diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index 8ee00d839..98d32365f 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -1,26 +1,10 @@ # Changelog -- Local FM seek finds stations after wrapping around 87.5–108 MHz, covers both - band edges, skips the starting station and rejects spectra from an earlier - tune (Aditya, @Rohilalala, #1174). -- Local RTL-SDR keeps USB reads queued in order and bounds pending decoder - work. A stalled or overloaded decoder stops with an explicit error; stopping - terminates its worker and rejects late audio. FM playback buffers short - scheduling gaps, caps its audio queue at 256 ms, and reduces display updates - and spectrum calculations while listening. - -- Add Bogotá (Tembici, 250 stations) and Santiago de Chile (Bike Itaú, 200 - stations) to the GBFS bikeshare registry, the layer's first stations in - Colombia and Chile. Both are PBSC feeds like the Brazilian Bike Itaú cities, - so no proxy change is needed. Both feeds also list depot stations on other - continents (São Paulo, Madrid) as in service; stations outside a city's load - radius are now dropped instead of drawn as live docks. - -- Add Barcelona's bike share to the GBFS registry: Bicing (543 stations, the - city's PBSC system) and AMBici (237 e-bike stations across the metropolitan - area, run by nextbike). Both are keyless GBFS 2.3 feeds listed in - MobilityData's systems catalogue; AMBici's is CC0. `gbfs.nextbike.net` joins - the proxy allowlist. These are the layer's first stations in Spain. +- The tracked-aircraft descriptor now publishes `verticalRateMps`, on both the + civil and military layers, so a consumer reading `getTrackedInfo()` no longer + has to reach past it into the raw poll record for climb/descent. Reported, + never derived: an aircraft that has not transmitted a rate reads as `null` + rather than a level-flight `0`. - Add nine Ontario transit feeds: TTC, MiWay, Hamilton HSR, Durham Region, YRT/Viva, Guelph, Burlington, Barrie and Kingston, each carrying its own diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md index cc3f27cfe..e53883548 100644 --- a/SECURITY.md +++ b/SECURITY.md @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ The data proxies under `server/providers/` are written so the browser cannot tur - **Sanitized errors** — internal error details are not echoed back to clients. - **Coalesced OAuth refresh** and cached successful responses only (OpenSky). - **Redacted debug logging.** The voice debug log (`.gev-logs/`, gitignored) strips API keys, bearer tokens, client secrets, and image data URLs before writing. -- **Cross-site gate on cost/log endpoints.** The cost-bearing (`/api/realtime/token`, `/api/openai/hud-summary`, `/api/google/nearby-places`, `/api/google/text-search`), quota-bearing (`/api/mapillary/*`, with a per-IP limit on tiles) and log (`/api/realtime/debug-log`) endpoints refuse cross-site browser requests: a foreign or opaque `Origin`, a `Sec-Fetch-Site` other than `same-origin`/`none` (this is what blocks an ``/navigation that carries no `Origin`), or any reverse-proxy/CDN forwarding header returns `403`. Non-browser loopback tools (the repo QA harnesses POST the token endpoint with no `Origin`) and the explicit `HOST=0.0.0.0` LAN opt-in keep working — the gate deliberately does not require a loopback remote address; that stricter requirement belongs only to the credential panel (`admitKeySetupRequest`). The Host check (`allowedHosts`, applied by `hostCheckPlugin` ahead of every route, since Vite's own check runs only after plugin middleware) rejects a rebinding `Host` before any handler runs, in every mode, and the gate is defense in depth behind it: the LAN opt-in keeps that check and accepts only IP addresses, `localhost` and names listed in `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS`. **Limit:** a name you list there is trusted like the app's own address, so list only names you control. +- **Cross-site gate on cost/log endpoints.** The cost-bearing (`/api/realtime/token`, `/api/openai/hud-summary`, `/api/google/nearby-places`, `/api/google/text-search`), quota-bearing (`/api/mapillary/*`, with a per-IP limit on tiles, and `/api/tomtom/*`, backed by its persistent daily tile budget) and log (`/api/realtime/debug-log`) endpoints refuse cross-site browser requests: a foreign or opaque `Origin`, a `Sec-Fetch-Site` other than `same-origin`/`none` (this is what blocks an ``/navigation that carries no `Origin`), or any reverse-proxy/CDN forwarding header returns `403`. Non-browser loopback tools (the repo QA harnesses POST the token endpoint with no `Origin`) and the explicit `HOST=0.0.0.0` LAN opt-in keep working — the gate deliberately does not require a loopback remote address; that stricter requirement belongs only to the credential panel (`admitKeySetupRequest`). The Host check (`allowedHosts`, applied by `hostCheckPlugin` ahead of every route, since Vite's own check runs only after plugin middleware) rejects a rebinding `Host` before any handler runs, in every mode, and the gate is defense in depth behind it: the LAN opt-in keeps that check and accepts only IP addresses, `localhost` and names listed in `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS`. **Limit:** a name you list there is trusted like the app's own address, so list only names you control. - **Full Content-Security-Policy.** The dev and preview servers send a real CSP (`script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' blob:` plus the YouTube, Facebook and X scripts the Nepal event's embedded media loads and the Maps JavaScript API that Street View runs on, with a matching `frame-src` for their players and posts: no inline script and no other script origin; `blob:` covers the object URLs Cesium's bundled workers bootstrap through in the built app), alongside the existing `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and `frame-ancestors 'none'`. `'unsafe-eval'` stays because Knockout, bundled inside Cesium's widgets package, resolves the global object with `eval` at load time and the globe does not initialize without it; styles permit `'unsafe-inline'` and Google Fonts because Vite's dev client injects `