +Behind a reverse proxy, put your keys in `.env` or pass them as environment variables - Provider Settings refuses proxied requests on purpose - and add the hostname you serve it on, for example `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS=globe.example.lan` (see [Sharing an instance](#-sharing-an-instance)). The map routes compare the browser's `Origin` with the `Host` the server sees, so the proxy must pass the original `Host` and, when it terminates TLS, `X-Forwarded-Proto`. Caddy does both by default; for nginx add `proxy_set_header Host $http_host;`, `proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;` and `proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;`. On an install outside Docker, that forwarding header also rate-limits the proxy's users apart from your own browser. Under the default Docker bridge network every client on the host, your browser included, reaches the container from its gateway address and shares one Overpass bucket. diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md index 4423eead3..6902a10a4 100644 --- a/SECURITY.md +++ b/SECURITY.md @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ The data proxies under `server/providers/` are written so the browser cannot tur - **Sanitized errors** — internal error details are not echoed back to clients. - **Coalesced OAuth refresh** and cached successful responses only (OpenSky). - **Redacted debug logging.** The voice debug log (`.gev-logs/`, gitignored) strips API keys, bearer tokens, client secrets, and image data URLs before writing. -- **Cross-site gate on cost/log endpoints.** The cost-bearing (`/api/realtime/token`, `/api/openai/hud-summary`, `/api/google/nearby-places`, `/api/google/text-search`), quota-bearing (`/api/mapillary/*`, with a per-IP limit on tiles, and `/api/tomtom/*`, backed by its persistent daily tile budget) and log (`/api/realtime/debug-log`) endpoints refuse cross-site browser requests: a foreign or opaque `Origin`, a `Sec-Fetch-Site` other than `same-origin`/`none` (this is what blocks an ``/navigation that carries no `Origin`), or any reverse-proxy/CDN forwarding header returns `403`. Non-browser loopback tools (the repo QA harnesses POST the token endpoint with no `Origin`) and the explicit `HOST=0.0.0.0` LAN opt-in keep working — the gate deliberately does not require a loopback remote address; that stricter requirement belongs only to the credential panel (`admitKeySetupRequest`). The Host check (`allowedHosts`, applied by `hostCheckPlugin` ahead of every route, since Vite's own check runs only after plugin middleware) rejects a rebinding `Host` before any handler runs, in every mode, and the gate is defense in depth behind it: the LAN opt-in keeps that check and accepts only IP addresses, `localhost` and names listed in `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS`. **Limit:** a name you list there is trusted like the app's own address, so list only names you control. The keyless terrain route (`/api/terrain/heights`) uses the same cross-site checks, minus the forwarding-header refusal: it guards only the per-client quota and point cache, not a key or a bill, and the map needs it to render behind a reverse proxy. The CCTV routes (`/api/cctv/*`) use the same keyless checks; their one key-bearing step, the Street View fallback, is skipped for any request with forwarding headers. +- **Cross-site gate on cost/log endpoints.** The cost-bearing (`/api/realtime/token`, `/api/openai/hud-summary`, `/api/google/nearby-places`, `/api/google/text-search`), quota-bearing (`/api/mapillary/*`, with a per-IP limit on tiles, and `/api/tomtom/*`, backed by its persistent daily tile budget) and log (`/api/realtime/debug-log`) endpoints refuse cross-site browser requests: a foreign or opaque `Origin`, a `Sec-Fetch-Site` other than `same-origin`/`none` (this is what blocks an ``/navigation that carries no `Origin`), or any reverse-proxy/CDN forwarding header returns `403`. Non-browser loopback tools (the repo QA harnesses POST the token endpoint with no `Origin`) and the explicit `HOST=0.0.0.0` LAN opt-in keep working — the gate deliberately does not require a loopback remote address; that stricter requirement belongs only to the credential panel (`admitKeySetupRequest`). The Host check (`allowedHosts`, applied by `hostCheckPlugin` ahead of every route, since Vite's own check runs only after plugin middleware) rejects a rebinding `Host` before any handler runs, in every mode, and the gate is defense in depth behind it: the LAN opt-in keeps that check and accepts only IP addresses, `localhost` and names listed in `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS`. **Limit:** a name you list there is trusted like the app's own address, so list only names you control. The keyless map routes (`/api/terrain/heights` and `/api/overpass`) use the same cross-site checks, minus the forwarding-header refusal: they guard only per-client quotas and caches, not a key or a bill, and the map needs both to render behind a reverse proxy. `/api/overpass` also admits at most 300 POSTs a minute per peer (IPv6 peers keyed by /64) and 900 a minute across all remote peers before it reads a body. A direct loopback request — a loopback socket with none of the forwarding headers `hasProxySignals` checks (`Forwarded`, `Via`, `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Forwarded-Host`, `X-Forwarded-Port`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`, `X-Real-IP`, `CF-Connecting-IP`, `CF-Ray`) — draws on its own per-peer admission window, so remote peers cannot exhaust the owner's admission. A reverse proxy on the same machine must add at least one of those headers (Caddy and Cloudflare do by default; nginx needs `proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;`, plus `proxy_set_header Host $http_host;` and `proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;` so the `Origin` check matches), or its traffic is indistinguishable from the owner's and shares the owner's window. With one, its requests are then counted as remote, in one bucket per proxy socket — the forwarded client address is never trusted as identity — so all users behind one proxy share 300/min. The isolation needs a loopback socket: under the default Docker bridge network every host-side client, the owner included, arrives from the container gateway and is one remote peer. **Limit:** this isolates admission only. The upstream budget (90 requests/min per client key, 300/min across all clients) is shared, so once remote traffic has used the global upstream budget, an owner request that misses the cache can still get `429`, or `503` when remote misses hold every upstream concurrency slot; cache hits are unaffected. The CCTV routes (`/api/cctv/*`) use the same keyless checks; their one key-bearing step, the Street View fallback, is skipped for any request with forwarding headers. - **Full Content-Security-Policy.** The dev and preview servers send a real CSP (`script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' blob:` plus the YouTube, Facebook and X scripts the Nepal event's embedded media loads and the Maps JavaScript API that Street View runs on, with a matching `frame-src` for their players and posts: no inline script and no other script origin; `blob:` covers the object URLs Cesium's bundled workers bootstrap through in the built app), alongside the existing `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and `frame-ancestors 'none'`. `'unsafe-eval'` stays because Knockout, bundled inside Cesium's widgets package, resolves the global object with `eval` at load time and the globe does not initialize without it; styles permit `'unsafe-inline'` and Google Fonts because Vite's dev client injects `