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Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into fix/cctv-streetview-fallback-catalog
# Conflicts: # SECURITY.md
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@@ -69,19 +69,22 @@ browser-key fallback for existing single-key setups.
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The data proxies under `server/providers/` are written so the browser cannot turn the server into an open relay:
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- **No arbitrary-URL fetching.** The CCTV frame proxy fetches only server-registered camera/frame URLs — clients cannot pass an upstream URL to fetch (SSRF mitigation). The key-bearing Street View fallback likewise answers only for a registered camera, always at its catalog position: a request sets only the view direction, field of view (20–120°) and pitch (−40–20°), so it cannot buy Street View of a place of its choosing. Other proxies target fixed upstream hosts.
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- **Live HLS is bounded and origin-pinned.** Registered HTTP(S) HLS sources use a Node puller that rejects redirects and off-origin playlist references, bounds playlists and segment bodies while streaming, and aborts timed-out or released sessions. At most two sessions retain 12 segments/24 MiB each, plus bounded download buffers. Stores are memory-only and idle sessions expire after 15 seconds. RTMP/ffmpeg execution is not enabled. Locally configured source URLs remain an operator trust boundary.
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- **Live HLS is bounded and origin-pinned.** Registered HTTP(S) HLS sources use a Node puller that rejects redirects and off-origin playlist references, bounds playlists to 256 KiB and segment bodies to 8 MiB while streaming, and aborts timed-out or released sessions. At most two sessions retain 12 segments/24 MiB each, plus bounded download buffers. Stores are memory-only and idle sessions expire after 15 seconds. RTMP/ffmpeg execution is not enabled. Locally configured source URLs remain an operator trust boundary.
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- **Radio is not an audio relay.** `/api/radio/stations` contacts only allowlisted Radio Browser HTTPS hosts and paths, rejects redirects, rejects any hostname with a loopback/private/link-local/metadata/non-public A or AAAA result, and pins each TLS connection to a validated address. It returns normalized public HTTPS stream URLs; `/api/radio/click/:uuid` applies the same destination policy and accepts only station IDs from the current bounded catalog. The browser then connects directly to the broadcaster after an explicit playback action, so the broadcaster sees the listener's IP address. GEV never proxies, caches, records, or redistributes audio.
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- **Québec 511 video plays in the browser, opt-in and after Play.** With `CCTV_QUEBEC_VIDEO_ENABLED=1`, `/api/cctv/sources` lists, for each MTQ camera, one URL built server-side from its numeric id on `https://www.quebec511.info/Carte/Fenetres/camera.ashx`; the overlay accepts no other host, path or format. The browser loads that clip only after the viewer presses Play for the selected camera, so Québec 511 sees the viewer's IP address, and the panel says so before Play. Selecting a camera by click, auto-hop, a scene or voice never loads it, and switching cameras stops playback. GEV never proxies, caches or reads the video's pixels. With the flag unset (the default) the browser makes no request to Québec 511.
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- **No verbatim client headers upstream.** The CCTV media route is the one route that relays a request header (`Range`, for video seeking). It is parsed and canonicalized before it is forwarded: one `bytes=` range only, with every accepted form — explicit span, open-ended and suffix — bounded to the same 64 MiB ceiling the relay applies to a declared response body. Multi-range, malformed, inverted and non-`bytes` values are dropped and the request proceeds without a `Range`, as RFC 7233 §3.1 prescribes. Bounding the request bounds what is asked for: a response that declares no length — live streamed media, or a chunked body from an upstream that ignores the `Range` — has no ceiling. An upstream request the browser has stopped waiting for is cancelled rather than left running, whether the viewer leaves before the headers arrive or during the body.
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- **The Data Library proxy fetches manifest upstreams only.** `/api/library/data/<id>`, `/api/library/tile/<id>/<z>/<x>/<y>` and `/api/library/index/<id>` (a partitioned GeoParquet entry's file index, built from an S3 ListObjectsV2 listing and one ranged footer read per file, cached in memory for the entry's `cacheSeconds`) resolve the id against the validated manifests in `src/library/entries/`; the browser never supplies a URL, and every derived request must stay on the manifest's https host. Redirects are refused, dataset bodies are capped while streaming at the manifest's `maxBytes` (at most 32 MiB) and tiles at 2 MiB of `image/png`, `image/jpeg` or `image/webp`, responses are cached in memory only (at most 512 tiles), requests are rate-limited per client, and upstream error text is never returned. A keyed entry must be proxied; its key is read from this server's environment through the key registry and its routes refuse cross-site and forwarded requests like the other cost-bearing routes. Browser-direct entries are fetched by the browser with no cookies or referrer.
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- **Transit fetches registered feeds only.** `/api/transit/vehicles/<id>` resolves the id against `src/data/transitFeeds.js`; the browser never supplies a URL, and a feed that is registered but disabled does not resolve at all. Redirects are followed manually and each hop is validated against the feed's own https origin before it is requested, so an off-origin or downgraded hop is refused rather than contacted. Bodies are capped at 8 MB, the protobuf is decoded server-side under entity-count and string-length ceilings, a differential feed is refused, and snapshots live 15 s in memory with no disk cache. A per-feed admission limiter and a failure cooldown ladder bound what this process can ask of any operator.
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- **Rail fetches registered feeds only, and none needs a credential.** `/api/rail/feeds` lists the offered feeds; `/api/rail/trains/<id>`, `/api/rail/updates/<id>`, `/api/rail/paths/<id>` and `/api/rail/schedule/<id>` resolve the id against `src/data/railFeeds.js` (`RAIL_FEED_ID_PATTERN`: lowercase letters, digits and hyphens). The browser never supplies a URL, and an id that is not registered, or a trip-updates route for a feed that registers none, does not resolve at all; any method but GET answers 405 (`Allow: GET`, never cached). Every registered feed and every static timetable is open: no rail request carries a credential of the deployer's; one feed's published URL includes a fixed public value its publisher prints for everyone (Bordeaux's `apiKey`), and the only rail setting the server reads is `RAIL_PATHS_DIR`. Upstream requests follow the Transit proxy's policy: https only, each redirect hop validated against the feed's own https origin before it is requested (three hops at most), a request timeout, bodies capped at 8 MiB unless the registry sets a feed's own cap (never above 64 MiB), and a per-feed admission limiter and the failure cooldown ladder bound what the process asks of any operator. Responses are decoded server-side: GTFS-Realtime under entity-count and string-length ceilings, a differential feed is refused, and an empty or header-less GTFS-Realtime reply (an error page served as 200, say) is refused as unreadable, so the last good snapshot is served stale or the request fails with 502. The Irish Rail and SIRI VM XML is read by small scanners, not an XML library: a document that declares a DTD or an entity is refused, and the whole text, the number of trains and every field are capped. Only vehicles the feed's classifier recognises as trains leave the server, and no train position inside Ukraine is ever sent (`src/data/railNoPositions.js`). Snapshots and trip updates live in memory for the feed's own freshness window, with serve-stale after a failure; there is no disk cache and no history. Path and schedule packs are optional build output, read from disk (`.cache/rail-paths/` or `RAIL_PATHS_DIR`) by a reader that re-checks the id against the same pattern, so a name never leaves that directory. A pack over 24 MiB is refused before it is read and answers 503, never a partial file, and so does a pack that cannot be read: only a missing pack is 404; the rest pass through as bytes, through a 64 MiB in-memory read cache keyed by each file's modification time and size, and are served as JSON holding timetables and track shapes only, `no-cache` with an ETag from that time and size (304 when unchanged). A schedule pack of another format version or another feed, or whose window has ended, is not used, and a feed that cannot be read without it answers 503 rather than an empty list. The pack build (`scripts/build-rail-paths.mjs`) runs only when a person runs it, never on app start: it downloads over https only (a redirect to plain http is refused), caps each download in size and time, sends no credential, and refuses an `--out` folder (or a `RAIL_PATHS_DIR` it writes to) inside `src/` or `public/`.
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- **Local receiver feeds are operator-configured and local-only.** `/api/local-receivers/aircraft` reads only the `aircraft.json` URLs in the server's `LOCAL_RECEIVER_FEEDS`; the browser never supplies an address. Each host must pass the shared tap address rule (`src/data/tapAddress.js`: loopback, RFC1918, `localhost`, `*.local`; no link-local, IPv6 or other names), the scheme must be http(s), the path must end in `aircraft.json`, and credentials, queries and fragments are refused. Invalid entries are logged at startup and never fetched. Reads use a 2 s timeout, refuse redirects, cap bodies at 2 MB and share one read per second; responses name each feed by band only and never carry upstream error text.
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- **Voice place search runs only on the operator's Overpass.** `/api/osm/features` answers only when `OVERPASS_UPSTREAMS` is set and never falls back to a public instance. The client sends a curated preset id, a box, a mode and a limit; the server writes and quotes the Overpass query itself, so no client or model text reaches it. Boxes are capped (36 deg² for a count, 4 deg² for a listing), as are the feature limit, the Overpass timeout and memory, and the response bytes read. Each client (IPv6 clients keyed by /64, as on `/api/overpass`) runs one search at a time and two run at once in all, under a per-client rate limit (12/min) and a global one (30/min); a search gets 22 s across every configured endpoint in turn (Overpass itself is told 20 s), which ends before the voice answer stops waiting at 25 s. The route sits behind the cross-site gate below. Answers are cached in memory and on disk (`.gev-cache/osm-features/`, at most 400 entries and 256 MB, kept a day), keyed to the configured instance so a repointed `OVERPASS_UPSTREAMS` never serves the old one's answers; a malformed answer is never cached.
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- **Validated response formats.** Proxied bodies are relayed only in the format the route serves. CCTV frames and the Street View fallback accept JPEG, PNG, GIF, WebP and AVIF only, sent under their canonical type; any other type falls through to the next fallback. Live CCTV media must match its feed kind (`video/mp4`, `video/webm`, or `multipart/x-mixed-replace` with a boundary) before it is relayed or the camera counts as healthy, and its redirects stay on the registered origin. GBFS bodies must parse as JSON and are re-serialized as `application/json; charset=utf-8`. Camera catalog URLs are pinned by parsed URL — scheme, exact host, no credentials, default port, and a normalized path inside the agency's image directory — and a redirect on a pinned host must stay inside the same directory. Every `/api/cctv` route uses the keyless cross-site checks described below, so cameras stay reachable behind a reverse proxy; a request carrying forwarding headers never reaches the key-bearing Street View fallback and gets the placeholder frame instead, as when no key is configured.
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- **Validated response formats.** Proxied bodies are relayed only in the format the route serves. CCTV frames and the Street View fallback accept JPEG, PNG, GIF, WebP and AVIF only, sent under their canonical type; any other type falls through to the next fallback. The one exception is a source registered as an MJPEG still (the Taiwan Highway Bureau feeds): its `multipart/x-mixed-replace` answer is read only up to its first JPEG part, capped at 2 MB, and sent as `image/jpeg`; a multipart answer from any other camera falls through. A camera whose API needs an operator credential (the City of Ottawa certificate, `OTTAWA_CAMERA_CERTIFICATE`) has a keyless catalog URL; the frame proxy adds the credential only at fetch time, only for a URL inside that camera's pinned path, so `/api/cctv/sources` and `/api/cctv/stream` never carry it. Live CCTV media must match its feed kind (`video/mp4`, `video/webm`, or `multipart/x-mixed-replace` with a boundary) before it is relayed or the camera counts as healthy, and its redirects stay on the registered origin. GBFS bodies must parse as JSON and are re-serialized as `application/json; charset=utf-8`. Camera catalog URLs are pinned by parsed URL — scheme, exact host, no credentials, default port, and a normalized path inside the agency's image directory — and a redirect on a pinned host must stay inside the same directory. Every `/api/cctv` route uses the keyless cross-site checks described below, so cameras stay reachable behind a reverse proxy; a request carrying forwarding headers never reaches the key-bearing Street View fallback and gets the placeholder frame instead, as when no key is configured.
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- **Consistent API response headers.** Every `/api` response, including errors, partial content, Host refusals and unknown routes, carries `Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox` and `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` (`apiResponseHeadersPlugin` in `build/vite.js`, installed ahead of the Host check). A route that sets its own policy adds it as a further policy; it never replaces this one.
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- **Response-size caps and timeouts** on proxied responses.
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- **Sanitized errors** — internal error details are not echoed back to clients.
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- **Coalesced OAuth refresh** and cached successful responses only (OpenSky).
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- **Redacted debug logging.** The voice debug log (`.gev-logs/`, gitignored) strips API keys, bearer tokens, client secrets, and image data URLs before writing.
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- **Cross-site gate on cost/log endpoints.** The cost-bearing (`/api/realtime/token`, `/api/openai/hud-summary`, `/api/google/nearby-places`, `/api/google/text-search`), quota-bearing (`/api/mapillary/*`, with a per-IP limit on tiles, and `/api/tomtom/*`, backed by its persistent daily tile budget) and log (`/api/realtime/debug-log`) endpoints refuse cross-site browser requests: a foreign or opaque `Origin`, a `Sec-Fetch-Site` other than `same-origin`/`none` (this is what blocks an `<img>`/navigation that carries no `Origin`), or any reverse-proxy/CDN forwarding header returns `403`. Non-browser loopback tools (the repo QA harnesses POST the token endpoint with no `Origin`) and the explicit `HOST=0.0.0.0` LAN opt-in keep working — the gate deliberately does not require a loopback remote address; that stricter requirement belongs only to the credential panel (`admitKeySetupRequest`). The Host check (`allowedHosts`, applied by `hostCheckPlugin` ahead of every route, since Vite's own check runs only after plugin middleware) rejects a rebinding `Host` before any handler runs, in every mode, and the gate is defense in depth behind it: the LAN opt-in keeps that check and accepts only IP addresses, `localhost` and names listed in `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS`. **Limit:** a name you list there is trusted like the app's own address, so list only names you control. The keyless map routes (`/api/terrain/heights`, `/api/drone-airspace`, `/api/inaturalist/observations`, `/api/acartia/sightings`, `/api/overpass` and voice place search's `/api/osm/features`, which spends the same operator Overpass) use the same cross-site checks, minus the forwarding-header refusal: they guard only per-client quotas and caches, not a key or a bill, and the map and voice need them to work behind a reverse proxy. `/api/overpass` also admits at most 300 POSTs a minute per peer (IPv6 peers keyed by /64) and 900 a minute across all remote peers before it reads a body. A direct loopback request — a loopback socket with none of the forwarding headers `hasProxySignals` checks (`Forwarded`, `Via`, `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Forwarded-Host`, `X-Forwarded-Port`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`, `X-Real-IP`, `CF-Connecting-IP`, `CF-Ray`) — draws on its own per-peer admission window, so remote peers cannot exhaust the owner's admission. A reverse proxy on the same machine must add at least one of those headers (Caddy and Cloudflare do by default; nginx needs `proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;`, plus `proxy_set_header Host $http_host;` and `proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;` so the `Origin` check matches), or its traffic is indistinguishable from the owner's and shares the owner's window. With one, its requests are then counted as remote, in one bucket per proxy socket — the forwarded client address is never trusted as identity — so all users behind one proxy share 300/min. The isolation needs a loopback socket: under the default Docker bridge network every host-side client, the owner included, arrives from the container gateway and is one remote peer. **Limit:** this isolates admission only. The upstream budget (90 requests/min per client key, 300/min across all clients) is shared, so once remote traffic has used the global upstream budget, an owner request that misses the cache can still get `429`, or `503` when remote misses hold every upstream concurrency slot; cache hits are unaffected. The CCTV routes (`/api/cctv/*`) use the same keyless checks; their one key-bearing step, the Street View fallback, is skipped for any request with forwarding headers.
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- **Cross-site gate on cost/log endpoints.** The cost-bearing (`/api/realtime/token`, `/api/openai/hud-summary`, `/api/google/nearby-places`, `/api/google/text-search`), quota-bearing (`/api/mapillary/*`, with a per-IP limit on tiles, `/api/tomtom/*`, backed by its persistent daily tile budget, and `/api/news/*`, which spends the World News API daily reads, Liveuamap reads and GDELT downloads) and log (`/api/realtime/debug-log`) endpoints refuse cross-site browser requests: a foreign or opaque `Origin`, a `Sec-Fetch-Site` other than `same-origin`/`none` (this is what blocks an `<img>`/navigation that carries no `Origin`), or any reverse-proxy/CDN forwarding header returns `403`. Non-browser loopback tools (the repo QA harnesses POST the token endpoint with no `Origin`) and the explicit `HOST=0.0.0.0` LAN opt-in keep working — the gate deliberately does not require a loopback remote address; that stricter requirement belongs only to the credential panel (`admitKeySetupRequest`). The Host check (`allowedHosts`, applied by `hostCheckPlugin` ahead of every route, since Vite's own check runs only after plugin middleware) rejects a rebinding `Host` before any handler runs, in every mode, and the gate is defense in depth behind it: the LAN opt-in keeps that check and accepts only IP addresses, `localhost` and names listed in `GEV_ALLOWED_HOSTS`. **Limit:** a name you list there is trusted like the app's own address, so list only names you control. The keyless map routes (`/api/terrain/heights`, `/api/drone-airspace`, `/api/inaturalist/observations`, `/api/acartia/sightings`, `/api/overpass` and voice place search's `/api/osm/features`, which spends the same operator Overpass) use the same cross-site checks, minus the forwarding-header refusal: they guard only per-client quotas and caches, not a key or a bill, and the map and voice need them to work behind a reverse proxy. `/api/overpass` also admits at most 300 POSTs a minute per peer (IPv6 peers keyed by /64) and 900 a minute across all remote peers before it reads a body. A direct loopback request — a loopback socket with none of the forwarding headers `hasProxySignals` checks (`Forwarded`, `Via`, `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Forwarded-Host`, `X-Forwarded-Port`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`, `X-Real-IP`, `CF-Connecting-IP`, `CF-Ray`) — draws on its own per-peer admission window, so remote peers cannot exhaust the owner's admission. A reverse proxy on the same machine must add at least one of those headers (Caddy and Cloudflare do by default; nginx needs `proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;`, plus `proxy_set_header Host $http_host;` and `proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;` so the `Origin` check matches), or its traffic is indistinguishable from the owner's and shares the owner's window. With one, its requests are then counted as remote, in one bucket per proxy socket — the forwarded client address is never trusted as identity — so all users behind one proxy share 300/min. The isolation needs a loopback socket: under the default Docker bridge network every host-side client, the owner included, arrives from the container gateway and is one remote peer. **Limit:** this isolates admission only. The upstream budget (90 requests/min per client key, 300/min across all clients) is shared, so once remote traffic has used the global upstream budget, an owner request that misses the cache can still get `429`, or `503` when remote misses hold every upstream concurrency slot; cache hits are unaffected. The CCTV routes (`/api/cctv/*`) use the same keyless checks; their one key-bearing step, the Street View fallback, is skipped for any request with forwarding headers.
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- **Full Content-Security-Policy.** The dev and preview servers send a real CSP (`script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' blob:` plus the YouTube, Facebook and X scripts the Nepal event's embedded media loads and the Maps JavaScript API that Street View runs on, with a matching `frame-src` for their players and posts: no inline script and no other script origin; `blob:` covers the object URLs Cesium's bundled workers bootstrap through in the built app), alongside the existing `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and `frame-ancestors 'none'`. `'unsafe-eval'` stays because Knockout, bundled inside Cesium's widgets package, resolves the global object with `eval` at load time and the globe does not initialize without it; styles permit `'unsafe-inline'` and Google Fonts because Vite's dev client injects `<style>` elements.
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Allowing `maps.googleapis.com` in `script-src` also trusts its JSONP endpoints, which can bypass the script allowlist if an HTML-injection bug exists; this is an accepted limitation of loading the Maps JavaScript API, alongside the existing `'unsafe-eval'` allowance.
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@@ -131,6 +134,7 @@ God's Eye View's tools are also served to MCP clients: over stdio (`npm run mcp`
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- **What the panel's requests can reach.** In clients that display MCP Apps, the panel loads the app through the `panel_request` tool, which requests paths on the app's server. It is marked for the panel only and requires a key that each MCP server puts in its panel page, which keeps it from clients that list tools to the model without loading the panel. That key is not access control: any MCP client can read the panel page, key included, and then reach the app's files and data routes through `panel_request`, much as its other tools reach the data. Provider Settings, credential and model endpoints, `/mcp` and the development server's internal routes are refused to every caller.
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- **The panel carries the two browser keys.** The panel build (`npm run build:panel`) includes the same Google Maps key and Cesium ion token as the app, and they run inside the client's panel page, on the client's site. A key restricted by HTTP referrer must also allow that page, or the panel cannot load tiles. To keep the app's own keys narrower, build the panel with separately restricted keys in the environment of `npm run build:panel`.
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- **Embed mode is not framable by default.** `?embed=1` documents keep `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and `frame-ancestors 'none'` unless `GEV_EMBED_FRAME_ANCESTORS` names the pages that may frame them; a framing page can change what the app shows. Other documents can never be framed.
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- **A plain link never loads a billed Street View panorama without a click.** A share link with `sl=google,<lat>,<lon>` flies there, switches to Google 3D and lights Street View, then stops: the panel is armed and the photo loads only when the visitor presses OPEN GOOGLE STREET VIEW (one lookup and one panorama load on the browser Maps key, no retries, no geocoding or server call). A view posted into the embedded app (the God's Eye View panel, or a page `GEV_EMBED_FRAME_ANCESTORS` allows), and the panel page's own opening link for a tool result issued in the last five minutes, are that client's own request and open the photo; freshness is judged only by the result's `issued_at`, so a result older than five minutes only arms, whether the panel was mounted again (reopening a conversation) or got it later on the same mount, while one re-sent or remounted within five minutes of issue opens the photo again; adding `?embed=1` to a published link does not lift the gate (in a frame the link only arms; the panel that holds OPEN is hidden there, so a posted view is the way to open a photo). The OPEN press uses the link's point only while the ground under the screen centre is within 1 km of it, or when the screen centre cannot be picked at all (no ground picking, or a globe with no size yet); with the sky in the middle it opens nothing. The armed lookup dies when its source is switched off, when its map leaves, or when any other photo opens or closes. A link pasted into an open tab follows the same rule, and a link's source switch and layer are never saved as the recipient's own preferences. A link that follows an entity ignores `sl`. Mapillary, KartaView and Panoramax links open their photo at once; none of them bills per image.
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## Scope & expectations
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