Merge branch 'main' into docker-support

SECURITY.md

@@ -21,19 +21,19 @@ The golden rule: **secret-bearing API keys stay on the server side.** The dev/pr
 | ChatGPT sign-in through Codex (optional, experimental) | Codex's own `auth.json` (`CODEX_HOME`, default `~/.codex`); GEV reads it server-side and never writes or refreshes it | Only after **USE CHATGPT OAUTH** is selected in Provider Settings: the server mints the same ephemeral Realtime token with the ChatGPT access token, for loopback clients only |
 | `AISSTREAM_API_KEY` | Server only | Server holds the AISStream websocket; browser polls the same-origin `/api/vessels` cache |
 | OpenSky OAuth (`OPENSKY_CLIENT_ID/SECRET`) | Server only | Server mints + refreshes the token behind `/api/flights` |
-| `GOOGLE_MAPS_SERVER_API_KEY` (optional, #33) | Server only | Server calls Places (`/api/google/nearby-places`, `/api/google/text-search`) and the Street View fallback with this key; falls back to `GOOGLE_MAPS_API_KEY` when unset |
+| `GOOGLE_MAPS_SERVER_API_KEY` (optional, #33) | Server only | Server calls Places (`/api/google/nearby-places`, `/api/google/text-search`), Geocoding (`/api/google/geocode`, `/api/google/reverse-geocode`) and the Street View fallback with this key; falls back to `GOOGLE_MAPS_API_KEY` when unset |
 
 ### Three deliberately client-side keys — restrict them
 
 These are designed to be used directly in the browser (like a Mapbox public token). They are injected into the client bundle via Vite's `define`, so they **will** be visible in browser devtools. Scope and restrict them rather than trying to hide them:
 
-1. **Google Maps API key** — loads Photorealistic 3D Tiles directly and powers GEV place search. **Restrict it** (HTTP referrer + API restriction to the required Google APIs) in the Google Cloud Console. An unrestricted key in a public deployment can be abused and billed to you.
+1. **Google Maps API key** — loads Photorealistic 3D Tiles directly and powers Street View (Maps JavaScript API; add it to the key's API restrictions). **Restrict it** (HTTP referrer + API restriction to the required Google APIs) in the Google Cloud Console. An unrestricted key in a public deployment can be abused and billed to you. Restrict it to the **Map Tiles API and Maps JavaScript API only**: a referrer restriction applies to the Maps JavaScript API and the client SDKs, not to the web services, so a key carrying Geocoding under one is refused with `API keys with referer restrictions cannot be used with this API`. Search does not need it — geocoding goes through the server proxies above (#363).
 2. **Cesium ion token** (`CESIUM_ION_TOKEN`, optional — for ion-hosted Google Photorealistic 3D Tiles, Bing world imagery, and world terrain) — used as `Cesium.Ion.defaultAccessToken` client-side. Use a public **`assets:read`** token with **URL restrictions** for any hosted deployment. The Community plan has eligibility and usage limits; a public token is not a secret, but it can still consume the account's quota.
 3. **Mapillary client token** (`MAPILLARY_CLIENT_TOKEN`, optional, Street Level) — used by the MapillaryJS viewer and Graph API lookups in the browser, and by the server's coverage-tile proxy. Mapillary client tokens are meant for browser use.
 
 > The explicit browser `define` block in `build/vite.js` controls exactly what reaches the client: only these three keys. Everything else stays server-side.
 
-**Places and Street View never needed to be on that list** (#33): they're called from the server-side proxies in the table above, which use `GOOGLE_MAPS_SERVER_API_KEY` when it's set. Splitting it from the browser-exposed key lets each key's Google Cloud restriction actually match what it does — the browser key referrer-restricted to the APIs the client loads, the server key IP-restricted (never a referrer, since it never leaves your server) to Places + Street View Static — instead of one key that has to be either over-permissioned or broken for one of its two jobs. A single shared `GOOGLE_MAPS_API_KEY` still works if you don't split them; it just has to cover every API both sides use.
+**Places, Geocoding and the Street View Static fallback never needed to be on that list** (#33, #363): they're called from the server-side proxies in the table above, which use `GOOGLE_MAPS_SERVER_API_KEY` when it's set. Splitting it from the browser-exposed key lets each key's Google Cloud restriction actually match what it does — the browser key referrer-restricted to Map Tiles + Maps JavaScript API, the server key IP-restricted (never a referrer, since it never leaves your server) to Places + Geocoding + Street View Static — instead of one key that has to be either over-permissioned or broken for one of its jobs. A single shared `GOOGLE_MAPS_API_KEY` still works if you don't split them, but then it cannot carry a referrer restriction at all: the web services refuse one, and search would be the half that breaks.
 
 Never commit real keys. `.env` is gitignored; only `.env.example` (placeholder names) is tracked. On macOS `dev-fresh.sh` can read keys from the Keychain; plain Vite uses env vars or a local `.env`, and Pinokio uses its ignored app `ENVIRONMENT` file.
 
@@ -74,6 +74,9 @@ The data proxies under `server/providers/` are written so the browser cannot tur
 - **Coalesced OAuth refresh** and cached successful responses only (OpenSky).
 - **Redacted debug logging.** The voice debug log (`.gev-logs/`, gitignored) strips API keys, bearer tokens, client secrets, and image data URLs before writing.
 - **Cross-site gate on cost/log endpoints.** The cost-bearing (`/api/realtime/token`, `/api/openai/hud-summary`, `/api/google/nearby-places`, `/api/google/text-search`), quota-bearing (`/api/mapillary/*`, with a per-IP limit on tiles) and log (`/api/realtime/debug-log`) endpoints refuse cross-site browser requests: a foreign or opaque `Origin`, a `Sec-Fetch-Site` other than `same-origin`/`none` (this is what blocks an `<img>`/navigation that carries no `Origin`), or any reverse-proxy/CDN forwarding header returns `403`. Non-browser loopback tools (the repo QA harnesses POST the token endpoint with no `Origin`) and the explicit `HOST=0.0.0.0` LAN opt-in keep working — the gate deliberately does not require a loopback remote address; that stricter requirement belongs only to the credential panel (`admitKeySetupRequest`). The Host check (`allowedHosts`, applied by `hostCheckPlugin` ahead of every route, since Vite's own check runs only after plugin middleware) rejects a rebinding `Host` before any handler runs, in every mode, and the gate is defense in depth behind it: the LAN opt-in keeps that check and accepts only IP addresses, `localhost` and names listed in `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS`. **Limit:** a name you list there is trusted like the app's own address, so list only names you control.
+- **Full Content-Security-Policy.** The dev and preview servers send a real CSP (`script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' blob:` plus the YouTube, Facebook and X scripts the Nepal event's embedded media loads and the Maps JavaScript API that Street View runs on, with a matching `frame-src` for their players and posts: no inline script and no other script origin; `blob:` covers the object URLs Cesium's bundled workers bootstrap through in the built app), alongside the existing `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and `frame-ancestors 'none'`. `'unsafe-eval'` stays because Knockout, bundled inside Cesium's widgets package, resolves the global object with `eval` at load time and the globe does not initialize without it; styles permit `'unsafe-inline'` and Google Fonts because Vite's dev client injects `<style>` elements.
+
+Allowing `maps.googleapis.com` in `script-src` also trusts its JSONP endpoints, which can bypass the script allowlist if an HTML-injection bug exists; this is an accepted limitation of loading the Maps JavaScript API, alongside the existing `'unsafe-eval'` allowance.
 - **Full Content-Security-Policy.** The dev and preview servers send a real CSP (`script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' blob:` plus the YouTube, Facebook and X scripts the Nepal event's embedded media loads, with a matching `frame-src` for their players and posts: no inline script and no other script origin; `blob:` covers the object URLs Cesium's bundled workers bootstrap through in the built app), alongside the existing `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and `frame-ancestors 'none'`. `'unsafe-eval'` stays because Knockout, bundled inside Cesium's widgets package, resolves the global object with `eval` at load time and the globe does not initialize without it; styles permit `'unsafe-inline'` and Google Fonts because Vite's dev client injects `<style>` elements.
 - **ChatGPT OAuth voice reuses the local Codex sign-in.** `/api/realtime/oauth-status`, `/api/realtime/oauth-login` and `/api/realtime/token?auth=oauth` answer only loopback connections, behind the same cross-site gate as the token endpoint; the login route also refuses a foreign `Origin`. None of them returns the access token. The login route runs `codex login` (or the executable named by `CODEX_BIN`) with an allowlisted environment that leaves out GEV's provider keys, keeps one attempt pending at a time and cancels it after two minutes or when the server stops. **Limits:** any program on this machine that can reach the server can mint Realtime sessions on the signed-in ChatGPT account, as it can with the API key; a local reverse proxy that hides the client's address defeats the loopback check; and OpenAI has not documented this use of Codex credentials for Realtime, so it may stop working or fall outside the account's terms.