fix(server): gate Google text search against cross-site requests

/api/google/text-search spends the same Google quota as nearby-places but
was not behind the cross-site gate. It now refuses cross-site requests
before calling Google, and a test covers both paid Google routes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@
 
 - Refuse cross-site browser requests to the cost-bearing and log endpoints
   (`/api/realtime/token`, `/api/openai/hud-summary`,
-  `/api/google/nearby-places`, `/api/realtime/debug-log`): a foreign or opaque
+  `/api/google/nearby-places`, `/api/google/text-search`,
+  `/api/realtime/debug-log`): a foreign or opaque
   Origin, a cross-site `Sec-Fetch-Site`, or proxy forwarding headers get 403,
   while loopback tools and LAN use keep working. The dev and preview servers
   send one shared Content-Security-Policy (James Sumpter, #242).

SECURITY.md

@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ The data proxies under `server/providers/` are written so the browser cannot tur
 - **Sanitized errors** — internal error details are not echoed back to clients.
 - **Coalesced OAuth refresh** and cached successful responses only (OpenSky).
 - **Redacted debug logging.** The voice debug log (`.gev-logs/`, gitignored) strips API keys, bearer tokens, client secrets, and image data URLs before writing.
-- **Cross-site gate on cost/log endpoints.** The cost-bearing (`/api/realtime/token`, `/api/openai/hud-summary`, `/api/google/nearby-places`) and log (`/api/realtime/debug-log`) endpoints refuse cross-site browser requests: a foreign or opaque `Origin`, a `Sec-Fetch-Site` other than `same-origin`/`none` (this is what blocks an `<img>`/navigation that carries no `Origin`), or any reverse-proxy/CDN forwarding header returns `403`. Non-browser loopback tools (the repo QA harnesses POST the token endpoint with no `Origin`) and the explicit `HOST=0.0.0.0` LAN opt-in keep working — the gate deliberately does not require a loopback remote address; that stricter requirement belongs only to the credential panel (`admitKeySetupRequest`). The Host check (`allowedHosts`, applied by `hostCheckPlugin` ahead of every route, since Vite's own check runs only after plugin middleware) rejects a rebinding `Host` before any handler runs, in every mode, and the gate is defense in depth behind it: the LAN opt-in keeps that check and accepts only IP addresses, `localhost` and names listed in `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS`. **Limit:** a name you list there is trusted like the app's own address, so list only names you control.
+- **Cross-site gate on cost/log endpoints.** The cost-bearing (`/api/realtime/token`, `/api/openai/hud-summary`, `/api/google/nearby-places`, `/api/google/text-search`) and log (`/api/realtime/debug-log`) endpoints refuse cross-site browser requests: a foreign or opaque `Origin`, a `Sec-Fetch-Site` other than `same-origin`/`none` (this is what blocks an `<img>`/navigation that carries no `Origin`), or any reverse-proxy/CDN forwarding header returns `403`. Non-browser loopback tools (the repo QA harnesses POST the token endpoint with no `Origin`) and the explicit `HOST=0.0.0.0` LAN opt-in keep working — the gate deliberately does not require a loopback remote address; that stricter requirement belongs only to the credential panel (`admitKeySetupRequest`). The Host check (`allowedHosts`, applied by `hostCheckPlugin` ahead of every route, since Vite's own check runs only after plugin middleware) rejects a rebinding `Host` before any handler runs, in every mode, and the gate is defense in depth behind it: the LAN opt-in keeps that check and accepts only IP addresses, `localhost` and names listed in `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS`. **Limit:** a name you list there is trusted like the app's own address, so list only names you control.
 - **Full Content-Security-Policy.** The dev and preview servers send a real CSP (`script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' blob:`: no inline script and no script from any other origin; `blob:` covers the object URLs Cesium's bundled workers bootstrap through in the built app), alongside the existing `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and `frame-ancestors 'none'`. `'unsafe-eval'` stays because Knockout, bundled inside Cesium's widgets package, resolves the global object with `eval` at load time and the globe does not initialize without it; styles permit `'unsafe-inline'` and Google Fonts because Vite's dev client injects `<style>` elements.
 
 ## Network exposure — the operator threat model

server/providers/places/google.js

@@ -178,6 +178,8 @@ export function googlePlacesContextProxy({
     // a view-biased Text Search lands on the actual feature. Same key, field
     // mask, throttle, and `places: []` error contract as nearby-places above.
     middlewares.use('/api/google/text-search', async (req, res) => {
+      // Paid like nearby-places, so gated the same way, first.
+      if (admitSameSite(req, res)) return;
       if (req.method !== 'GET') {
         res.statusCode = 405;
         res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');

src/tooling/placeProviders.test.mjs

@@ -482,3 +482,64 @@ test('the upstream host is pinned: a redirect is refused, not followed', async (
   await request('/api/route', '?profile=car&coords=-97,30;-97.01,30.01');
   assert.deepEqual(seen, ['error'], 'a redirect would escape the pinned host');
 });
+
+test('both paid Google routes refuse cross-site requests before calling Google', async (t) => {
+  const plugin = googlePlacesContextProxy({ resolveApiKey: () => 'key' });
+  const routes = new Map();
+  plugin.configureServer({
+    middlewares: { use: (route, handler) => routes.set(route, handler) },
+  });
+  let upstream = 0;
+  t.mock.method(globalThis, 'fetch', async () => {
+    upstream += 1;
+    return Response.json({ places: [] });
+  });
+  const call = async (route, url, headers) => {
+    const res = {
+      statusCode: 200,
+      headers: {},
+      setHeader(name, value) {
+        this.headers[name.toLowerCase()] = value;
+      },
+      writeHead(status) {
+        this.statusCode = status;
+      },
+      end() {},
+    };
+    await routes.get(route)(
+      {
+        url,
+        method: 'GET',
+        headers: { host: 'localhost:4173', ...headers },
+        socket: { remoteAddress: '127.0.0.1' },
+      },
+      res,
+    );
+    return res.statusCode;
+  };
+  const crossSite = {
+    origin: 'https://attacker.example',
+    'sec-fetch-site': 'cross-site',
+  };
+  for (const [route, url] of [
+    ['/api/google/nearby-places', '?lat=30&lon=-97'],
+    ['/api/google/text-search', '?q=museum&lat=30&lon=-97'],
+  ]) {
+    assert.equal(await call(route, url, crossSite), 403, route);
+    assert.equal(
+      await call(route, url, { 'sec-fetch-site': 'cross-site' }),
+      403,
+      route,
+    );
+  }
+  assert.equal(upstream, 0, 'a refused request never reaches Google');
+  // The app's own page still gets answers.
+  assert.equal(
+    await call('/api/google/text-search', '?q=museum&lat=30&lon=-97', {
+      origin: 'http://localhost:4173',
+      'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin',
+    }),
+    200,
+  );
+  assert.equal(upstream, 1);
+});