feat(street-level): Google Street View as the second imagery provider

Google Street View registers beside Mapillary as provider `google`. It runs
on the Maps JavaScript API with the browser GOOGLE_MAPS_API_KEY, loaded on
first use (mapsLoader.js), and uses Google's own StreetViewPanorama as its
viewer adapter, emitting provider-neutral poses (address and month in the
caption, a link to Google Maps, steps along Google's arrows, FOLLOW on
Google 3D). Its chip starts off because every panorama is billed to the
key; the share option is `g`.

Google offers no coverage layer for other maps, so the provider draws
none: with it on, a click on bare ground at street zoom opens its nearest
Google-collected outdoor panorama (groundClick.js). A key Google refuses
reads KEY REJECTED and fails a pending open at once; a lookup Google never
answers fails after 10 s.

Core: providers may declare `groundClick` and `defaultOn`; poses may carry
`capturedAtPrecision` and `title`; the coverage line keeps every
provider's hint; opening one provider's image releases another's
prewarmed viewer; FIT/FILL hides for viewers without render modes. CSP
script-src admits https://maps.googleapis.com. The browser gate gains two
Street View steps (the keyed one skips as 'no Google key' in CI).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>

SECURITY.md

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ The golden rule: **secret-bearing API keys stay on the server side.** The dev/pr
 
 These are designed to be used directly in the browser (like a Mapbox public token). They are injected into the client bundle via Vite's `define`, so they **will** be visible in browser devtools. Scope and restrict them rather than trying to hide them:
 
-1. **Google Maps API key** — loads Photorealistic 3D Tiles directly and powers GEV place search. **Restrict it** (HTTP referrer + API restriction to the required Google APIs) in the Google Cloud Console. An unrestricted key in a public deployment can be abused and billed to you.
+1. **Google Maps API key** — loads Photorealistic 3D Tiles directly and powers GEV place search and Street View (Maps JavaScript API). **Restrict it** (HTTP referrer + API restriction to the required Google APIs) in the Google Cloud Console. An unrestricted key in a public deployment can be abused and billed to you.
 2. **Cesium ion token** (`CESIUM_ION_TOKEN`, optional — for ion-hosted Google Photorealistic 3D Tiles, Bing world imagery, and world terrain) — used as `Cesium.Ion.defaultAccessToken` client-side. Use a public **`assets:read`** token with **URL restrictions** for any hosted deployment. The Community plan has eligibility and usage limits; a public token is not a secret, but it can still consume the account's quota.
 3. **Mapillary client token** (`MAPILLARY_CLIENT_TOKEN`, optional, Street Level) — used by the MapillaryJS viewer and Graph API lookups in the browser, and by the server's coverage-tile proxy. Mapillary client tokens are meant for browser use.
 
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ The data proxies under `server/providers/` are written so the browser cannot tur
 - **Coalesced OAuth refresh** and cached successful responses only (OpenSky).
 - **Redacted debug logging.** The voice debug log (`.gev-logs/`, gitignored) strips API keys, bearer tokens, client secrets, and image data URLs before writing.
 - **Cross-site gate on cost/log endpoints.** The cost-bearing (`/api/realtime/token`, `/api/openai/hud-summary`, `/api/google/nearby-places`, `/api/google/text-search`), quota-bearing (`/api/mapillary/*`, with a per-IP limit on tiles) and log (`/api/realtime/debug-log`) endpoints refuse cross-site browser requests: a foreign or opaque `Origin`, a `Sec-Fetch-Site` other than `same-origin`/`none` (this is what blocks an `<img>`/navigation that carries no `Origin`), or any reverse-proxy/CDN forwarding header returns `403`. Non-browser loopback tools (the repo QA harnesses POST the token endpoint with no `Origin`) and the explicit `HOST=0.0.0.0` LAN opt-in keep working — the gate deliberately does not require a loopback remote address; that stricter requirement belongs only to the credential panel (`admitKeySetupRequest`). The Host check (`allowedHosts`, applied by `hostCheckPlugin` ahead of every route, since Vite's own check runs only after plugin middleware) rejects a rebinding `Host` before any handler runs, in every mode, and the gate is defense in depth behind it: the LAN opt-in keeps that check and accepts only IP addresses, `localhost` and names listed in `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS`. **Limit:** a name you list there is trusted like the app's own address, so list only names you control.
-- **Full Content-Security-Policy.** The dev and preview servers send a real CSP (`script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' blob:` plus the YouTube, Facebook and X scripts the Nepal event's embedded media loads, with a matching `frame-src` for their players and posts: no inline script and no other script origin; `blob:` covers the object URLs Cesium's bundled workers bootstrap through in the built app), alongside the existing `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and `frame-ancestors 'none'`. `'unsafe-eval'` stays because Knockout, bundled inside Cesium's widgets package, resolves the global object with `eval` at load time and the globe does not initialize without it; styles permit `'unsafe-inline'` and Google Fonts because Vite's dev client injects `<style>` elements.
+- **Full Content-Security-Policy.** The dev and preview servers send a real CSP (`script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' blob:` plus the YouTube, Facebook and X scripts the Nepal event's embedded media loads and the Maps JavaScript API that Street View runs on, with a matching `frame-src` for their players and posts: no inline script and no other script origin; `blob:` covers the object URLs Cesium's bundled workers bootstrap through in the built app), alongside the existing `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and `frame-ancestors 'none'`. `'unsafe-eval'` stays because Knockout, bundled inside Cesium's widgets package, resolves the global object with `eval` at load time and the globe does not initialize without it; styles permit `'unsafe-inline'` and Google Fonts because Vite's dev client injects `<style>` elements.
 
 ## Network exposure — the operator threat model