fix(overpass): keyless gate, loopback admission headroom and per-phase arrival budgets

Address gekh's review of 69a87fe2:

- P1: /api/overpass now uses admitSameSiteKeyless, like /api/terrain/heights,
  so an instance behind the README's reverse proxy keeps its Overpass-backed
  layers; cross-site shapes are still refused and forwarding headers no
  longer launder them. SECURITY.md, the gate header and CURRENT-STATE say so.
- P2: admission keys IPv6 peers by /64 and folds IPv4-mapped peers
  (clientNetworkKey), and loopback has its own 300/min window outside the
  900/min global, so a few LAN peers cannot lock the owner's browser out.
- P2 (track): the settle and reveal frames each get their own 500 ms budget,
  measured from moveEnd and from the settle frame respectively, so a ~300 ms
  SwiftShader frame no longer trips the reveal deadline while both stay
  inside the 1 s idle refresh.
- Smaller: drop the dead settings-block check and stale probe comment in
  query.js, clamp whitespace-tolerant [ timeout : N ], and add tests for the
  global window, the /64 keying, loopback headroom, proxied admission and
  cache hits spending admission but not upstream budget.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
Said TurkseverandClaude Fable 5.1 committed 2026-10-21 16:17:37 +01:00
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*
* The credential panel has its own stricter gate (`admitKeySetupRequest` in
* keySetupCore.mjs): loopback socket + local Host + exact Origin + JSON
* Content-Type. The four endpoints here — `/api/realtime/token` (mints an
* OpenAI Realtime token = spends money), `/api/openai/hud-summary` (OpenAI
* spend), `/api/google/nearby-places` (Google spend), and
* `/api/realtime/debug-log` (appends to a local JSONL) — were previously
* ungated, so a hostile web page open in the same browser could reach them
* cross-site: a `fetch` carries a foreign `Origin`, and an `<img>`/navigation
* carries NO `Origin` at all but does carry `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`.
* Content-Type. The endpoints behind this gate — `/api/realtime/token` (mints
* an OpenAI Realtime token = spends money), `/api/openai/hud-summary` (OpenAI
* spend), `/api/google/nearby-places` (Google spend),
* `/api/realtime/debug-log` (appends to a local JSONL) and the quota-bearing
* routes SECURITY.md lists with them — were previously ungated, so a hostile
* web page open in the same browser could reach them cross-site: a `fetch`
* carries a foreign `Origin`, and an `<img>`/navigation carries NO `Origin`
* at all but does carry `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`. The keyless map routes
* (`/api/terrain/heights`, `/api/overpass`) reuse this core through
* `admitSameSiteKeyless` with the forwarding-header refusal switched off.
*
* This module is the pure core that refuses those shapes while keeping the
* documented `HOST=0.0.0.0` LAN opt-in and non-browser loopback tools (the two