Merge upstream main (typed AI chat) into pr/street-level-show-action

SECURITY.md

@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ The data proxies under `server/providers/` are written so the browser cannot tur
 
 Allowing `maps.googleapis.com` in `script-src` also trusts its JSONP endpoints, which can bypass the script allowlist if an HTML-injection bug exists; this is an accepted limitation of loading the Maps JavaScript API, alongside the existing `'unsafe-eval'` allowance.
 - **Full Content-Security-Policy.** The dev and preview servers send a real CSP (`script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' blob:` plus the YouTube, Facebook and X scripts the Nepal event's embedded media loads, with a matching `frame-src` for their players and posts: no inline script and no other script origin; `blob:` covers the object URLs Cesium's bundled workers bootstrap through in the built app), alongside the existing `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and `frame-ancestors 'none'`. `'unsafe-eval'` stays because Knockout, bundled inside Cesium's widgets package, resolves the global object with `eval` at load time and the globe does not initialize without it; styles permit `'unsafe-inline'` and Google Fonts because Vite's dev client injects `<style>` elements.
+- **Typed chat spends the provider keys.** `/api/openai/chat` and `/api/gemini/chat` send the conversation to OpenAI Chat Completions or Gemini `generateContent` with the server's `OPENAI_API_KEY` or `GEMINI_API_KEY`. They require a same-site `Origin` (the Gemini request check), cap request bodies at 512 KB, refuse upstream redirects, cut the upstream call off after 60 s and return only sanitized errors. OpenAI chat can only bill `OPENAI_API_KEY`, so while `GEV_PREFER_CODEX_OAUTH` pins OpenAI to ChatGPT OAuth it refuses with `503` (`CODEX_OAUTH_REQUIRED`) rather than spend the key. After the provider refuses the key or account (a `401`, a `403`, Gemini's `400` `API_KEY_INVALID` or OpenAI's `429` `insufficient_quota`), a route stops sending that key upstream for a minute, or until the key changes.
 - **ChatGPT OAuth voice reuses the local Codex sign-in.** `/api/realtime/oauth-status`, `/api/realtime/oauth-login` and `/api/realtime/token?auth=oauth` answer only loopback connections, behind the same cross-site gate as the token endpoint; the login route also refuses a foreign `Origin`. None of them returns the access token. The login route runs `codex login` (or the executable named by `CODEX_BIN`) with an allowlisted environment that leaves out GEV's provider keys, keeps one attempt pending at a time and cancels it after two minutes or when the server stops. **Limits:** any program on this machine that can reach the server can mint Realtime sessions on the signed-in ChatGPT account, as it can with the API key; a local reverse proxy that hides the client's address defeats the loopback check; and OpenAI has not documented this use of Codex credentials for Realtime, so it may stop working or fall outside the account's terms.
 
 ## Network exposure — the operator threat model
@@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ The dev server is a **key broker**: every server-side key above is spendable by
 
 - **Local-only by default.** `./scripts/dev-fresh.sh` (and the Vite config itself) bind to `localhost`, so only your machine can reach the server — and only local names are accepted (`allowedHosts` stays restricted, which also blunts DNS-rebinding tricks). Binding to all interfaces keeps that restriction: IP addresses and `localhost` work, and LAN hostnames must be listed in `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS` (for example `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS=globe.lan`); suffix and wildcard entries are ignored.
 - **LAN exposure is an explicit opt-in**: `HOST=0.0.0.0 ./scripts/dev-fresh.sh`. The launcher prints a prominent warning plus your LAN URL. Understand what opting in means: **every device on that network can drive the proxies and spend your OpenAI / Google / OpenSky / AISStream / TomTom / FIRMS quota** for as long as the server runs. Do this only on networks you trust.
-- **App-level throttles (on by default):** `GEV_RATELIMIT_OPENAI_PER_MIN` (default `30`) and `GEV_RATELIMIT_GOOGLE_PER_MIN` (default `120`) — the values the Pinokio build already ships — cap the cost-bearing endpoints per client IP per minute (over-limit requests receive a sanitized `429`). Both defaults sit well above what the app itself generates; set either to exactly `0` to run unthrottled. They are **per-IP, process-local, in-memory guards** — they reset on restart, a caller with several addresses gets a bucket per address, and they are **not billing caps**.
+- **App-level throttles (on by default):** `GEV_RATELIMIT_OPENAI_PER_MIN` (default `30`) and `GEV_RATELIMIT_GOOGLE_PER_MIN` (default `120`) — the values the Pinokio build already ships — cap the cost-bearing endpoints per client IP per minute (over-limit requests receive a sanitized `429`). Typed chat keeps its own per-IP window, set by `GEV_RATELIMIT_OPENAI_CHAT_PER_MIN` and `GEV_RATELIMIT_GEMINI_CHAT_PER_MIN`; left unset, each takes its provider's resolved cap (`GEV_RATELIMIT_OPENAI_PER_MIN`, or `GEV_RATELIMIT_GEMINI_PER_MIN`, default `30`), so lowering a provider throttle lowers chat too, while an explicit chat value, including `0`, wins. Both defaults sit well above what the app itself generates; set either to exactly `0` to run unthrottled. They are **per-IP, process-local, in-memory guards** — they reset on restart, a caller with several addresses gets a bucket per address, and they are **not billing caps**.
 - **Docker trusts one address, and only because the port is on loopback.**
   Docker delivers the host's own browser to the container from the container
   network's gateway, never from `127.0.0.1`, so a loopback-only Provider