fix(street-level): pause Street View details retries after a failure

Maintainer follow-up to #966 review:

- A failed panorama-details lookup now waits DETAILS_RETRY_COOLDOWN_MS
  (5 s) per panorama before a view event can retry it, so dragging the
  view after a failure no longer issues a lookup on every pov change. A
  success clears the pause; one panorama's failure does not delay another.
- SECURITY.md notes that allowing maps.googleapis.com in script-src also
  trusts its JSONP endpoints, an accepted limitation alongside the
  existing 'unsafe-eval' allowance.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>

SECURITY.md

@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ The data proxies under `server/providers/` are written so the browser cannot tur
 - **Cross-site gate on cost/log endpoints.** The cost-bearing (`/api/realtime/token`, `/api/openai/hud-summary`, `/api/google/nearby-places`, `/api/google/text-search`), quota-bearing (`/api/mapillary/*`, with a per-IP limit on tiles) and log (`/api/realtime/debug-log`) endpoints refuse cross-site browser requests: a foreign or opaque `Origin`, a `Sec-Fetch-Site` other than `same-origin`/`none` (this is what blocks an `<img>`/navigation that carries no `Origin`), or any reverse-proxy/CDN forwarding header returns `403`. Non-browser loopback tools (the repo QA harnesses POST the token endpoint with no `Origin`) and the explicit `HOST=0.0.0.0` LAN opt-in keep working — the gate deliberately does not require a loopback remote address; that stricter requirement belongs only to the credential panel (`admitKeySetupRequest`). The Host check (`allowedHosts`, applied by `hostCheckPlugin` ahead of every route, since Vite's own check runs only after plugin middleware) rejects a rebinding `Host` before any handler runs, in every mode, and the gate is defense in depth behind it: the LAN opt-in keeps that check and accepts only IP addresses, `localhost` and names listed in `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS`. **Limit:** a name you list there is trusted like the app's own address, so list only names you control.
 - **Full Content-Security-Policy.** The dev and preview servers send a real CSP (`script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' blob:` plus the YouTube, Facebook and X scripts the Nepal event's embedded media loads and the Maps JavaScript API that Street View runs on, with a matching `frame-src` for their players and posts: no inline script and no other script origin; `blob:` covers the object URLs Cesium's bundled workers bootstrap through in the built app), alongside the existing `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and `frame-ancestors 'none'`. `'unsafe-eval'` stays because Knockout, bundled inside Cesium's widgets package, resolves the global object with `eval` at load time and the globe does not initialize without it; styles permit `'unsafe-inline'` and Google Fonts because Vite's dev client injects `<style>` elements.
 
+Allowing `maps.googleapis.com` in `script-src` also trusts its JSONP endpoints, which can bypass the script allowlist if an HTML-injection bug exists; this is an accepted limitation of loading the Maps JavaScript API, alongside the existing `'unsafe-eval'` allowance.
+
 ## Network exposure — the operator threat model
 
 The dev server is a **key broker**: every server-side key above is spendable by anyone who can send HTTP requests to it. That shapes the defaults: