fix(cctv): give Catalonia cameras stable ids and pin their frame paths

Ids were built from the feed's fid, which embeds an upstream server-start stamp,
so every upstream restart renamed all cameras (it already had since the PR
fixture). Ids now come from the validated frame URL (cat-sct-<stem>, or host
and path for partner cameras), which also collapses the five duplicate rows.
Frame links must sit directly in each host's frame directory with no explicit
port, and sctidcam must be a bare image filename. Numeric entity decoding
handles hex references and leaves invalid code points as written, so one bad
name no longer empties the pack. Counts in the docs are now ~130.

DATA_SOURCES.md

@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ The optional Local ADS-B layer and the broadcast-FM receiver use radio you recei
 - **Warendorf webcam.** The Stadt Warendorf Marktplatz webcam, registered from the curated `config/cctv_sources.warendorf.json` (the Kreis Warendorf registration-office cameras from the contributing PR are indoor waiting rooms and were left out); only the municipal image host is proxied, frames are fetched at request time and never stored or redistributed. Disable with `CCTV_WARENDORF_ENABLED=0`.
 - **Live Traffic NSW cameras.** The camera list is the keyless public `data.livetraffic.com/cameras/traffic-cam.json` feed (Transport for NSW open data, CC BY 4.0); frames are stills on `webcams.transport.nsw.gov.au`, and only that host is registered. That image host answers non-browser clients with an HTML placeholder, so the proxy identifies as a browser for that one host and as itself everywhere else. Frames are fetched at request time and never stored or redistributed. Disable with `CCTV_NSW_ENABLED=0`.
 - **Open Calgary traffic cameras.** Keyless. The camera list is the public Socrata dataset `k7p9-kppz` on `data.calgary.ca`; frames are stills on the city's own `trafficcam.calgary.ca` host, and only that host is registered. Most rows publish an `http://` frame URL and the host redirects those to HTTPS, so URLs are upgraded and pinned to that origin before registration. Frames are fetched at request time and never stored or redistributed. The dataset publishes no camera facing: the `quadrant` field and the quadrant suffix on each camera name are Calgary's address grid, not a bearing, so headings use the shared id-hash fallback at low confidence and are corrected with the in-app calibration gizmo. The licence requires the attribution statement above. Disable with `CCTV_CALGARY_ENABLED=0`.
-- **Catalonia (Servei Català de Trànsit) cameras.** The camera list is the keyless `https://www.gencat.cat/transit/opendata/cameres.xml` WFS/GML feed, fetched over https with redirects refused and the body read capped at 1 MiB, since the list decides ids, coordinates and which allowlisted frame path is proxied. It carries a `font` field naming the real publisher per camera; this pack keeps SCT's own highway cameras plus hotlinked Barcelona (IMI) and Terrassa municipal cameras (~135 total), each confirmed to return a real frame, so frame URLs are checked against a small host allowlist (`mct.gencat.cat`, `www.bcn.cat`, `emap.terrassa.cat`) rather than one pinned origin (a link carrying `user:pass@` userinfo is rejected even on an allowed host), and every non-SCT camera carries its real owner as a `credit` shown beside the shared `provider`. The feed carries no compass heading, so every camera loads at low heading confidence (same as TfL and Fintraffic). SCT's own feed link (`RenderService`) needed a workaround: it always 302s to a second endpoint (`TransitCamera`) on a Location the upstream hardcodes as plain http even when requested over https — refused by `fetchWithinHost`'s same-origin (scheme-included) redirect policy — and separately, `mct.gencat.cat`'s TLS setup fails the handshake with Node's fetch outright (`ERR_SSL_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE`) even though other HTTP clients complete it. The loader therefore builds the `TransitCamera` URL itself, over plain http, from `RenderService`'s `sctidcam` id, rather than registering the (broken) upstream link — the only transport this one host actually serves to this runtime. The feed carries no camera status field, so a camera its publisher has taken offline still registers and shows the publisher's own "image unavailable" still (SCT and Barcelona both serve one with HTTP 200), the same as other packs without a status field. Frames are fetched at request time and never stored or redistributed. Disable with `CCTV_CATALONIA_ENABLED=0`.
+- **Catalonia (Servei Català de Trànsit) cameras.** The camera list is the keyless `https://www.gencat.cat/transit/opendata/cameres.xml` WFS/GML feed, fetched over https with redirects refused and the body read capped at 1 MiB, since the list decides ids, coordinates and which allowlisted frame path is proxied. It carries a `font` field naming the real publisher per camera; this pack keeps SCT's own highway cameras plus hotlinked Barcelona (IMI) and Terrassa municipal cameras (~130 total), each confirmed to return a real frame, so frame URLs are checked against a small host allowlist (`mct.gencat.cat`, `www.bcn.cat`, `emap.terrassa.cat`) rather than one pinned origin (a link carrying `user:pass@` userinfo or an explicit port, or pointing outside that host's frame directory, is rejected even on an allowed host; an SCT `sctidcam` must be a bare `.gif`/`.jpg` filename), and every non-SCT camera carries its real owner as a `credit` shown beside the shared `provider`. The feed carries no compass heading, so every camera loads at low heading confidence (same as TfL and Fintraffic). SCT's own feed link (`RenderService`) needed a workaround: it always 302s to a second endpoint (`TransitCamera`) on a Location the upstream hardcodes as plain http even when requested over https — refused by `fetchWithinHost`'s same-origin (scheme-included) redirect policy — and separately, `mct.gencat.cat`'s TLS setup fails the handshake with Node's fetch outright (`ERR_SSL_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE`) even though other HTTP clients complete it. The loader therefore builds the `TransitCamera` URL itself, over plain http, from `RenderService`'s `sctidcam` id, rather than registering the (broken) upstream link — the only transport this one host actually serves to this runtime. Camera ids are built from the SCT camera file or the partner image path, not the feed's `fid` (which embeds an upstream server-start stamp and changes on every upstream restart), and rows the feed lists more than once collapse to one camera. The feed carries no camera status field, so a camera its publisher has taken offline still registers and shows the publisher's own "image unavailable" still (SCT and Barcelona both serve one with HTTP 200), the same as other packs without a status field. Frames are fetched at request time and never stored or redistributed. The feed itself states no licence; the pack relies on the Generalitat de Catalunya open-data portal's terms for this dataset (the licence and attribution above). Disable with `CCTV_CATALONIA_ENABLED=0`.
 - **Statens vegvesen road cameras.** Keyless. The camera list is one GeoJSON request to the OGC API Features view of the official DATEX 3.1 CCTV site table (`ogckart-sn1.atlas.vegvesen.no/ogc/features/v1/collections/datex_3_1:CctvSimple/items`), so no DATEX account is needed; frames are stills on `kamera.atlas.vegvesen.no/api/images/<cameraId>`, and only that exact path per camera is registered. Cameras the feed reports as faulty are dropped. About 135 working cameras also publish live HLS (`kamera.vegvesen.no/public/<cameraId>/manifest.m3u8`, MPEG-TS); those play as live video through the bounded in-memory HLS relay, with the still as the snapshot fallback, and only that exact manifest path per camera is registered. `CCTV_VEGVESEN_VIDEO=0` keeps every camera on stills. `orientationDescription` names the place a camera faces, not a bearing, so it goes into the label and headings use the id-hash fallback at low confidence. By default every live camera loads (~850); `CCTV_VEGVESEN_MAX_SOURCES` (8–1000) lowers the cap, keeping the cameras nearest Oslo, Bergen, Stavanger, Trondheim, Kristiansand, Bodø and Tromsø and `CCTV_VEGVESEN_ENABLED=0` turns the pack off. Frames are fetched at request time and never stored or redistributed. The NLOD attribution is registered in the Data attribution popover.
 - **NYC DOT Traffic Management Center cameras.** Off by default. NYC DOT's [developer data feeds page](https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/about/datafeeds.shtml) asks developers who want the camera feed to contact `[email protected]` and sign a data-sharing agreement. This project does not hold one that covers downstream installations, so the pack loads only when an operator who holds their own agreement sets `CCTV_NYC_ENABLED=1`; with the flag unset, empty or any other value, the server makes no request to NYC DOT. The endpoint needs no key. The camera list is the public `webcams.nyctmc.org/api/cameras` catalog (~980 cameras across the five boroughs); frames are stills at `webcams.nyctmc.org/api/cameras/<uuid>/image`, synthesized from a validated UUID rather than taken from the payload, and only that host is registered. Cameras the feed reports as offline are dropped. The catalog publishes no camera facing, so headings use the shared id-hash fallback at low confidence and are corrected with the in-app calibration gizmo. Once enabled, the 250 cameras nearest the borough cores load; `CCTV_NYC_MAX_SOURCES` (8–400) changes the cap. Frames are fetched at request time and never stored or redistributed. NYC DOT asks every application that uses its data to carry its disclaimer; it is registered verbatim in the Data attribution popover.
 - **Camera frame content.** Public camera frames can contain people, vehicles and license plates, and the camera layer does nothing with them beyond putting them on the map. A successful upstream response is relayed as the provider served it: nothing in the camera pipeline blurs, redacts, enhances or restores it, and nothing there runs face, plate or object detection or otherwise recognises or classifies what is in the picture. (The ALPR layer described below maps where plate-reader cameras are, from locations contributors tagged in OpenStreetMap; it reads nothing from any camera frame.) When an upstream has no frame for a camera, what you see instead is a Google Street View still or the app's own placeholder card; the panel's source badge names which of them you are looking at, and a refresh that fails after a frame has arrived leaves the last good picture on screen rather than replacing it. The browser resamples each frame for display: onto a fixed 1920x1080 surface for the camera's projection plane in the scene, and onto a 192x108 canvas for the small ambient card. That scaling is the only change made to the picture, and the only pixels the camera layer reads back are a 64x36 downscale hashed to tell whether the picture has changed. Live streams are piped through; the still path reads the image into memory to pass it on — TxDOT wraps its JPEG in a JSON envelope, which is decoded there — and no frame is written to disk (the disk cache, `.gev-cache/`, holds feed JSON for other layers and never camera imagery). Outside that pipeline, the voice assistant is the one feature that sends imagery anywhere: when it answers a question about what is in view it may attach a downscaled screenshot of the rendered scene — including any camera plane on screen — to the request it sends to the voice model. Frames are fetched only from server-registered camera URLs — a client cannot hand the proxy a URL (see [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md)). What the app does stays inside the line README draws: no named-person search, no face recognition, no tracking individuals.