diff --git a/DATA_SOURCES.md b/DATA_SOURCES.md index 61b971b71..6d2ee498b 100644 --- a/DATA_SOURCES.md +++ b/DATA_SOURCES.md @@ -205,6 +205,8 @@ The [Bhote Koshi event pack](public/events/bhote-koshi-2026/README.md), under `p | **DataSF Analysis Neighborhoods** (41 SF neighborhood polygons) | `neighborhoods/` | **PDDL 1.0** (public domain) | ✅ (no restrictions) | "City & County of San Francisco — DataSF" (courtesy — not legally required) | | **Natural Earth countries, states and provinces** (260 admin-0/map units + 4,587 admin-1 polygons) | `natural_earth/` | **Public domain** | ✅ (no restrictions) | "Made with Natural Earth" (courtesy credit — not legally required) | | **US Census Bureau counties** (3,235 county polygons) | `us_census_counties/` | **Public domain** | ✅ (no restrictions) | "U.S. Census Bureau" (courtesy — not legally required) | +| **Yale Bright Star Catalogue** (9,096 stars, sky background) | `sky/` | **Public domain** | ✅ (no restrictions) | "Yale Bright Star Catalogue (Hoffleit & Warren, via CDS)" (courtesy credit) | +| **ESO Milky Way panorama** (eso0932a, blurred cube map, sky background) | `sky/` | **CC BY 4.0** | ✅ (attribution; changes stated) | "ESO/S. Brunier" | | **CCTV ground heights** (3,445 cameras) | `cctv_ground_heights/` | Precomputed camera placement heights, aligned to work with Google Photorealistic 3D Tiles (folder README) | — | — | | **CCTV Camera Database** model-enrichment extract v2.26.0 (17 camera-model records) | `src/layers/cctv/modelSpecs.js` | **CC0-1.0** (public domain dedication) | ✅ (no restrictions) | "Specs: cctv-database.com" (courtesy — not legally required) | @@ -277,6 +279,11 @@ https://www.naturalearthdata.com/about/terms-of-use/). We credit anyway: "Made w Earth". Registration in the in-app `dataCredits.js` attribution list ships with the resolver wiring (see below). +### Sky background (`sky/`) + +Sources, licences, the changes CC BY asks to state, hashes and build commands +are in [`sky/README.md`](src/data/local_data/sky/README.md). + ### DataSF Analysis Neighborhoods (`neighborhoods/`) `neighborhoods/san-francisco.json` bundles the City & County of San Francisco's official diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md index 12ace22b2..1baad029f 100644 --- a/SECURITY.md +++ b/SECURITY.md @@ -69,11 +69,13 @@ The data proxies under `server/providers/` are written so the browser cannot tur - **No verbatim client headers upstream.** The CCTV media route is the one route that relays a request header (`Range`, for video seeking). It is parsed and canonicalized before it is forwarded: one `bytes=` range only, with every accepted form — explicit span, open-ended and suffix — bounded to the same 64 MiB ceiling the relay applies to a declared response body. Multi-range, malformed, inverted and non-`bytes` values are dropped and the request proceeds without a `Range`, as RFC 7233 §3.1 prescribes. Bounding the request bounds what is asked for: a response that declares no length — live streamed media, or a chunked body from an upstream that ignores the `Range` — has no ceiling. An upstream request the browser has stopped waiting for is cancelled rather than left running, whether the viewer leaves before the headers arrive or during the body. - **Transit fetches registered feeds only.** `/api/transit/vehicles/` resolves the id against `src/data/transitFeeds.js`; the browser never supplies a URL, and a feed that is registered but disabled does not resolve at all. Redirects are followed manually and each hop is validated against the feed's own https origin before it is requested, so an off-origin or downgraded hop is refused rather than contacted. Bodies are capped at 8 MB, the protobuf is decoded server-side under entity-count and string-length ceilings, a differential feed is refused, and snapshots live 15 s in memory with no disk cache. A per-feed admission limiter and a failure cooldown ladder bound what this process can ask of any operator. - **Local receiver feeds are operator-configured and local-only.** `/api/local-receivers/aircraft` reads only the `aircraft.json` URLs in the server's `LOCAL_RECEIVER_FEEDS`; the browser never supplies an address. Each host must pass the shared tap address rule (`src/data/tapAddress.js`: loopback, RFC1918, `localhost`, `*.local`; no link-local, IPv6 or other names), the scheme must be http(s), the path must end in `aircraft.json`, and credentials, queries and fragments are refused. Invalid entries are logged at startup and never fetched. Reads use a 2 s timeout, refuse redirects, cap bodies at 2 MB and share one read per second; responses name each feed by band only and never carry upstream error text. +- **Validated response formats.** Proxied bodies are relayed only in the format the route serves. CCTV frames and the Street View fallback accept JPEG, PNG, GIF, WebP and AVIF only, sent under their canonical type; any other type falls through to the next fallback. Live CCTV media must match its feed kind (`video/mp4`, `video/webm`, or `multipart/x-mixed-replace` with a boundary) before it is relayed or the camera counts as healthy, and its redirects stay on the registered origin. GBFS bodies must parse as JSON and are re-serialized as `application/json; charset=utf-8`. Camera catalog URLs are pinned by parsed URL — scheme, exact host, no credentials, default port, and a normalized path inside the agency's image directory — and a redirect on a pinned host must stay inside the same directory. Every `/api/cctv` route uses the keyless cross-site checks described below, so cameras stay reachable behind a reverse proxy; a request carrying forwarding headers never reaches the key-bearing Street View fallback and gets the placeholder frame instead, as when no key is configured. +- **Consistent API response headers.** Every `/api` response, including errors, partial content, Host refusals and unknown routes, carries `Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox` and `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` (`apiResponseHeadersPlugin` in `build/vite.js`, installed ahead of the Host check). A route that sets its own policy adds it as a further policy; it never replaces this one. - **Response-size caps and timeouts** on proxied responses. - **Sanitized errors** — internal error details are not echoed back to clients. - **Coalesced OAuth refresh** and cached successful responses only (OpenSky). - **Redacted debug logging.** The voice debug log (`.gev-logs/`, gitignored) strips API keys, bearer tokens, client secrets, and image data URLs before writing. -- **Cross-site gate on cost/log endpoints.** The cost-bearing (`/api/realtime/token`, `/api/openai/hud-summary`, `/api/google/nearby-places`, `/api/google/text-search`), quota-bearing (`/api/mapillary/*`, with a per-IP limit on tiles, and `/api/tomtom/*`, backed by its persistent daily tile budget) and log (`/api/realtime/debug-log`) endpoints refuse cross-site browser requests: a foreign or opaque `Origin`, a `Sec-Fetch-Site` other than `same-origin`/`none` (this is what blocks an ``/navigation that carries no `Origin`), or any reverse-proxy/CDN forwarding header returns `403`. Non-browser loopback tools (the repo QA harnesses POST the token endpoint with no `Origin`) and the explicit `HOST=0.0.0.0` LAN opt-in keep working — the gate deliberately does not require a loopback remote address; that stricter requirement belongs only to the credential panel (`admitKeySetupRequest`). The Host check (`allowedHosts`, applied by `hostCheckPlugin` ahead of every route, since Vite's own check runs only after plugin middleware) rejects a rebinding `Host` before any handler runs, in every mode, and the gate is defense in depth behind it: the LAN opt-in keeps that check and accepts only IP addresses, `localhost` and names listed in `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS`. **Limit:** a name you list there is trusted like the app's own address, so list only names you control. The keyless terrain route (`/api/terrain/heights`) uses the same cross-site checks, minus the forwarding-header refusal: it guards only the per-client quota and point cache, not a key or a bill, and the map needs it to render behind a reverse proxy. +- **Cross-site gate on cost/log endpoints.** The cost-bearing (`/api/realtime/token`, `/api/openai/hud-summary`, `/api/google/nearby-places`, `/api/google/text-search`), quota-bearing (`/api/mapillary/*`, with a per-IP limit on tiles, and `/api/tomtom/*`, backed by its persistent daily tile budget) and log (`/api/realtime/debug-log`) endpoints refuse cross-site browser requests: a foreign or opaque `Origin`, a `Sec-Fetch-Site` other than `same-origin`/`none` (this is what blocks an ``/navigation that carries no `Origin`), or any reverse-proxy/CDN forwarding header returns `403`. Non-browser loopback tools (the repo QA harnesses POST the token endpoint with no `Origin`) and the explicit `HOST=0.0.0.0` LAN opt-in keep working — the gate deliberately does not require a loopback remote address; that stricter requirement belongs only to the credential panel (`admitKeySetupRequest`). The Host check (`allowedHosts`, applied by `hostCheckPlugin` ahead of every route, since Vite's own check runs only after plugin middleware) rejects a rebinding `Host` before any handler runs, in every mode, and the gate is defense in depth behind it: the LAN opt-in keeps that check and accepts only IP addresses, `localhost` and names listed in `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS`. **Limit:** a name you list there is trusted like the app's own address, so list only names you control. The keyless terrain route (`/api/terrain/heights`) uses the same cross-site checks, minus the forwarding-header refusal: it guards only the per-client quota and point cache, not a key or a bill, and the map needs it to render behind a reverse proxy. The CCTV routes (`/api/cctv/*`) use the same keyless checks; their one key-bearing step, the Street View fallback, is skipped for any request with forwarding headers. - **Full Content-Security-Policy.** The dev and preview servers send a real CSP (`script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' blob:` plus the YouTube, Facebook and X scripts the Nepal event's embedded media loads and the Maps JavaScript API that Street View runs on, with a matching `frame-src` for their players and posts: no inline script and no other script origin; `blob:` covers the object URLs Cesium's bundled workers bootstrap through in the built app), alongside the existing `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and `frame-ancestors 'none'`. `'unsafe-eval'` stays because Knockout, bundled inside Cesium's widgets package, resolves the global object with `eval` at load time and the globe does not initialize without it; styles permit `'unsafe-inline'` and Google Fonts because Vite's dev client injects `