LIVE loads YouTube only after Play, and stops when its view is hidden

Selecting a station no longer builds the player: the LIVE section and the
Cockpit's LIVE page show a poster with Play under the line that YouTube sees
the viewer's IP address, as SECURITY.md asks of third-party media. The player
goes when the section collapses, Context collapses or closes, the Cockpit
leaves its LIVE page, or the Cockpit is entered or left, so nothing plays
unseen. A selection that moves straight on to another entry of the same
station (the Cockpit stepping between views) keeps the player instead of
rebuilding it. SECURITY.md also lists the ISS telemetry relay.
This commit is contained in:
Denis Groshev committed 2026-11-17 16:25:04 +01:00
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@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ The data proxies under `server/providers/` are written so the browser cannot tur
- **Live HLS is bounded and origin-pinned.** Registered HTTP(S) HLS sources use a Node puller that rejects redirects and off-origin playlist references, bounds playlists to 256 KiB and segment bodies to 8 MiB while streaming, and aborts timed-out or released sessions. At most two sessions retain 12 segments/24 MiB each, plus bounded download buffers. Stores are memory-only and idle sessions expire after 15 seconds. RTMP/ffmpeg execution is not enabled. Locally configured source URLs remain an operator trust boundary.
- **Radio is not an audio relay.** `/api/radio/stations` contacts only allowlisted Radio Browser HTTPS hosts and paths, rejects redirects, rejects any hostname with a loopback/private/link-local/metadata/non-public A or AAAA result, and pins each TLS connection to a validated address. It returns normalized public HTTPS stream URLs; `/api/radio/click/:uuid` applies the same destination policy and accepts only station IDs from the current bounded catalog. The browser then connects directly to the broadcaster after an explicit playback action, so the broadcaster sees the listener's IP address. GEV never proxies, caches, records, or redistributes audio.
- **Québec 511 video plays in the browser, opt-in and after Play.** With `CCTV_QUEBEC_VIDEO_ENABLED=1`, `/api/cctv/sources` lists, for each MTQ camera, one URL built server-side from its numeric id on `https://www.quebec511.info/Carte/Fenetres/camera.ashx`; the overlay accepts no other host, path or format. The browser loads that clip only after the viewer presses Play for the selected camera, so Québec 511 sees the viewer's IP address, and the panel says so before Play. Selecting a camera by click, auto-hop, a scene or voice never loads it, and switching cameras stops playback. GEV never proxies, caches or reads the video's pixels. With the flag unset (the default) the browser makes no request to Québec 511.
- **Station live video plays only after Play.** The LIVE section of Context and the Cockpit briefing's LIVE page load YouTube's player (the IFrame API from `www.youtube.com`, the video on `www.youtube-nocookie.com`) only after the viewer presses Play, under a line saying that YouTube sees their IP address. Selecting a station by click, a share link that follows it, a scene or voice shows the poster and loads nothing. The player goes when the section is collapsed, Context is closed or collapsed, the Cockpit leaves its LIVE page, the Cockpit is entered or left, or the selection moves to an object without that stream. GEV never proxies, caches or reads the video's pixels.
- **The ISS telemetry relay is opt-in, keyless and read-only.** With `ISS_TELEMETRY_ENABLED=1`, `/api/iss-telemetry` answers from one shared WebSocket the server opens to NASA's public ISSLive feed (`wss://push.lightstreamer.com`), only while a browser has asked in the last two minutes; every byte from the feed is parsed as untrusted text, frames over 64 KB are dropped, and only the listed joint and clock items are kept. The route uses the keyless same-site checks and a per-client rate limit; with the flag unset (the default) it answers `{ configured: false }` and the server opens no socket.
- **No verbatim client headers upstream.** The CCTV media route is the one route that relays a request header (`Range`, for video seeking). It is parsed and canonicalized before it is forwarded: one `bytes=` range only, with every accepted form — explicit span, open-ended and suffix — bounded to the same 64 MiB ceiling the relay applies to a declared response body. Multi-range, malformed, inverted and non-`bytes` values are dropped and the request proceeds without a `Range`, as RFC 7233 §3.1 prescribes. Bounding the request bounds what is asked for: a response that declares no length — live streamed media, or a chunked body from an upstream that ignores the `Range` — has no ceiling. An upstream request the browser has stopped waiting for is cancelled rather than left running, whether the viewer leaves before the headers arrive or during the body.
- **The Data Library proxy fetches manifest upstreams only.** `/api/library/data/<id>`, `/api/library/tile/<id>/<z>/<x>/<y>` and `/api/library/index/<id>` (a partitioned GeoParquet entry's file index, built from an S3 ListObjectsV2 listing and one ranged footer read per file, cached in memory for the entry's `cacheSeconds`) resolve the id against the validated manifests in `src/library/entries/`; the browser never supplies a URL, and every derived request must stay on the manifest's https host. Redirects are refused, dataset bodies are capped while streaming at the manifest's `maxBytes` (at most 32 MiB) and tiles at 2 MiB of `image/png`, `image/jpeg` or `image/webp`, responses are cached in memory only (at most 512 tiles), requests are rate-limited per client, and upstream error text is never returned. A keyed entry must be proxied; its key is read from this server's environment through the key registry and its routes refuse cross-site and forwarded requests like the other cost-bearing routes. Browser-direct entries are fetched by the browser with no cookies or referrer.
- **Transit fetches registered feeds only.** `/api/transit/vehicles/<id>` resolves the id against `src/data/transitFeeds.js`; the browser never supplies a URL, and a feed that is registered but disabled does not resolve at all. Redirects are followed manually and each hop is validated against the feed's own https origin before it is requested, so an off-origin or downgraded hop is refused rather than contacted. Bodies are capped at 8 MB, the protobuf is decoded server-side under entity-count and string-length ceilings, a differential feed is refused, and snapshots live 15 s in memory with no disk cache. A per-feed admission limiter and a failure cooldown ladder bound what this process can ask of any operator.