merge main a16eb07 into feat/voice-outlines

DATA_SOURCES.md

@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ How to read this:
 | **Kartverket** (`ws.geonorge.no/hoydedata/v1/punkt`)               | Terrain heights (NN2000) used as the ground prior for Statens vegvesen cameras                                                     | [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) — attribution REQUIRED | "© Kartverket", modified (heights over water set to 0 m, rounded to 0.1 m) |
 | **NYC DOT Traffic Management Center** (`webcams.nyctmc.org`) | CCTV camera catalog + frames, New York City five boroughs | NYC DOT requires developers to sign a [data-sharing agreement](https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/about/datafeeds.shtml) for the camera feed. **Off by default**; enable only under your own agreement | "NYC DOT Traffic Management Center" + NYC DOT's required application disclaimer (in the Data attribution popover) |
 | **City of Toronto Open Data** (`opendata.toronto.ca`)                 | CCTV camera catalog + frames, Toronto city streets                                                                                  | [Open Government Licence – Toronto](https://www.toronto.ca/city-government/data-research-maps/open-data/open-data-licence/) — attribution REQUIRED                                                                                                                                                                                                    | "Contains information licensed under the Open Government Licence – Toronto"                                                                 |
+| **Autostrada del Brennero (A22)** (catalog `tourism.api.opendatahub.com`, frames `www.autobrennero.it/WebCamImg/`) | CCTV camera catalog + frames, A22 Brenner–Modena motorway, Italy | Public Autobrennero webcam images; camera list republished by the Open Data Hub, whose records are tagged CC0 (`ClosedData: false`, licence holder Autobrennero); Autobrennero publishes no terms of its own for the images | "Webcam images © Autostrada del Brennero S.p.A., via the Open Data Hub (NOI Techpark)" (courtesy) |
 | **GBFS (Lyft / BCycle / Social Bicycles / PBSC)**                     | Bikeshare availability                                                                                                              | Per-feed (attribution-only)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | Credit the operator (e.g. Austin BCycle) + its `license_url`                                                                                                   |
 | **Bike Share Toronto** (`toronto.publicbikesystem.net`) | Bikeshare station availability, Toronto | Operator GBFS feed. No licence is published: the City's open-data package declares none and the feed has no `license_url`. Attribution is given to the operator. | "Bike Share Toronto (Toronto Parking Authority)" |
 | **Bike Itaú / Tembici** (`*.publicbikesystem.net`, seven Brazilian cities, Santiago and Bogotá) | Bikeshare station availability: São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, Recife, Porto Alegre, Brasília, Curitiba, Santiago de Chile and Bogotá | Operator GBFS feeds. No licence is published: the feeds' `system_information.json` carries no `license_url`, operator or attribution fields. Attribution is given to the operator. | "Bike Itaú (Tembici)"; "Tembici Bogotá" |
@@ -176,6 +177,7 @@ The optional Local ADS-B layer and the broadcast-FM receiver use radio you recei
 - **Kartverket ground heights for Statens vegvesen cameras.** The camera feed's points are 2D, so the loader asks Kartverket's keyless point-height API (`ws.geonorge.no/hoydedata/v1/punkt`, CC BY 4.0) for the terrain height at each camera. Requests carry 20 points: the API accepts 50, but above ~20 it answers the extra points from contour lines (`hoydekurver`, metres to ~20 m off) or not at all. Eight requests run at a time, about 36 for the whole country: a cold lookup took 6–13 s in testing (single requests 0.6–9.5 s). Answers are matched by the coordinates the API echoes and recorded only for points that request asked about. Over water the API returns the sea-floor depth (`dybdekurver` or `Havflate`), which is replaced by 0 m, the water surface; for the ~14 bridge cameras that is below the deck, but much closer than the sea floor or the flat prior. Heights are cached in memory by position for the life of the server, and points with no height (a few ferry quays and bridges, or a point a 200 answer leaves out) for 6 h, so the 15-minute catalog refresh only asks about new or moved cameras. The first failing request (a 408, 429 or 5xx, a network error, a request over 10 s, or an unreadable or oversized body) stops the lookup, with no retries, and no new lookup starts until the backoff ends (Retry-After when sent, else 30 min, longer than the refresh; bounded to 1 min–1 h). Any other 4xx marks that request's points as having no height and the lookup carries on. The whole lookup has a 30 s deadline; a lookup cut short by it resumes on the next refresh without a backoff. The lane waits at most 12 s, counted from the start of the loader, and only when more than 10% of the cameras have no answer yet; a few new cameras or expired misses are looked up in the background. A slower lookup keeps filling the cache, and the cameras it had not reached keep the flat prior until the next 15-minute refresh (about 190 of 865 on one slow first run). Only coordinates are sent, with the same User-Agent as the other CCTV requests. `CCTV_VEGVESEN_HEIGHTS=0` turns the lookup off. The Kartverket credit, with a note that heights over water are set to 0 m and heights are rounded to 0.1 m, is shown beside the Statens vegvesen entry in the Data attribution popover.
 - **NYC DOT Traffic Management Center cameras.** Off by default. NYC DOT's [developer data feeds page](https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/about/datafeeds.shtml) asks developers who want the camera feed to contact `[email protected]` and sign a data-sharing agreement. This project does not hold one that covers downstream installations, so the pack loads only when an operator who holds their own agreement sets `CCTV_NYC_ENABLED=1`; with the flag unset, empty or any other value, the server makes no request to NYC DOT. The endpoint needs no key. The camera list is the public `webcams.nyctmc.org/api/cameras` catalog (~980 cameras across the five boroughs); frames are stills at `webcams.nyctmc.org/api/cameras/<uuid>/image`, synthesized from a validated UUID rather than taken from the payload, and only that host is registered. Cameras the feed reports as offline are dropped. The catalog publishes no camera facing, so headings use the shared id-hash fallback at low confidence and are corrected with the in-app calibration gizmo. Once enabled, the 250 cameras nearest the borough cores load; `CCTV_NYC_MAX_SOURCES` (8–400) changes the cap. Frames are fetched at request time and never stored or redistributed. NYC DOT asks every application that uses its data to carry its disclaimer; it is registered verbatim in the Data attribution popover.
 - **City of Toronto RESCU cameras.** Keyless. The camera list is the City's public `tmcearthcameras.json` on `opendata.toronto.ca` (dataset "Traffic Cameras", Transportation Services), served as JSONP and unwrapped with an anchored pattern. This is the municipal network the Ontario 511 pack does not carry: downtown arterials plus the Gardiner, DVP, Allen and Lake Shore. The list publishes no frame URL, so frame URLs are BUILT from the documented `CameraImages/loc####.jpg` convention and a strictly-digits camera number, pinning the frame proxy to the portal origin by construction; the list fetch refuses redirects and bounds the body it buffers. Frames are fetched at request time and never stored or redistributed. The dataset publishes no camera facing: the `D1`-`D4` fields are the directions of the *comparison* images (static reference stills captured in 2016 under a different path), not a bearing for the live pan-tilt-zoom frame, so headings use the shared id-hash fallback at low confidence and are corrected with the in-app calibration gizmo. A camera that is temporarily out of service still answers 200 with a byte-identical "Image Unavailable" placeholder rather than an error (about 6% of the network at any moment), so such a camera reads as healthy; the frame it shows is the agency's, not a synthesized one. The licence requires the attribution statement above. Disable with `CCTV_TORONTO_ENABLED=0`.
+- **Autostrada del Brennero (A22) webcams.** Keyless. The camera list is one request to the Open Data Hub tourism API (`tourism.api.opendatahub.com/v1/WebcamInfo?source=a22`), run by NOI Techpark in South Tyrol, which republishes Autobrennero's own list of 13 motorway webcams with coordinates and kilometre markers. Frames are the operator's stills on `www.autobrennero.it/WebCamImg/km<N>.jpg`, refreshed about once a minute, and only the exact image for each camera's kilometre is registered. The feed names no bearing, so headings use the id-hash fallback at low confidence. The road climbs from about 20 m in the Po valley to about 1,370 m at the Brenner Pass, so each camera's ground elevation comes from a per-kilometre table sampled from the Copernicus GLO-90 DEM (via Open-Meteo's elevation API); a camera not in the table uses a 200 m prior. The Open Data Hub tags every record CC0 (`ClosedData: false`, Autobrennero as licence holder), but that tag is the aggregator's metadata and Autobrennero publishes no terms of its own for the images, so they are credited to the operator as a courtesy and are not redistributed. Frames are fetched at request time and never stored. Disable with `CCTV_A22_ENABLED=0`.
 - **Camera frame content.** Public camera frames can contain people, vehicles and license plates, and the camera layer does nothing with them beyond putting them on the map. A successful upstream response is relayed as the provider served it: nothing in the camera pipeline blurs, redacts, enhances or restores it, and nothing there runs face, plate or object detection or otherwise recognises or classifies what is in the picture. (The ALPR layer described below maps where plate-reader cameras are, from locations contributors tagged in OpenStreetMap; it reads nothing from any camera frame.) When an upstream has no frame for a camera, what you see instead is a Google Street View still or the app's own placeholder card; the panel's source badge names which of them you are looking at, and a refresh that fails after a frame has arrived leaves the last good picture on screen rather than replacing it. The browser resamples each frame for display: onto a fixed 1920x1080 surface for the camera's projection plane in the scene, and onto a 192x108 canvas for the small ambient card. That scaling is the only change made to the picture, and the only pixels the camera layer reads back are a 64x36 downscale hashed to tell whether the picture has changed. Live streams are piped through; the still path reads the image into memory to pass it on — TxDOT wraps its JPEG in a JSON envelope, which is decoded there — and no frame is written to disk (the disk cache, `.gev-cache/`, holds feed JSON for other layers and never camera imagery). Outside that pipeline, the voice assistant is the one feature that sends imagery anywhere: when it answers a question about what is in view it may attach a downscaled screenshot of the rendered scene — including any camera plane on screen — to the request it sends to the voice model. Frames are fetched only from server-registered camera URLs — a client cannot hand the proxy a URL (see [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md)). What the app does stays inside the line README draws: no named-person search, no face recognition, no tracking individuals.
 - **Transit (GTFS-Realtime).** The proxy requests only registered operator feeds, validates redirects, bounds responses, and uses conditional requests, short snapshot caching and failure backoff. All sixteen registered regions are live-enabled; each can be disabled independently. Vehicles use delayed playback between reports, with report age and waiting states shown separately. Session-local selected trails are available for every feed. MBTA additionally retains up to 15 minutes of recently observed positions in the running proxy, so available history can survive a browser reload; server restart clears it. History reads never fetch upstream, and other feeds have no proxy retention. Nothing is archived to disk or collected in the background. Operator text credits are included as a courtesy and do not imply endorsement. Heights are aligned to work with Google 3D tiles; subway markers are shown at street level because these feeds do not supply depth. The TTC feed is BusTime, the surface system: it carries buses and streetcars and no subway at all. About four in ten of its vehicles report no route at all (unassigned or deadheading), and those are shown with the feed default rather than a route-established mode. It sends no ETag or Last-Modified, so its conditional requests fall through to the ordinary snapshot cache. Three Golden Horseshoe neighbours run alongside it — MiWay, Hamilton HSR and Durham Region Transit — each bus-only and each polled only near its own region. Durham Region Transit publishes no bearing on any vehicle, so those sprites take their heading from observed movement like any other feed that omits it. Guelph, Kingston and Barrie extend the same pattern eastward and north. Hamilton, Guelph, Burlington and YRT publish route ids that are not the number on the vehicle, so those entries carry a route-name table taken from each operator’s own published GTFS; any id missing from a table renders unchanged rather than blank. A label is never invented: YRT runs a route `9101` that appears nowhere in its published routes, so it stays as the feed sends it. Burlington’s is the one that cannot be shortcut: `351` is route 1 while `3510` is route 10, so the table is a real join rather than a trimmed prefix. GO Transit / Metrolinx is deliberately absent: its REALTIME feed requires an API key issued by manual review, which the keyless admission rule excludes (its static schedule download is keyless, but carries no vehicle positions). Barrie and YRT/Viva each invite acceptance of their licence through a form, and each licence also states that using the data is itself acceptance; this deployment relies on that clause, which is recorded in both entries. Grand River Transit in Waterloo is absent for a different reason: it answers, but its feed header was months stale and it publishes no per-vehicle timestamps, so it would render vehicles that look live and are not. Ottawa’s OC Transpo falls to the same keyless admission rule as GO Transit — its realtime feed requires an API key. London Transit and Thunder Bay Transit publish vehicle positions over plain HTTP with no HTTPS endpoint available. Every other Ontario system — Brampton, Oakville, Niagara, Milton, Windsor, Greater Sudbury, UP Express and a dozen smaller operators — publishes static GTFS schedules only, with no realtime vehicle positions to register. Between the nine included and these exclusions, every Ontario realtime vehicle-position feed catalogued in the Mobility Database is accounted for.
 - **Radio Browser.** `/api/radio/stations` discovers official API mirrors, makes bounded and coalesced healthy/geolocated HTTPS-station queries, caches the normalized public-domain directory for 45 minutes, and may serve the last good catalog for up to seven days during an outage. Refreshes must meet minimum accepted-query and station coverage before replacing a warm catalog; schema-valid responses whose rows all fail the product's health policy do not count as successful queries. A usable partial cold catalog is explicitly `DEGRADED`, and non-array or empty successful payloads are rejected atomically. Individual structurally malformed rows are skipped rather than failing the whole query; the response carries their bounded `rejectedStationCount` (at most 10,000), which the client adds to its own rejected rows and reports as degraded coverage without discarding the accepted generation. Every directory and click-count request rejects redirects, validates all resolved addresses as globally routable (including reserved/documentation IPv4 and special/non-global IPv6 exclusions), and pins the TLS connection to a validated address. Only MP3/AAC non-HLS directory rows with public HTTPS stream targets are returned; favicons are intentionally omitted. Pressing play connects one browser audio element directly to the selected broadcaster and calls the directory's click counter through known-ID-only `POST /api/radio/click/:uuid`. GEV never proxies, caches, records, bundles, or redistributes audio. Radio Browser supplies station-level tags, not dependable current-song or upcoming-program metadata, so Radio filtering never claims either. Direct playback exposes the listener's IP address to the broadcaster, whose own stream terms apply.