fix(gnss): date replayed snapshots by the proxy-reported age, not cross-clock fetchedAt

The layer compared the server's fetchedAt with the browser's clock, so a
skewed client clock could shift or void the 30-minute window. The proxy now
returns ageMs (its own now minus fetchedAt, at serve time, on fresh, cached
and stale answers); the source refuses a snapshot without a finite,
non-negative ageMs, and the layer dates rows as its now() - ageMs. fetchedAt
stays in the payload for display.

Tests: proxy cached/stale answers report ageMs on the server clock; the
source rejects missing/invalid/negative ageMs; the layer replay test drives
ageMs. qa-gnss stubs send ageMs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>

docs/CURRENT-STATE.md

@@ -3072,7 +3072,7 @@ its criteria cannot be silently ignored.
 | GNSS Integrity 📡 (`gnss-interference`) | adsb.lol point snapshot, low navigation accuracy binned per 0.5° cell (GEV NIC/NACp threshold + gpsjam.org formula and bands, keyless, ODbL) | `src/layers/gnss/` via `src/app/layers/gnss.js` | `/api/gnss-integrity` | 60s (server cache 60 s; 30 min rolling window) |
 | Fire Perimeters 🔥 | NIFC WFIGS current interagency perimeters (keyless, paged past the 2000-record cap); InciWeb catalog + incident page origin and update time checks for verified incident-page links | `src/layers/perimeters/` via `src/app/layers/perimeters.js` | `/api/fire-perimeters` + `/api/fire-perimeters/inciweb/*` | 5 min (server caches: catalog 1 h; publication 30 min) |
 
-GNSS Integrity fetches a capped adsb.lol snapshot around the view anchor, keeps each aircraft once per cell over 30 minutes as the camera pans, and draws low/medium/high ground rectangles only for cells with at least 3 aircraft. The row legend counts cells per band. The method is a GEV threshold plus gpsjam.org aggregation, not the gpsjam method: the per-aircraft rule (NIC < 7 or NACp < 8, borrowed from the US 14 CFR 91.227 ADS-B Out minima, or readsb's GPS-loss flag) and the 30-minute visited-view window are GEV-defined and unvalidated; only the cell formula and 2% / 10% bands come from gpsjam.org. `layer.provenance` (also on `getStats()`) records each part, and the proxy tags its rows with `classifier: gev-nic-nacp-v1`. Cells carry `state: navigation-integrity-anomaly` (medium/high) or `nominal`; `interpretation: suspected-gnss-interference` is a secondary reading, not a detection or a located emitter. Only DO-260A/B (ADS-B versions 1 and 2) direct 1090ES positions with a known `seen_pos` of 0–60 s count. Presence and degraded evidence age separately: a degraded report keeps the aircraft degraded in its cell for 30 minutes after that report, however many healthy reports follow, and an aircraft unheard for 30 minutes starts fresh. Rows are dated by the snapshot's `fetchedAt`, which the proxy keeps on cached and stale answers, so a replayed snapshot never restarts the window; the proxy stops serving a stale snapshot once it is older than 30 minutes, the source refuses an undated one, and cells age out on schedule during fetch failures or while there is no view anchor.
+GNSS Integrity fetches a capped adsb.lol snapshot around the view anchor, keeps each aircraft once per cell over 30 minutes as the camera pans, and draws low/medium/high ground rectangles only for cells with at least 3 aircraft. The row legend counts cells per band. The method is a GEV threshold plus gpsjam.org aggregation, not the gpsjam method: the per-aircraft rule (NIC < 7 or NACp < 8, borrowed from the US 14 CFR 91.227 ADS-B Out minima, or readsb's GPS-loss flag) and the 30-minute visited-view window are GEV-defined and unvalidated; only the cell formula and 2% / 10% bands come from gpsjam.org. `layer.provenance` (also on `getStats()`) records each part, and the proxy tags its rows with `classifier: gev-nic-nacp-v1`. Cells carry `state: navigation-integrity-anomaly` (medium/high) or `nominal`; `interpretation: suspected-gnss-interference` is a secondary reading, not a detection or a located emitter. Only DO-260A/B (ADS-B versions 1 and 2) direct 1090ES positions with a known `seen_pos` of 0–60 s count. Presence and degraded evidence age separately: a degraded report keeps the aircraft degraded in its cell for 30 minutes after that report, however many healthy reports follow, and an aircraft unheard for 30 minutes starts fresh. Rows are dated by the snapshot's observation time, which the proxy keeps on cached and stale answers and reports as `ageMs` on its own clock (so browser clock skew does not move the window); a replayed snapshot never restarts the window; the proxy stops serving a stale snapshot once it is older than 30 minutes, the source refuses an undated one, and cells age out on schedule during fetch failures or while there is no view anchor.
 
 Fire Perimeters uses capped, timed server reads with stale-on-error caching and a per-client limit. Unchanged snapshots retain geometry; link checks cancel on disable or selection change, and the row legend shows reported containment.